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Abstract 
The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe prompted Western Europe to integrate the region 
with European Union (EU) expansion. The collapse of the Eastern bloc was concerning to the West, which 
viewed the nationalist tensions in the region as having the potential to trigger destabilization and conflict. 
This thesis evaluates the treatment of Hungarian national minorities in three states that eventually joined 
the EU: Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia. Marxist-Leninist legacies, in combination with democratization 
and EU membership, determined key differences in state compliance with EU national minority 
recommendations in the wake of membership. I identify how both communist-era legacies and European 
Union accession have shaped the treatment of national minorities – specifically Hungarian minorities – in 
each of the three cases. There are, however, additional variables that may shape majority and minority 
sentiment, and compliance with European Union conditionality. These are primarily domestic: the 
keenness of the state to achieve EU integration; the position of the state emerging from communism; the 
duration of EU accession; the relative size of the national minority group; and pre-communist historical 
events. The combination of domestic and international variables suggest that European Union 
conditionality is not sufficient to understand national minority group treatment; rather, it is a combination 
of international pressure and domestic state politics that influences how national minority rights are 
granted, maintained, or regress. 
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The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe prompted Western Europe to 
integrate the region with European Union (EU) expansion. The collapse of the Eastern bloc was 
concerning to the West, which viewed the nationalist tensions in the region as having the potential 
to trigger destabilization and conflict. This thesis evaluates the treatment of Hungarian national 
minorities in three states that eventually joined the EU: Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia. Marxist-
Leninist legacies, in combination with democratization and EU membership, determined key 
differences in state compliance with EU national minority recommendations in the wake of 
membership. I identify how both communist-era legacies and European Union accession have 
shaped the treatment of national minorities – specifically Hungarian minorities – in each of the 
three cases. There are, however, additional variables that may shape majority and minority 
sentiment, and compliance with European Union conditionality. These are primarily domestic: the 
keenness of the state to achieve EU integration; the position of the state emerging from 
communism; the duration of EU accession; the relative size of the national minority group; and 
pre-communist historical events. The combination of domestic and international variables suggest 
that European Union conditionality is not sufficient to understand national minority group 
treatment; rather, it is a combination of international pressure and domestic state politics that 
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Glossary and Terminology 
 
Communist States 
 The terms “communist” and “post-communist” states are used to reference the past 
Marxist-Leninist regimes of Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania. These states have been referred to 
as “socialist” or “post-socialist” states in other literature, but this choice respects these regimes’ 
goals of reaching the final stage of communism. While it remains true that the communist states 
of Central and Eastern Europe never accomplished the “final stage” of communism, the leaders of 
these states believed they were advancing towards it. Their ideology reflected this. Socialist 
thought is not defined by Marxism-Leninism.  
 
Copenhagen Criteria  
 The Copenhagen criteria are the key criteria necessary to begin EU accession negotiations. 
They consist of:   
“Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competition and market forces in the EU; the ability to take on and implement effectively 
the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union” (European Union, Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 
2020).  
Upon application to join the EU, the European Commission considers the progress of the state in 
meeting the membership criteria before deciding to begin accession negotiations. The European 
Union has helped Central and Eastern European states prepare to meet the Copenhagen criteria 
through monetary investment for state development, notably through the PHARE (Poland and 
Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) Program. Failure to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria results in a delay to accession negotiations. During evaluation, the European Commission 
makes recommendations to states to assist them in making changes to their domestic policies that 
would be in line with the criteria. (See section on The European Union). 
 
Eastern Bloc  
 The “Eastern bloc” refers to the group of communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, 
including states aligned with the Soviet Union under the Warsaw Pact. The Eastern bloc stood in 
contrast with the West’s democratic ideals, human rights, and capitalist economies. 
 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML)  
 The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was created in 1992, and 
entered into force in 1993. It was adopted to protect the right of national minorities to use their 
language in public or private spheres. The ECRML specified several measures to protect national 
minority language use in public: education, justice, administration and public services, media, 
cultural activities, and economic and social activities (1993). The significance placed on language 
rights by national minorities necessitated the creation of an agreement that would best address the 
rights of national minorities to use their mother-tongue. (See section on The Council of Europe). 
 
European Commission 
 The European Commission is the branch of the European Union that oversees European 
enlargement and the negotiations process for candidate states. The European Commission works 
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with the Council of Europe and the OSCE in making reports on candidate states, including 
recommendations on national minority policies. (See section on The European Union). 
 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
 The European Convention of Human Rights was first established in 1950 with the creation 
of the Council of Europe. The ECHR was previously known as the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, but has since been known as the European 
Convention of Human Rights. The ECHR advocates for the promotion of fundamental freedoms, 
including justice and peace, and delineates various human rights to which party states agree to 
adhere by. Ratification of the ECHR is necessary to joining the Council of Europe. (See section 
on The Council of Europe). 
 
Europeanization  
 Europeanization refers to the ongoing expansion of Western European ideology, culture, 
and influence into Central and Eastern Europe. The trend of Western influence has been linked to 
European Union integration with the promotion and adoption of human rights, democracy, and a 
market economy into Central and Eastern European states.  
 
European Union Accession  
 Accession to the European Union operates under Article 49 of the Treaty of the European 
Union. States are required to meet the Copenhagen criteria before proceeding to negotiations with 
the European Commission. Once negotiations have begun, the candidate state begins adopting and 
implementing all current European Union rules, or acquis. The rules are divided into 35 chapters, 
including financial services, energy, social policy and employment, etc. The chapters are 
progressively opened and closed upon complete implementation of the policies (European Union, 
Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2020). States are eligible for membership 
after completing and closing all 35 chapters of negotiations. (See section on The European Union).   
 
European Union Conditionality  
 European Union conditionality refers to the incentives proffered to states – predominantly 
in Central and Eastern Europe – by the EU. Candidate states have to abide by EU recommendations 
throughout accession negotiations. EU conditionality is believed to be a strong enough force to 
ensure compliance among candidate states; the benefits to joining the EU are perceived to 
outweigh the costs of domestic policy changes (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2004; Kelley, 2004).  
 
Framework Convention on National Minorities (FCNM) 
 The Framework Convention on National Minorities was adopted by the Council of Europe 
in 1994 in the aftermath of the ECHR, the ECRML, and Recommendation 1201. The FCNM 
became the Council of Europe’s most detailed text in describing national minority rights; the 
FCNM considered national minority rights as a part of broader universal human rights. It is a 
legally binding multilateral agreement that encompasses the ideas set forth in the ECHR and the 
ECRML (FCNM, 1994). Adherence to the FCNM is monitored by the Advisory Committee by the 
Council of Europe, which conducts country visits to monitor the status of national minorities in 
the state; opinions on state affairs are then published with recommendations. (See section on The 
Council of Europe). 
 
		 8 
High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)  
 The High Commissioner on National Minorities position was created in 1992 with the 
OSCE’s interest in monitoring national minority relations after the fall of communism in 1990. 
The HCNM was designed to be a third party post that would monitor the situation of national 
minorities, not to advocate on their behalf: the position was the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, not the High Commissioner for National Minorities (Kemp, 1999: 14). The 
establishment of a neutral position was to ensure that national minority conflict would be resolved 
without bias, and with the best interests for maintaining peace and security within states. The 
HCNM regularly visits states and speaks to government officials and minority leaders to conduct 
a report on the status of national minority relations within the state. It proposes recommendations 
states can adopt in order to improve their minority protections and ensure state stability. (See 
section on The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). 
 
Kin-State 
 A kin-state has a diaspora of outside of its territorial borders. Kin-states view their diaspora 
as part of their broader community of potential or actual citizens; as such, the kin-state is invested 
in the interests of its national minorities abroad and may attempt to protect or advocate on their 
behalf. In the case of Hungary, the state has made repeated attempts to cultivate ties with its 
national minorities abroad to maintain shared cultural and national sentiment. 
 
Maastricht Treaty or Treaty of the European Union  
 The Maastricht Treaty or the Treaty of the European Union established the present-day 
European Union in 1992. While Western European states shared a history of economic linkage in 
the wake of World War II, the Maastricht Treaty officially created the European Union. Article 1 
of the Maastricht Treaty marked “a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen” (Art. 1, 




 This thesis will refer to ethnic minority groups as “national minorities.” While some 
scholarship in the field has used “ethnic minority” to refer to minority groups, both terms have 
been used interchangeably. The term “national minority” refers to minority groups within states 
that can stem from a shared belonging to a cultural past, or a pre-conceived “nation” with distinct 
cultural patterns and autonomy. The choice to use the term “national minority” draws from 
Marxist-Leninist thought that referred to ethnic minority groups as ones that sought self-
determination (Connor, 1984). Use of the term is further reflected in Western European agreements 
and governmental bodies, including the European Union (EU), the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities (HCNM) from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), and the Council of Europe. To maintain consistency with both Marxist-Leninist thought 
and the existing discussion of minority rights in Western European bodies, the term “national 
minority” will be used throughout this thesis.  
 
Recommendation 1201  
 Recommendation 1201 of the Additional Protocol on the Rights of Minorities to the 
European Convention on Human Rights was issued in 1993. The Council of Europe adopted the 
		 9 
non-binding Recommendation to provide greater guidance to states with national minorities. The 
Recommendation notably emphasizes the right of choice for national group membership, the 
freedom from discrimination for minority groups, and specified collective rights national 
minorities have to education, language use, and kin-state relations (1993). Recommendation 1201 
sought to increase clarity with collective national minority rights in addition to the ECHR and the 
ECRML. (See section on The Council of Europe). 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) 
 The Council of Europe was created in 1949 in the interest of establishing a Europe that 
protected human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The Council of Europe, in contrast to the 
OSCE and the EU, has been considered to adopt a normative approach on human and national 
minority rights; this differs from the peace and security approach adopted towards minorities by 
the EU and the OSCE (Kemp, 1999). The Council of Europe promotes human rights through its 
international conventions, including the European Convention of Human Rights, the Framework 
Convention on National Minorities, and the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages. The Council of Europe currently has 47 member states, and includes all European 
Union member states (Council of Europe, Who We Are, 2020).  
 
The European Union (EU) 
 The European Union was established in 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty. The concept of 
the European Union began in the aftermath of World War II among states who wanted to share 
economic interests. It has since grown in size to encompass 27 European states (European Union, 
Goals of the EU, 2020). The EU places an emphasis on the promotion of democracy and human 
rights, its single market, and peace and security within and without its neighborhood. Member 
states of the European Union are also members of the Council of Europe and the Organization for 
the Security and Co-operation in Europe.  
  
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was created in 1975 
with the intention of promoting peace and security in Europe. Its presence increased after 1990 
and the collapse of communism, regarding the risk of destabilization in Central and Eastern Europe 
as a potential threat to the stability of Europe as a whole. The OSCE viewed national minority 
relations and national tensions in Central and Eastern Europe as a potential path to conflict; as 
such, the OSCE approached national minority protections as necessary to ensuring the interests 
and peace of Europe (Kemp, 1999: 7). The need for national minority regulation led to the 
appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) who regularly monitors 
national minority relations in states to avoid potential conflict. European Union members are also 
members of the OSCE.  
 
Warsaw Pact  
 The Warsaw Pact refers to states in the Eastern bloc that were aligned militarily with the 
Soviet Union. The Pact included the Soviet Union (USSR), Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and 
Romania. Under the Warsaw Pact, USSR Communist Leader Leonid Brezhnev promoted the 
“Brezhnev Doctrine” which permitted the Soviet Union to intervene in the affairs of any of the 
states in the Warsaw Pact who were seen as violating communist ideas.  
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 What has been the impact of European Union accession on national minorities in post-
communist Central and Eastern European states? Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia share with the 
state of Hungary historical legacies from the Kingdom of Hungary (1867-1918).  Likewise, they 
each experienced communist regimes predominantly directed by Marxist-Leninist thought. These 
states democratized at roughly the same time, joining the EU in 2004 and 2007. Despite their 
similar histories, the three states have adopted different policies regarding their Hungarian 
minority population after EU membership. What has caused these different outcomes? The 
different outcomes of national minority policies and sentiment among states in the wake of 
European Union (EU) membership necessitates consideration of how communist regimes, their 
subsequent collapse, and their democratization and Europeanization have shaped this variation. 
This thesis will consider how the progression of national minority group treatment has evolved 
over time through an evaluation of the Hungarian national minority in three states: Slovakia, 
Romania, and Slovenia. The prominent populations of Hungarian national minorities in these cases 
make them ideal to evaluate in order to determine whether and how communist legacies or EU 
accession have shaped their current treatment of national minorities. While this thesis focuses on 
the questions raised by consideration of these three cases, it has broader implications for European 
Union conditionality and the evolution of national minority policies with increasing 
Europeanization into Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
1.1 Contribution and Hypothesis 
 In recent years, there has been considerable scholarship on national minority relations in 
Central and Eastern European states following the collapse of communism. Violence among 
national groups in the twentieth century in regions under Soviet hegemony, and tumultuous 
transitions from communism have prompted scholars to look at the trajectory of intergroup 
relations in this region. The robust literature on national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe 
has presented a diverse range of opinions on how national identity is constructed and politicized 
over time. In addition to contention on national minority formation, scholars have further 
considered how national minority group treatment is shaped by European Union accession. EU 
conditionality, and its ability to influence domestic policies in Central and Eastern states, have 
been closely criticized in its effectiveness. The vast pool of existing research demonstrates the 
significance of this topic, and the need to further research the intersection of national minorities 
and European Union accession.  
 This thesis hopes to advance research by looking at the historical legacies that may have 
impacted Hungarian minority group treatment in three states: Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia. It 
will consider those legacies alongside the impact of EU accession and democratization. While 
research exists on Hungarian national minorities and the evolution of their treatment throughout 
EU accession, this thesis hopes to provide an in-depth look at their treatment through the 
comparison of several cases. This research will look solely at Hungarian national minority group 
treatment over time in three states; existing research typically analyzes individual cases of different 
national minority groups to consider the impact of EU conditionality.  
 This thesis will consider the following hypotheses in response to the research question:  
H1. The treatment of Hungarian national minorities in post-communist states is a legacy 
from the communist period.   
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H2. European Union accession has changed the pattern of treatment of Hungarian national 
minorities.  
H3. Both the legacies of communist policies and European Union accession have impacted 
the current treatment of Hungarian national minorities.  
 
1.2 National Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe: A Review  
 Before discussing the scope of the research, an overview of existing literature and 
additional information is provided that supplements our understanding of national minority 
relations in Central and Eastern Europe. There are three dominant themes relevant to the work of 
this thesis: first, the role of national minorities under communist ideology – specifically Marxist-
Leninist thought; secondly, Western European approaches to national minorities; and lastly, 
European Union conditionality and state compliance. Understanding of these three themes will 
inform the research later conducted here.  
 
1.2.1 National Minorities and Marxist-Leninist Thought  
The adoption of communism in Central and Eastern European (CEE) states resulted in the 
deliberate reconstruction of national identities as a component of communist revolutionary 
movements. Scholars agree that many CEE communist states were ethnofederal in form, where 
the central government had the goal of respecting and protecting multiple national – ethnic – 
identities under a single state policy (Connor 1984; Bunce 1999; Stepan et al. 2011). Marxism-
Leninism, employed within the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Soviet-aligned states, referred to ethnic 
groups living on their respective homelands as “nations.” They viewed self-determination and 
nationalist movements as potential vehicles of a broader communist revolution that would spread 
worldwide (Connor 1984: 32). The USSR championed this model of communism, and the 
aftermath of its successful revolution in 1917 positioned it as a model for subsequent communist 
states (Schöpflin, 1993). The Soviet Union originally advocated individual national group 
determination and independence, and promoted revolutions abroad in developed capitalist states. 
The USSR believed that supporting nationalist revolutions would lead to the creation of states that 
would later adopt communism in line with the USSR. However, after these groups came under 
Soviet control, nationalism among unsatisfied minorities was discouraged, and often condemned 
as counter-revolutionary. Lenin’s strategy prevailed: support nationalist movements where it 
suited the communist movement, grant them national autonomy within a workers’ state, but not 
independence (Connor 1984). Marxist-Leninist doctrine regarded nationalities as transitionary 
components of human progress that were a result from capitalism. Leninist vanguard parties 
expected nationalist consciousness to fade as communism was constructed. 
After the establishment of Marxist regimes, some states – notably the USSR and 
Yugoslavia – engaged in direct national group management through policies that governed 
language use, education, domestic migration, and political elites (Connor, 1984). Despite the 
Soviet model, not all communist states in CEE willingly adopted Marxist-Leninist policies. Rather, 
some regimes were established organically through revolution and civil war, while others were 
imposed by the USSR. Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia all adopted slightly different 
interpretations of Marxist-Leninist thought, and disagreed with the USSR on multiple occasions 
with respect to national minority group treatment. Notably, Yugoslavia afforded significantly more 
autonomy to its national minorities than the USSR, which gradually began implementing 
integration programs over time (Connor, 1984). In addition, some CEE states had traditions of 
Austro-Marxist thought, which left legacies on their communist management of national 
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minorities. National group management under Austro-Marxist thought differed from Marxism-
Leninism, emphasizing the enduring role of national cultures. Under Austro-Marxism, national 
identities were seen as lasting social formations that could not be easily dissolved. Austro-Marxists 
were therefore more tolerant in their state policies and accommodations of linguistic and national 
differences, but viewed these provisions as sufficient expressions of national self-determination: 
full, sovereign independence was not needed if “national autonomy” was protected (Sandner, 
2005). While the three cases of Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia each adopted their own models 
of communism that differed slightly from the USSR, their national minority treatments were each 
partially informed by Marxist-Leninist thought.  
 
1.2.2 Communist Federations and the Breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia  
The significance of national minority relations continued with the dissolution of communist 
regimes in the 1990s. While Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia were all impacted by nationalist 
tensions near the end of their communist regimes, the particularly tense relations of national 
minorities in post-federal states warrants further consideration. Slovakia and Slovenia were each 
part of federations that eventually broke apart due to national tensions and had significant 
Hungarian national minorities. Romania, since it retained its independence throughout 
communism, is not relevant to this discussion. However, scholarship on the breakups of 
communist federations is significant in informing how national minority rights were viewed by 
states in the aftermath of communism. 
The collapse of communist federations has been considerably discussed by scholars 
seeking to understand their breakups. Collectively, scholars have agreed that national minority 
groups and their management had a large role in creating tensions within communist states that 
later contributed to their breakups (Anderson, 2014; Bunce, 1999; Hale, 2005; McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2009). The Soviets, the Yugoslavs, and the Czechoslovaks claimed to be multinational 
federations that granted some degree of self-autonomy to regions or groups within a federal system 
that divided power among government units (Anderson, 2014). Under this system, some 
communist states granted regional autonomy to national groups through cultural rights, such as 
language or education (Connor, 1984). This was particularly noticeable in Yugoslavia. However, 
national minority groups and their parties were often excluded from political power, making these 
states pseudo-federal as political power was highly centralized within the vanguard Leninist party 
(Anderson, 2014; McGarry and O’Leary, 2009; Watts, 2008). In the case of Czechoslovakia, the 
Czechs dominated the Communist Political Party and Slovaks were left excluded from significant 
decision-making.  
Scholars have also agreed that while communist policies claimed to encourage tolerance, 
they often resulted in the domination of the strongest national groups over minorities (Roeder, 
1993, Connor 1984; Bunce 1999). While national groups were expected to, over time, leave behind 
their adherences to their group identities and adopt a shared identity under the final stage of 
communism, in reality national minority cultures were often excluded and obliged to adopt the 
dominant culture (Connor 1984, McGarry and O’Leary, 2009; Veres, 2015). Marxist-Leninist 
thought, which believed class to be more salient than national identity, was proven incorrect. While 
national minorities in communist states were often initially granted language and education rights, 
these policies were slowly taken away. National minorities were often forced to adopt the dominant 
language or culture, either out of restrictive cultural policies, or because of the economic or social 
benefits that would arise from the use of the dominant culture (Connor, 1984). These 
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assimilationist pressures further stressed relations between the dominant and minority groups of 
the state. 
National relations were further exacerbated by economic strain in the years preceding the 
1990s (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009; Ramet, 2005). The attempts to create effective economic 
reform in the period before state collapse were ultimately unsuccessful and were the result of 
ineffective central government management. Economic strain added further pressure on national 
minority groups who were often marginalized as a result of assimilationist policies. The ensuing 
collapse of CEE communist states contributed to a lack of political structure and fears about 
destabilization within the region (Bunce 1999; Kymlicka 2009). The ongoing national minority 
exclusion under communist federations increased national tensions that threatened to erupt in the 
wake of communism. Given this, Western Europe was eager to stabilize the region and integrate 
Central and Eastern states as a means of conflict prevention.  
 
1.2.3 Western European Democracies and National Minorities  
Western Europe’s policies have stood in contrast to communist thought: democracy, 
human rights, and a market economy are emphasized as a result of liberal ideology. Western liberal 
democracies place a great emphasis on civil liberties and individual freedoms that are often 
enshrined within a constitution (Kymlicka 2009; O’Leary and McGarry 2012; McCrudden and 
O’Leary 2013). The traditions of liberalism and democracy have long been conflated in the West. 
Here, “democracy can be seen as the natural development of liberalism” that merged the two 
strains of political thought (Bobbio, 1990: 37). The emphasis on individualism and constraints on 
government power were later promoted abroad in CEE states after the collapse of communism as 
a means of mitigating conflict. These states were encouraged to democratize into liberal states 
similar to the West during this time of transition (Zakaria, 1997; Kymlicka, 2009; Levitsky, 2010). 
Initially, Western Europe believed that generous protections for national minorities and the 
development of multiculturalism would be most effective in integrating Central and Eastern 
Europe. Multicultural states with explicit protections for national minorities became the image of 
a “modern state” that CEE states should emulate (Kymlicka, 2009: 178). 
 However, as some CEE states experienced incredibly violent transitions from communism, 
Western European powers became increasingly wary of spiraling instability within the region. 
Western states feared that advocacy for specific rights for minority groups would lead to increased 
tensions within their states and threaten their internal stability. As a result, they reversed their 
stances on explicit minority rights, and believed that culturally-blind approaches would lead to the 
gradual assimilation of minority groups (O’Leary and McGarry, 2012: 83; McCrudden and 
O’Leary, 2013). This approach became known as the “integrationist approach.” Integrationists 
believe that conflict stems from “group-based” partisanship in political institutions, and specific 
rights towards an ethnicity, language, or religion, can spark division among communities (O’Leary 
and McGarry, 2012). As a result of this, the rights granted are individualistic in scope, falling under 
generic rights that do not place an emphasis on national identity (Kymlicka, 2009; O’Leary and 
McGarry, 2012). Western Europe’s desire to contain conflict within Central and Eastern Europe 
led to the adoption of this model, and placed national minority rights under a broader scope of 
human rights; the lack of specific designation to national minority rights would avoid possibilities 
of future conflict (Kymlicka, 2009).  
Unsurprisingly these policies may fail to protect national minority group identities 
(Anderson, 2013; Kymlicka, 2009; McCrudden and O’Leary, 2013; O’Leary and McGarry, 2012). 
Integrationist policies may instead lead to the hegemony of the dominant national group (Kymlicka 
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2009; O’Leary and McGarry 2012; Anderson 2014; McCrudden and O’Leary 2013). “Difference 
blind” policies do not, in reality, result in equality, but rather encourage assimilation into the 
dominant culture at the expense of minorities (Kymlicka 2009). Furthermore, Western liberal 
opposition to stringent group based rights can lead to conflicting approaches towards national 
group management. The demand to comply with liberal institutions, such as the EU, can be 
destabilizing for a state that has deeply divided and precarious national group relations 
(McCrudden and O’Leary, 2013). The volatile posture of Western liberal democracies, initially 
favorable toward national minority rights, and then favorable to a difference-blind human rights 
approach, ultimately resulted in conflicting messages regarding what policies are adequate to 
protect minorities and raised questions about their enforceability and effectiveness.   
 
1.2.4 European Bodies and National Minority Rights   
 Three organizations drove Western European expansion into Central and Eastern Europe 
in the wake of communism: The Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, and the European Union. The motivations of each of these organizations to 
integrate Central and Eastern Europe differed slightly; the CoE attempted to promote a normative 
form of human and minority rights, while both the European Union and the OSCE viewed national 
minority rights as a means of peace and security (Kemp, 2001; Kymlicka, 2009). While their 
motivations for promoting national minority rights differed, they shared consensus that the 
granting of minority rights was necessary to address the underlying national tensions in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Each body established their own relations with each democratizing state, and 
worked together to provide reports on the status of national minority protections in each state.  
 
1.2.5 Defining National Minority Rights 
The West’s aversion to creating explicit national minority group rights was expressed in 
their lack of clarity surrounding the term “national minority” (Kymlicka, 2009; Hughes and Sasse, 
2015). In each of their international agreements, there is no legal definition for the term “national 
minority” (Kymlicka, 2009; Hughes and Sasse, 2015).  
The European Convention on Human Rights mentions national minorities under Article 
14, which prohibits discrimination against “association with a national minority” (1950, Art. 14). 
However, it does not clarify who constitutes as a minority. Furthermore, the Framework 
Convention on National Minorities (FCNM), fails to offer a consistent definition. The introduction 
to the text acknowledges that a democratic state should “not only respect the ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a national minority, but also create 
appropriate conditions enabling them to express, preserve, and develop this identity” (1994). 
Additionally, the OSCE relies heavily upon its appointment of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities to address national minority claims and affairs. As such, the usage of the term “national 
minority” rose to prominence in the aftermath of the collapse of the Eastern bloc, but lacked a 
consistent legal definition; scholars agree that this has added to confusion surrounding who 
constitutes a national minority and what rights should be afforded to individual groups (Kymlicka, 
2009; Hughes and Sasse, 2015).  
 
1.2.6 Negative National Minority Rights  
The aversion to providing a clear definition of “national minorities” is further complicated 
with the approach European bodies have taken towards national minority protections. As 
previously discussed, Western Europe initially took a proactive approach towards national 
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minority rights, but reversed their stance on explicit minority protections. The shift in Western 
Europe’s decision to encapsulate national minority rights as a part of human rights led to the 
promotion of negative national minority rights. Generic human rights promotion has been 
criticized as limited in their scope since they do not explicitly address the needs of national 
minority communities (Kelley, 2004; Kymlicka, 2009; Mabry, McGarry, Moore, and O’Leary, 
2013; Lempp, 2015).  
Instead, the CoE, the OSCE, and the EU have recognized the significance of language, 
education, and cultural rights and have consistently advocated the freedom of national minority 
groups to develop their own institutions without discrimination. Language, education, and cultural 
development each play a large role in the preservation of national minority identity, and as a result 
most laws involve regulation on these three social categories. The three bodies have agreed on the 
right of national minorities to self-identify with their national group (Kymlicka, 2009). The ability 
to choose whether or not to identify as a national minority leaves open the possibility of voluntary 
assimilation. The enforcement of negative rights protections means that states are not required to 
provide explicit protections on behalf of national minorities; instead, states cannot interfere in the 
development of national minority institutions. 
The rhetoric of negative rights promotion is evident in both the ECHR and the FCNM. For 
instance, the ECHR prohibits discrimination against individuals on the basis of “. . . language, 
religion . . . association with a national minority” and states that “the State shall respect the right 
of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions” (ECHR, 1953). The FCMN declares that national minorities have the 
right to choose whether or not to be treated as such, and that states should promote equality in all 
aspects of the state – including economic, social, political, and cultural life – between national 
minorities and the majority (FCMN, 1994). Regarding education, the FCNM further states “that 
persons belonging to a national minority have the right to set up and to manage their own private 
educational and training establishments” (1994, Art. 13). There are no explicit rights granted to 
national minorities.  
Both the ECHR’s and FCMN’s employment of negative rights for national minorities align 
with the integrationist approach adopted by Western Europe, where policies are tolerant of national 
differences, but do not necessarily advocate specific programs or policies to protect minorities 
(Kymlicka, 2009). The encapsulation of national minority rights under human rights has left it to 
the individual state to interpret what is “sufficient” or “adequate” protection for minorities and 
does not guarantee national minority representation within states. For example, Slovenia defined 
its national minority population as Hungarians and Italians; other minority groups are not 
considered as national minorities or granted the same rights as Hungarians or Italians in the state.  
 The promotion of negative human rights has been mirrored within the OSCE HCNM. The 
HCNM has withdrawn from previous consideration of territorial self-government (autonomy) and 
representation that was first advocated under the Lund Recommendations of 1999. Originally 
written in response to issues of minority education and languages, the Lund Recommendations 
were put forth by the HCNM to ensure more rigorous and broader protections of national 
minorities. The Lund Recommendations (1999) notably called for minority representation and 
participation in decision making, and self-government, possibly through territorial arrangements 
(Lund Recommendations, 1999). However, since then, the EU’s evolving stance on national 
minority rights has also been reflected within the HCNM. By the early 2000s, the HCNM no longer 
viewed self-autonomy as necessary and ceased advocacy for territorial self-government; in the 
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case of Hungarian minorities, it viewed that autonomy would violate European standards (Mabry, 
McGarry, Moore, and O’Leary, 2013: 383).  
Altogether, the Western European approach towards national minority protections has 
predominantly focused on negative national minority rights as a part of a broader human rights. 
Scholars have agreed that the promotion of negative rights for national minorities and the advocacy 
of generic human rights alone are not necessarily effective in protecting minority groups (Kelley, 
2006; Mabry, McGarry, Moore, and O’Leary, 2013; Lempp, 2015). The combination of vagueness 
in national minority definitions and the increased aversion to delineating explicit national minority 
rights makes European Union accession and national minority compliance complicated.  
 
1.2.7 European Union Conditionality  
 In addition to negative rights promotion and the importation of democracy into Central and 
Eastern Europe, the OSCE HCNM, the Council of Europe, and the European Union engaged in 
conditionality as a means to ensure compliance with national minority policies. Conditionality, as 
defined by Hughes and Sasse, relies on a power imbalance where the EU, or Western institutions, 
“can exert political leverage on candidates to ensure the requisite outcomes in policy or legislation” 
(Hughes and Sasse, 2015: 26). The influence of conditionality rests on the premise that 
democratizing states desire to integrate with Western Europe, and as such will be willing to comply 
with demands made by the organizations. The perceived benefits from joining European bodies 
ensures compliance (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon, 2004; Kelley, 2004).  
 The European Union is most discussed regarding European conditionality. The EU’s 
changing positon on national minorities has been reflected in its membership criteria – the 
Copenhagen criteria (Hughes and Sasse, 2015: 30). National minority rights, in line with Western 
Europe’s aversion to delineate specific minority rights, have been categorized under a broader 
category of “democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and respect for and protection of 
minorities” (Hughes and Sasse, 2015: 33). The continued advocacy for national minority rights 
follows a longstanding trend from national minority treaties in the wake of World War I, but 
polices for the explicit protections of national minorities have increasingly grown broader over 
time (Kymlicka, 2009; Hughes and Sasse, 2015). This is noticeable in the EU’s inclusion of 
national minority protections in the Copenhagen criteria, but limited discussion of national 
minority rights within the 35 chapters of accession negotiations.  
 However, scholars have debated the effectiveness of EU conditionality in improving 
national minority protections. Importantly, there are two prominent issues raised regarding 
national minority policies in the wake of 1990. First, the conditions set forth by the EU regarding 
minority protections would not have been met by Western European member states had they been 
applying for candidacy after 1990 (Hughes and Sasse, 2015: 34). The expectations for national 
minority protections and compliance were higher for new candidate states. Secondly, the EU’s 
lack of clarity on national minorities – both in the absence of a clear definition and the lack of 
inclusion in the accession criteria – make compliance difficult (Hughes and Sasse, 2015: 38).  
 In light of the vagueness on national minority protections set forth by the EU, there are 
varied opinions among scholars regarding the actual effectiveness of EU conditionality. Scholars 
agree that are additional factors that may influence compliance with the EU, specifically, domestic 
factors (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2004; Kelley, 2004; Kymlicka, 2009). However, the salience 
of domestic factors in the EU accession process is contested. Some scholars believe that while 
domestic factors contribute to compliance, joining the EU remains the most significant factor that 
shapes changes to domestic policy (Kelley, 2004). In contrast, others view that EU conditionality 
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only appears influential on paper. Instead, hypocrisy and vagueness in EU recommendations 
contribute to a perception that conditionality reinforces an EU “double standard” (Kymlicka, 2009: 
42; Hughes and Sasse, 2015: 38). As a result, these scholars view EU conditionality as one factor 
that impacts changes in national minority policies, but by far are not the most significant factor in 
increasing minority protections. In contrast, the domestic aspects of a state play a much larger role 
in shaping national minority treatment (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2004).  
The ongoing debate over the effectiveness of EU conditionality marks a continuation of 
shifting Western European stances on national minority rights and treatment. It is clear among 
scholars that Western Europe’s approaches to national minority rights have evolved over time, and 
have been predominantly relegated as less significant in light of other recommendations made 
during the process of Western integration (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2004; Kymlicka, 2009; 
Hughes and Sasse, 2015). The ongoing debate over the effectiveness of European Union 
conditionality will likely continue as Europeanization into Central and Eastern Europe progresses. 
The discussion of EU conditionality and its development in the early 1990s is significant in 
considering the outcomes of national minority treatment in our cases: Slovakia, Romania, and 
Slovenia.  
 
1.3 Data and Methods  
 This thesis will use qualitative case methods to look at Hungarian national minorities in 
three states: Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia. This approach allows for an in-depth evaluation of 
the treatment of Hungarian national minorities in each state. The research has been conducted in 
two ways: first through evaluation of secondary data documenting historical communist and pre-
communist policies towards Hungarian minorities; and second, with primary archival data from 
the European Commission, the Office of the High Commission on National Minorities, and the 
Council of Europe. Together, the usage of primary and secondary data enables us to evaluate the 
changes made to national minority policies throughout communism, the accession negotiations, 
and after EU membership. 
 
1.3.1 Measures  
 This research project has one broad set of independent and dependent variables relevant to 
EU accession. National minority treatment will be documented over time from communism, EU 
accession, and after EU membership. Each time period will be evaluated for their protections on 
national minorities. “Anti-minority” indicates state policies or practices are not beneficial to 
national communities and have received condemnation from the EU, the CoE, or the OSCE 
HCNM. “Pro-minority” are policies adopted by states that have been praised by the EU, the CoE, 
or the OSCE HCNM that are not detrimental to national minorities.  
As a result, the independent variable is any position by the EU, the CoE, or the OSCE 
HCNM on a national minority policy in a state. This could be either a positive or a negative 
position, typically found in a recommendation or report made by any of the three institutions. The 
dependent variable is the corresponding change, or lack of change, in the state’s policy on national 
minorities. The overall trend of national minority policies and their compliance with 
recommendations from the EU, the CoE, or the OSCE HCNM will determine whether a time 
period is defined by “anti-minority sentiment” or “pro-minority sentiment.” Anti-minority 
sentiment will indicate that the state did not abide by recommendations made by any of the three 
European bodies, while positive minority sentiment will indicate the state’s cooperation. The broad 
trend of national minority treatment before, during, and after accession will determine the impact 
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of EU accession on national minority group treatment. A change in sentiment from before 
accession to after accession will indicate if a state has improved, declined, or maintained its 
policies on national minorities.  
 
1.3.2 Sample 
This thesis will gather primary and secondary data to inform its research. Primary data will 
come from the Historical Archives of the European Commission, located in Brussels, Belgium. 
Further primary data will be gathered from online databases of the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE HCNM, found on their official websites. The primary data for the Council of Europe and 
the OSCE will range from the beginning of the 1990s through to current day reports; these are 
typically yearly reports and correspondences between the state and the governing body. In the case 
of primary data from the European Union, yearly reports published by the European Commission 
documenting each state’s accession progress will be evaluated. The reports will range from 1993 
to 2007; this encapsulates the entire accession timeline for Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia. All 
primary data will focus solely on the treatment of national minorities and recommendations made 
to each state on domestic policies each year. These will be recommendations made on laws or 
treatment regarding language, education, political rights, or cultural development.  
 Secondary data will predominantly focus on the historical time period before and under 
communism. The secondary data gathered will focus on language, education, political, and cultural 
rights; it will further include any international agreements or domestic laws that directly influenced 
national minority group treatment. It will be sourced from peer-reviewed articles and books that 
have conducted extensive research on any of the three cases. Secondary data will further 
supplement primary data regarding EU accession and later EU membership to provide a timeline 
of events that inform the recommendations and laws passed during EU accession. Together, the 
combination of primary and secondary data provide a complete picture of how national minority 
group policies and treatment have evolved over time.  
 
1.3.3 Analytic Strategy  
 This largely historical and documentary analysis has been provided for by a travel grant 
from the Center for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Immigration. The travel grant to the 
Historical Archives of the European Commission and the European Commission’s Library and 
eResources allowed me to gather primary data on the accessions of Slovakia, Romania, and 
Slovenia. The data from the Historical Archives and the Library and eResources focuses on 
European Commission reports from 1995 to 2007. Additional data has been gathered from the 
online databases of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. To correspond with the primary data 
gathered from the OSCE, I reached out to Mr. Bob Deen who was Senior Adviser at the OSCE 
High Commissioner on National Minorities. The interview was intended to provide supplemental 
information on the OSCE HCNM’s role in the accessions of Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia. 
Recent developments regarding the situation of COVID-19 unfortunately hindered the conduction 
of an interview.  
The data gathered is sorted according to four broad time periods. These are: the 
establishment of the Hungarian diaspora from World War I to World War II (1910 – 1945); World 
War II and communist regimes (roughly 1945 – 1990); democratization and EU accession (1990 
– 2007); and after EU membership (2004 – 2016). Primary and secondary data work to evaluate 
two parts of each time period – legislation or policies passed by the state, and the policies in 
practice. These two components – de jure treatment and de facto treatment – are significant in 
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considering national minority group relations. Analysis of de jure treatment and de facto treatment 
allows us to evaluate how “fair” laws for national minorities may in reality have negative impacts 
on minority communities. In short, policies that appear fair legally, may not be fully implemented 
or adhered to in social practice.  
 In addition to analysis of de jure and de facto treatment for each time period, primary and 
secondary data focus here on the political, language, education, and cultural rights afforded to 
minorities. These four categories are of particular significance to national minority communities 
as they provide avenues for advocacy, cultural development, and national self-identification. In 
summary, each time period will be broken down to consider both laws and practices in four 
categories – political, language, education, and cultural rights.  
 
2. The Establishment of the Hungarian National Minority Diaspora 
 
To begin, this thesis will discuss the establishment of the Hungarian national minority 
diaspora that was created after World War I. The period of time between World War I and World 
War II resulted in drastic changes to state borders in Central and Eastern Europe. The interwar 
period and the aftermath of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 were significant in shaping Hungarian 
national minority consciousness.  
Before World War I, Hungary was part of a broader federation known as Austria-Hungary. 
The Austro-Hungarian empire included the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Hungary, and the 
later annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. During World War I, the empire was aligned with the 
Central Powers. The subsequent defeat of the Central Powers in World War I led to territorial 
cession and the establishment of the present-day Hungarian state. Peace negotiations after the war 
were settled at the Paris Peace Conference from 1919 to 1920, where the League of Nations first 
placed a great emphasis on national minority protections.  
Before World War I, the Hungarian empire had previously practiced “Magyarization.” 
“Magyarization” refers to the attempted assimilation of non-Hungarian minorities into the 
dominant Hungarian culture and language; the term “Magyar” is synonymous with being 
ethnically Hungarian. The assimilation policies had suppressed many of the national groups in the 
state, including Slovaks, Romanians, and Slovenes. These national groups would later form 
independent states after World War I. Their repression under Hungary was not easily forgotten, 
and after gaining independence from Austria-Hungary, they each attempted to create their own 
nation-states.  
 The emergence from World War I also resulted in a growing trend towards communism in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and its success was 
celebrated by communists as the model for future revolutions (Connor, 1985). Marxist-Leninist 
thought, as a result, became the prominent ideology which communist movements attempted to 
emulate; the Soviet Union became the communist model (Schöpflin, 1993). Lenin’s thoughts on 
national groups (as previously discussed) were adopted – with varying success – in Slovenia 
(Yugoslavia), Romania, and Slovakia (Czechoslovakia) under their later communist regimes. 
 
2.1 The 1910 Austro-Hungarian Census 
 The 1910 census was the last census taken by Austria-Hungary before its breakup after 
World War I. The census categorized the population according to their preferred language, and 
documented the population in each of the regions of the state – Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Dr. Wilhelm Winkler, the Secretary of the Central Commission for Statistics at the 
		 21 
University of Vienna recorded the findings of the 1910 census (see map 2.1.a in Annex). The total 
population within the federation at the time was approximately 51 million people. Of this, 
approximately 28 million lived within Austria, with 20.8 million in Hungary. Within Hungary, 
48% of the population living there spoke Hungarian and were considered ethnically Hungarian – 
or Magyar – as a result. The Hungarian population was estimated to be approximately 10 million 
people. The second largest population within the Hungarian Empire was Romanian, constituting 
approximately 14%, or 3 million people. In contrast, Austria was predominantly German and 
Czech (Winkler, 1921: 1) – (see map 2.1.a in the Annex).  
 The Austro-Hungarian population self-identified by their preferred language. As a result, 
there is a chance that the population totals may not be entirely accurate, since the national identity 
of an individual may not directly correspond to their primary language used. Furthermore, some 
scholars have argued the census during the pre-war period may have favored the ruling nationality 
instead (Kirk, 1946: 224). While contention over the accuracy remains, this census depicts the 
concentration of the Hungarian population before World War I and is relevant to later treaty 
negotiations following the end of the war.  
 
2.2 The Treaty of Trianon  
 The aftermath of World War I and the defeat of the Central Powers culminated in the Paris 
Peace Conference from 1919 to 1920. During this time, the Treaty of Trianon was negotiated 
between the Entente Powers and Austria-Hungary. The Treaty of Trianon regulated the new 
borders of Hungary and the change of territory in the region. During the Paris Peace Conference, 
the Entente Powers relied upon a map presented by Count Pál Teleki, the Chief Secretary of the 
Hungarian Geographical Society. This map, known as the Carte Rouge, or Red Map, was used at 
the Paris Peace Conference to determine the national distribution of the population within the 
Kingdom of Hungary (American Geographical Society, 1918). It was drafted from 1918 to 1919 
based on Austria-Hungary’s 1910 census. Its prominent red color depicted the distribution of 
Hungarians within the region, and further contributed to its name (American Geographical Society, 
1918). The Entente Powers attempted to create a highly homogenized Hungarian state, and drew 
the new borders of Hungary around the heavily concentrated red regions of the map. The ceded 
territories contained pockets of Hungarian populations that would became national minorities 
following World War I (see Map 2.2.a in the Annex). 
 The Treaty of Trianon reshaped Central and Eastern Europe with the establishment of 
independent Austrian and Hungarian states. Hungary was reduced to roughly one-third of its 
original size under Article 27 of the Treaty (Treaty of Trianon, 1920; Schöpflin, 1993). 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia) had 
much to gain from the Treaty. Czechoslovakia increased in size by approximately 60,000 
kilometers, and gained a population of roughly 3.5 million people. Of the population added from 
Austria-Hungary, roughly 30%, or 1 million, were Hungarian minorities. In Romania, around 
100,000 kilometers of territory and over 5 million people were added to the state. Roughly 30% 
of them were nationally Hungarian, or almost 1.7 million people. In The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes, 20,000 kilometers of territory were added with a population increase of 1.5 million 
people. Approximately 30%, or almost half a million people were nationally Hungarian (Winkler, 
1921:1) – (see Maps 2.2b and 2.2.c in the Annex).  
The results of the Treaty led to a more homogenized Hungarian state, with approximately 
90% of the total population within Hungary being nationally Hungarian (Zeidler, 2007: 41). The 
end of World War I resulted in both a significant loss of land and a drastic reduction of Hungary’s 
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population (Ludanyi, 1996: 372). The Treaty of Trianon left concentrations of national Hungarians 
within new states, specifically in the regions of Transylvania, Banat, the southern borders of 
Czechoslovakia, and the Prekmurje and Vojvodina regions of modern-day Slovenia and Serbia. 
Hungarians who were once the dominant national group now found themselves as minorities; 
national tensions in the region grew as the hierarchies of national groups shifted. The Treaty of 
Trianon remains a point of grief and humiliation for Hungarians, and its legacy has continued to 
shape the foreign policy of Hungary towards its diaspora abroad.  
 
2.3 Slovakia: National Minority Treatment After the Treaty of Trianon 
 Czechoslovakia gained its independence from Austria-Hungary in 1918, and grew in size 
after the Treaty of Trianon. The state was formed as a union between Czechs and Slovaks who 
wanted unite with one another against their large minority populations (Leff, 1997). The Czech 
Republic a large population of German minorities, and the Slovak Republic had a large population 
of Hungarian minorities. The Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia at the time of the 1921 
census was over 700,000 people, or roughly 5-6% of the total population (Tóth & Novotný, 2014: 
217). Czechoslovakia was divided into four provinces: Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia, and 
Subcarpathian Rus. The Hungarian minority population was predominantly concentrated within 
Slovakia, along the southern border with Hungary.  
 Czechoslovakia adopted a constitution in 1920 and established a democratic government. 
The Constitution extended political rights to all national minorities, and included a provision for 
national minority rights. The protections for national minorities stemmed from the Paris Peace 
Conference, where the League of Nations put forth a series of international treaties governing the 
treatment of national minorities. National minority rights in Czechoslovakia were based on the 
international Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye that was negotiated between the Entente Powers 
and the state of Austria (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017). It recognized the independence of 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later 
Yugoslavia) in 1920.  
 Under the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Czechoslovakia agreed to guarantee the civil 
and political rights of all its citizens, granting citizenship to individuals not of Czechoslovak 
nationality (Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 1920, Article 7). Article 7 of the Treaty prohibited 
discrimination based on national identity, and stated that “no restriction shall be imposed on the 
free use by any Czechoslovak national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in 
religion, in the press or publications of any kind, or at public meetings” (Treaty of Saint-Germain-
en-Laye, 1920, Article 7). The Treaty of Saint Germain also mandated minority language use, 
permitting minorities to establish and manage schools or institutions in their own language or 
religion (Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 1920, Article 8). The establishment of these 
institutions fell under state jurisdiction, who was responsible for providing adequate public 
education facilities for non-Czechoslovak instruction in regions with considerable amounts of 
national minorities (1920, Art, 9). Together, Articles 7, 8 and 9 provided the framework for 
Czechoslovakia’s constitutional protections for national minorities. 
 
2.3.1 Political Rights and Representation  
 The 1920 Constitution of Czechoslovakia began with “We, the Czechoslovak nation.” The 
inclusion of this language was highly contentious. Hungarian representatives protested this 
wording because it promoted the idea of a Czechoslovak nation-state that would exclude national 
minorities (Bakke, 2002). While the preamble discussed the idea of a nation-state, the text of the 
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Constitution did not refer to a Czechoslovak nation. Instead, the term “people” was commonly 
used to refer to citizens of the state. National minorities were granted protection under Section VI 
of the Constitution, with specific articles (128 – 134) covering the treatment and rights granted to 
national groups (Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1920, Section VI). The Constitution 
guaranteed the political and civil rights of all individuals within the state – regardless of national 
identity. Later sections within the Constitution regulated language and education for national 
minorities, and national minorities were permitted political parties and active representation within 
state government. While the Constitution did not impose the creation of a Czechoslovak nation-
state, the implications from the preamble reinforced the idea that Czechoslovakia prioritized its 
dominant Czech and Slovak national groups.  
 Czechoslovakia adopted a parliamentary electoral system that consisted of two chambers: 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The parliament was elected based on proportional 
representation under multi-member districts (Tóth & Novotný, 2014; Kuklík and Petrás, 2017). 
There were numerous political parties that emerged during this time, including parties that 
represented the interests of national minority groups. Positions to the Chamber of Deputies were 
based on 23 electoral districts, with seats to the Senate elected from 13 larger districts. Hungarian 
representatives were predominantly elected from the southern districts of Slovakia, such as Nové 
Zámky and Košice, which had high concentrations of Hungarian communities. The use of 
proportional representation aided the election of national minorities to the central government, and 
the political inclusion of national minorities also emerged in public bodies and institutions (Kuklík 
and Petrás, 2017: 156). The inclusion of minorities in state and administrative bodies provided 
avenues for Hungarian minority interests. 
 
2.3.2 Language Use, Education and Cultural Expression 
 National minority language, education, and cultural expression were protected by the 
Czechoslovak Constitution, the 1920 Language Act, and the international Treaty of Saint-
Germain-en-Laye. The 1920 Constitution included a separate provision regulating Czechoslovak 
language called the Language Act of 1920. The Act established the Czechoslovak language as the 
official state language under Section 1, relying on Article 7 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-
Laye (Language Act 1920). Article 7 of the Treaty permitted the use of the Czechoslovak language 
in public areas of government, “in which the work of all the courts, offices, institutions, 
undertakings and organs of the Republic shall be conducted, in which they shall issue their 
proclamations and notices as well as their inscriptions and designations” (Treaty of Saint Germain-
en-Laye, 1920, Article 7). Section 1 of the Language Act reflected this, and stated that 
Czechoslovak would be the primary language used in courts, offices, and institutions (Language 
Act, 1920, Section 1). However, under obligation to the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, the 
Language Act also guaranteed the protection of national minority languages. The Act permitted 
the use of a minority language if 20% of the population within a jurisdictional district spoke the 
same minority language (1920: Section 2). The minority language would be used in the courts and 
public offices of districts meeting the population threshold, and representative councils and 
government officials would likewise be required to accept documents in the minority language. 
However, the 20% threshold could only be used in regions where the non-Czechoslovak 
population spoke the same minority language. This hurt districts with diverse minority 
populations, since a minority language could not be used unless a single minority group constituted 
at least 20% of the population there (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017).    
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 The Language Act also regulated national minority education. The establishment of 
national minority schools was based under Article 9 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain. 
Czechoslovakia’s obligation to the international agreement was fulfilled through the inclusion of 
minority schooling in its Constitution. Section 5 of the Language Act stated “the instruction in all 
schools established for members of a national minority shall be given in their language. Likewise, 
educational and cultural institutions shall be administered in their language” (1920, Section 5). As 
a result, national minority schools, resources, and supplies were state funded. While the creation 
of minority schools worked to mitigate inequality between majority and minority education, 
educational inequality still persisted. Schools for Czechoslovaks in regions that had high national 
minority populations were noted to have received additional state support (Kuklík and Petrás, 
2017). The difference in state funding emphasized the hierarchy of Czechoslovak nationals in the 
education system.  
Despite the initial protections the Language Act offered, the Act was continuously reduced 
until its implementation in 1926. In the 1926 version, the Language Act was constrained and 
interpreted to exacerbate national minority relations with the state (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017:143). 
Under the 1926 interpretation of the Language Act, the ability to use national minority languages 
was refined to “administration . . . Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Finances, Industry, Business 
and Trades, Public Works and Public Health, and Sports” (Tóth & Novotný, 2014: 228). It did not 
apply to any other offices, including education, foreign affairs, or social care. The implementation 
of the Language Act of 1926 was met with minority criticism which believed too much time has 
passed between the initial signing of the act and its implementation (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 141).  
 The freedom of expression and press was also protected under the 1920 Constitution. The 
freedom of press was protected under Section 113 and 117 of the Constitution which guaranteed 
the freedom of the press, assembly, and right of individual citizens to express their opinion publicly 
(Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1920, Section 113). This guaranteed Hungarian 
minorities the ability to express their opinions and contributed to their cultural development. 
However, Section 113 also granted the government the right to determine “to which limitations 
the principles laid down in previous paragraphs shall be subject in times of war or when such 
events occur in the state that pose a significant threat to the republican state form, the Constitution 
or peace and order” (1920, Section 113). The permission of press regulation later became a way 
for the government to suppress national minorities. Censorship laws were later introduced that 
restricted political parties – specifically communist parties – and national minority opinions that 
were deemed threatening to the state (Tóth & Novotný, 2014: 228). National minorities viewed 
the state regulation of press as anti-minority sentiment.   
 The decline in national minority protections continued in the interwar years with the 
looming threat of Germany. In the 1930s, the state passed legislation known as the Defense of the 
State Act, which directly impacted Czechoslovak minorities. Under this act, the government had 
the authority to intervene in issues they deemed a threat to state security. It granted considerable 
power to the government to adopt orders with presidential approval that would address state 
defense emergencies (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017). These orders could be conducted under 
presidential approval, and would work in place of a law. National minorities were skeptical of the 
subjective nature of the Act, believing that the government could employ repressive measures 
against minorities they deemed as “threats.” Interestingly, while some restrictions on national 
minority expression were occurring, the rising threat of Germany also resulted in some improved 
national minority treatment. State policies became more tolerant of national minorities – 
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specifically Germans– and increased minority language support and political representation in an 
attempt to evade the threat of Germany (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017).  
 Altogether, the period of interwar Czechoslovakia has been defined as a relatively robust 
“democratic state” that granted equal citizenship, universal suffrage, and protection of national 
minorities (Bakke, 2002; Tóth & Novotný, 2014; Kuklík and Petrás, 2017). However, despite de 
jure protections for minorities, the subjective interpretation of legislation led to varying treatment 
of minorities within the state. Overall, national minorities were able to freely use their mother-
tongue and to pursue education under state protection. The rise of President Beneš in 1938 and 
later state occupation under Nazi Germany would mark a sharp turn away from tolerant policies 
for national minorities.  
 
2.4 Romania: National Minority Treatment after the Treaty of Trianon   
 Romania also benefitted from the Treaty of Trianon, with the addition of Transylvania and 
parts of eastern Banat nearly doubling the size of the state (Treaty of Trianon, 1920). These regions 
were predominantly populated by Romanians, but held significant pockets of Hungarians. As a 
result of World War I, Romania was able to consolidate most of its national people; however, the 
population of national minorities in Romania increased from 8% to almost 30% of the total 
population (Ignat-Coman, 2012: 494).  
 Similar to Czechoslovakia, the Romanian population in newly added territories had been 
marginalized under Hungarian rule (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018). Previous “Magyarization” 
shaped the policies employed by the newly enlarged Romanian state towards its Hungarian 
national minorities. As Romania homogenized much of its population, it attempted to consolidate 
itself as a nation-state.  
 
2.4.1 Political Rights and Representation 
 Romania’s Constitution of 1923 granted suffrage to all men and promised political rights 
to all individuals within the state, regardless of national identity. However, the Constitution also 
declared the Kingdom of Romania as a unitary and indivisible national state, emphasizing the 
dominance of Romanians over national minorities. Article 5 of the Constitution stated that all 
“Romanians without distinction of ethnic origin, language, or creed” shared the same political 
freedoms (Blomqvist, 2014: 233). However, the Constitution differentiates between the rights of 
“Romanians” and “foreigners” yet does not define who is a “foreigner” and who is a “Romanian.” 
The lack of clarity meant that “Romanians” could be defined to mean Romanian nationals, which 
would exclude minorities (Blomqvist, 2014). The lack of distinction was significant because 
“foreigners” are excluded from some political rights, including the right to attend public functions 
or own property.  
 The heightened concern over national minority rights and representation led to the creation 
of political parties along national lines. Hungarians found representation among The Hungarian 
People’s Party and The Hungarian National Party (Ignat-Coman, 2012: 500). In addition to this, 
Hungarians in Transylvania aligned themselves with left-wing parties. Many became supporters 
of communist parties, which they viewed as a way to gain equal treatment and opportunity within 
the state (Schöpflin, 1993). 
 
2.4.2 Language, Education and Cultural Expression 
 Language, education and cultural development were regulated under the 1923 Constitution. 
Article 129 of the Constitution, declared the Romanian language the official language of the state; 
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this contradicted earlier passages that claimed all individuals had the right to use the language of 
their choice in both public and private spheres (Blomqvist, 2014). The enforcement of a single 
national language reflected the establishment of a Romanian nation-state (Macartney, 1937). 
Romanian language use became a method to assimilate national minorities, and many city and 
location names within Transylvania were changed from Hungarian to Romanian (Ignat-Coman, 
2012). While the state attempted to assimilate Hungarian minorities and suppress Hungarian 
language use, the Hungarian language remained dominant within Transylvania. As a result, the 
state turned to education policies as a method of forcing assimilation.  
 The Romanian government began a “Romanianization” of the public education system. It 
required the use of Romanian in all state schools, and national minority languages were only 
permitted in private education. Private schools received less funding than public schools, and this 
effectively reduced the support for minority education overall (Ignat-Coman, 2012). The increased 
inequality between public and private schools made it difficult for national minorities to receive 
the same quality of education from private schools. They would have to attend Romanian public 
schools in order to improve their future prospects. However, even within private schools, the state 
made important subjects – such as history and geography – compulsory in the Romanian language 
(Blomqvist, 2014: 33). National minority schools did not have teachers who were proficient in 
Romanian to teach these subjects, further contributing to educational inequality (Blomqvist, 2014). 
The education system became an effective method in promoting the Romanian language and in 
disadvantaging minorities who pursued private education to preserve their mother-tongue.  
 Romanianization intensified throughout the interwar years with the deliberate promotion 
of Romanians in the public sector. The government was wary of large populations of non-
Romanians within government and suspected them as a potential threat to the state. In order to 
restrict minority access to the public sector, the government introduced language tests throughout 
the Satu-Mare region near the border of Hungary in 1934. Individuals who passed the Romanian 
language tests tended to be Romanian as a result of lasting educational inequality. The government 
was successful; Romanians constituted around 59% of workers in the public sector (Blomqvist, 
2014: 37). As World War II approached, the state adopted more repressive measures towards its 
national minorities through its strongly right-winged political stance, increasingly viewing 
national minorities as traitors to the state (Schöpflin, 1993).  
The interwar years of Romania can be characterized by their attempt to reverse 
“Magyarization” from Hungarian rule through Romanianization policies. The establishment of a 
nation-state promoted Romanian culture and language in the public sector and education systems. 
While the presence of Hungarian culture and language remained strong, the increasing repression 
of national minorities contributed to their support for communist parties as World War II 
approached.  
 
2.5 Slovenia: National Minority Treatment after the Treaty of Trianon   
 The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was formed in the aftermath of World War I, 
and gained over 20,000 kilometers with the addition of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Hungary 
after the Treaty of Trianon. The increase in territory also added roughly 400,000 Hungarian 
minorities to the state (Winkler, 1921:1). The Hungarian population was predominantly 
concentrated in Serbia – in northern Bačka in Vojvodina – and in Slovenia in the northeast 
Prekmurje region bordering Hungary (Banac, 1984: 55). Hungary’s Magyarization had also 
impacted The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and the state attempted to develop its 
national cultures after the World War I (Lukanovič and Limon, 2014).  
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2.5.1 Political Organization and Representation 
The initial protections for national minorities in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes stemmed from the series of Minority Treaties signed at the Paris Peace Conference in 
1919. In particular, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes agreed to the Treaty of Saint 
Germain-en-Laye with the League of Nations, which protected national minority rights to 
language, education, and political equality within their states (1920: Art. 7). The state agreed to 
additional treaties which granted rights to both the Italian and Romanian minorities, but none 
regulated the rights of the Hungarian community (Shoup, 1963). While The Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes agreed to protect the rights of national minorities, its first state elections in 
1920 denied the right to vote for those who “by virtue of their nationality had a right to opt for 
foreign citizenship” (Banac, 1984: 49). This provision permitted the exclusion of German, 
Hungarian, and Jewish voters. The 1920 elections resulted in the exclusion of Hungarian political 
parties and national minority interests. Hungarian political parties were not permitted to participate 
in elections until 1923 (Shoup, 1963: 66).  
The political exclusion of national minorities within the state was also mirrored within the 
constitution. The Vidovdan Constitution of The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1921) 
declared the state a “constitutional, parliamentary, and hereditary Monarchy” (Hondius, 1968: 97). 
Legislative power rested with the King and the National Assembly, which comprised of state 
elected members. The Constitution recognized three national groups– Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 
– but did not acknowledge other national groups, including Hungarians. National minorities were 
protected broadly under Article 4 of the 1921 Constitution, which stated that all citizens were 
“equal” (Hondius, 1968: 97). However, the vagueness of national minority policies contributed to 
insufficient minority protection. The Constitution also attempted to gerrymander territorial 
districts – Regions – to reduce national minority influence (Hondius, 1968: 100). While the 
Constitution stated the Regions were created according to “natural, social, and economic 
conditions,” the intent was to weaken to national minority group interests (Hondius, 1968: 100). 
As a result, legal national minority protections were weak, and often excluded national minorities 
from political power and decision-making.  
 
2.5.2 Language, Education, and Cultural Expression 
 The insufficient protections for national minorities were also prominent in the lack of 
language and education protections. The immediate end of World War I had resulted in retaliation 
against Hungarian minorities in the state. Many of the large land estates and farms in Vojvodina 
were owned by Hungarians; these were confiscated without compensation under the guise of land 
reform, and granted to Serb peasants. Additionally, all Hungarian-language schools within the 
region were closed, halting national minority education (Ramet, 2006: 51). The development of 
the 1921 Constitution contributed to the repression of Hungarians by further preventing political 
representation of Hungarian interests.  
The 1921 Constitution recognized the official state language was “Serbo-Croato-
Slovenian.” The three languages not only excluded minority languages, they also were not equal 
themselves. Even though Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian were official languages, Serbian 
language use dominated public institutions (Ramet, 2006: 52). Schools were shifted towards a 
Serb-centric curriculum, and official state documents often used the Cyrillic alphabet (Ramet, 
2006: 52). The Cyrillic alphabet is used by Serbs, while Slovenians rely on a Latin alphabet. The 
curriculum within some schools – while not standardized – also depicted historical events from a 
pro-Serb angle, and attempted to claim all national cultures in Yugoslavia stemmed from Serbian 
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roots (Ramet, 2006: 53). The underlying tensions among the prominent national groups led to 
contention over the Constitution’s legitimacy, and in 1929, the state was consolidated under a 
dictatorial monarchy and renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
For Hungarian minorities, there was restricted access to national minority schools. Where 
national minority schools were offered, the state engaged in “name analysis” to determine 
admission (Shoup, 1963: 67). Under “name analysis,” the last names of Hungarian students would 
be evaluated by the state to determine if the Hungarian student was, in reality, Hungarian. Often 
times the last names of Hungarians would be reinterpreted to indicate that the family was not of 
Hungarian nationality. For instance, a Hungarian student would be told their last name (which was 
in Hungarian) translated to indicate they were “Slovene” or “Slav” in Hungarian. The state 
attempted to claim some Hungarians were actually Slavs who had simply adopted Hungarian last 
names under the previous Hungarian empire. By “correcting” Hungarian identities, the state would 
deny families access to national minority schools (Shoup, 1963). There would be no need to attend 
a national minority school if you were in fact, not a national minority in the first place. In 1929, 
the Law on Minority Schools made it more difficult to open minority schools and limited their 
instruction to basic education which was subject to government approval (Shoup, 1963: 66). The 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia also attempted to expel its Hungarian population in Vojvodina in 1934 
claiming that the Hungarian community was involved in the assassination of King Aleksandar 
(Ramet, 2006: 51). 
Between 1929 and 1934, the Communist Party in Yugoslavia repeatedly attempted to 
undermine the stability of the state, and aligned itself with national minority movements in its 
attempts to overthrow the government. Utilizing nationalist movements was in line with Marxist-
Leninist thought which viewed national revolutions as a catalyst for the spread of communism 
(Connor, 1984). The impending Second World War, alliances among neighboring states, and 
underlying national tensions within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia led to widespread casualties, the 
outbreak of civil war, and the later establishment of communism.  
 
3. World War II and Post-War Communism 
 
The interwar period for Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
resulted in attempts to create homogenized nation-states. However, the prominent populations of 
national minorities left in these newly established states hindered their ability to consolidate their 
populations. National minorities were of significant importance to the League of Nations, who 
passed a series of international agreements and protections for minorities in many peace treaties 
arranged at the end of World War I. As these treaties were binding, many protections for national 
minorities were regulated under international law, not domestic policy. Despite agreement to 
binding international treaties, the treatment of Hungarian minorities varied greatly among 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  
This section will briefly discuss changes in Hungary and neighboring state relations that 
later impacted the treatment of Hungarian minorities after World War II. It will then address how 
policies towards national minorities continued to evolve under communism. Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia all adopted communist regimes in the aftermath of 
World War II, and Hungary’s alliance with the USSR further complicated Hungarian minority 




3.1 World War II 
 After the Treaty of Trianon, Hungarians were irredentist: they still considered its ceded 
territory to be Hungarian and were eager to restore its former borders (Zeidler, 2007). In order to 
do so, Hungary allied itself with Germany before and during WWII in hopes to win back its 
territories. In 1938, Hungary entered Czechoslovakia, and claimed southern portions of Slovakia 
with prominent Hungarian minorities. The Munich Agreement, struck between Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, effectively granted Germany vast territory with prominent German populations, 
and granted Hungary significant portions of Southern Slovakia (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017). The 
transfer of territory was recognized as the First Vienna Arbitration Award (Zeidler, 2007: 264). 
The remaining land of Czechoslovakia was later encapsulated as a protectorate under Nazi 
Germany, with the Czechoslovak government forced into exile (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 183). 
Czech patriots believed that the partition of Czechoslovakia was partly the fault of prominent 
national minority groups who they viewed as traitors. The anti-minority sentiment would continue 
after Czechoslovakia regained sovereignty after the war. Famously, the end of World War II saw 
the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the brutal repression of Hungarians within Slovakia. 
After gaining territory from Czechoslovakia, Hungary proceeded to threaten Romania with 
invasion in 1940. The threat led to negotiations, with Hungary demanding a return of 
approximately two-thirds of the territory it ceded to Romania at Trianon. The Second Vienna 
Arbitration Award granted Hungary the northern half of the territory, or northern parts of 
Transylvania (Zeidler, 2007: 269). The changeover in territory created widespread panic within 
the region and galvanized nationalist tensions, propelling Romanians to flee from Northern 
Transylvania, and Hungarians to flee from Southern Transylvania.  
Hungary and Yugoslavia discussed a friendship pact in 1940, which fell through with 
German occupation of the latter. Hungary was then able to broker a deal with Germany to return 
parts of the Prekmurje region of Slovenia, along with parts of Bačka in Serbia. Both had prominent 
populations of national Hungarians, with nearly 40 % of individuals within those regions 
identifying as Hungarian (Zeidler, 2007: 279). While Hungary did not regain the entirety of the 
territories it lost at Trianon, it was able to reclaim significant territory with considerable Hungarian 
minority populations. In doing so, Hungary re-acquired prominent non-Hungarian minority groups 
in the regions it reclaimed.  
Hungarian rule meant a reversal in representation within the previously ceded regions. 
Non-Hungarian minority groups were subject to re-integration within the Hungarian state and 
faced social, political, and economic repression (Zeidler, 2007). Integration efforts continued 
under World War II until the defeat of the Axis Powers. The defeat of Nazi Germany and its 
Hungarian ally, the Soviet occupation of Romania and Czechoslovakia, and the alignment of 
Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union under Tito’s partisans halted Hungarian territorial revisionism. 
The Treaty of Paris (1947) re-stored Hungary’s pre-Munich borders, and granted additional 
territory to Czechoslovakia (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 228). These borders were predominantly 
based on the Treaty of Trianon, and remained the same throughout the course of communism in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The formation of the Eastern bloc began with the adoption of 
communism in the region; Hungary came under communist control and became part of the Soviet-






3.2 Slovakia: World War II and Communist Repression   
 
3.2.1 The Beneš Decrees   
From 1940 to 1945 the Czechoslovak government-in-exile was led by President Edvard 
Beneš, who had been elected in 1935. While in exile he issued a number of presidential decrees. 
These decrees were based on the “interim of legislative power” and were “published on the basis 
of governmental drafts with signatures attached by the Prime Minister and ministers entrusted with 
their execution” (Kuklík, 2015: 131).  The Beneš decrees focused on the reconstruction of 
Czechoslovakia after the war, and envisioned a Czechoslovak state without its prominent national 
minorities. Notably, they called for the expulsion of Hungarian and German minorities within 
Czechoslovakia (Leff, 1997: 42). The Beneš Decrees were a part of a larger program called “the 
Košice Program,” an agreement between the exiled Czechoslovak government and Czechoslovak 
Communists. The end of the war in 1945 re-stored Czechoslovakia’s pre-Munich borders – with 
the exception of Ruthenia which was granted to the Soviet Union – and affirmed itself as a nation-
state of Czechs and Slovaks (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 231). 
The proposal for population transfer was supported by the Allied Powers, who negotiated 
the transfer of German minorities under the Potsdam Agreement. The 1945 Potsdam Agreement 
predominantly focused on the “humane and orderly” transfer of German minorities from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 204). While the transfer of Hungarians 
was proposed, the Agreement eventually only discussed the transfer of Germans under Article 12 
(1945: Art. 12). The Beneš Decrees relied upon the Potsdam Agreement to carry out its expulsion 
of the German population, and were implemented in 1945. The expulsion of the German minority 
was revenge for the treachery of the Sudeten Germans, and the product of Beneš’s widely-shared 
conviction that the German minority would be a “Trojan horse” in the state. Retaining the German 
minority would prevent the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia (Leff, 1997: 42).  
 The Beneš Decrees also addressed Czechoslovakia’s Hungarian minorities. While 
Germans faced the most severe treatment through forced population transfers, seizure of property, 
and land redistribution, Hungarian minorities had similar experiences. Specifically, Constitutional 
Decree No. 33/1945 Sb. addressed the citizenship of German and Hungarian national minorities. 
The decree regulated who was considered a Czechoslovak citizen based on their citizenship during 
the war: citizenship would be withdrawn from those who adopted either Hungarian and German 
citizenship after the Munich Agreement, or while Czechoslovakia was at war (Kuklík and Petrás, 
2017: 214). Czechoslovakia also confiscated Hungarian land under Decree No. 4/1945 Sb. SNC, 
which labeled the Hungarians and Germans as traitors (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 215). The 
presidential decrees regularly referred to Hungarian or German national minorities as “enemies,” 
“persons unreliable in relation to the state,” “war criminals,” or “traitors;” naturally these usages 
inflamed national tensions in the post-war period (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 218). Specifically, 
there was a rise in violence, homicides, and seizures of property that were nationally motivated. 
 The Czechoslovak government also attempted a population exchange with its Hungarian 
minorities and Hungary. Preparations for this agreement were published under No. 145/1946 Sb. 
based on Decree No. 133/1945 Sb. regarding the revocation of citizenship. Under No. 145/1946 
Sb., the population transfer would apply to those who lost their citizenship under No. 133/1945 Sb 
(Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 195). While the population transfer was proposed, there was no 
international support for it from the Peace Conference in Paris in 1947. Despite the initial intention 
to transfer roughly 500,000 Hungarians from Slovakia, the government was only able to transfer 
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around 90,000 Hungarian minorities to Hungary in exchange for about 70,000 Slovaks (Bugajski, 
1995: 323).  
As a result of the failure to accomplish a comprehensive transfer, Czechoslovakia 
attempted other policies to regulate its Hungarian minority population. Hungarian minorities were 
required to complete labor service under Decree No. 88/1945 Sb.; failure to do so would subject 
Hungarians to forced labor camps, which were regulated under No. 105/1945 Sb. Essentially, 
individuals stripped of their citizenship were required to work on behalf of the state. While these 
workers were supposed to be treated the same as their Czechoslovak counterparts, in reality were 
significantly underpaid and were often mistreated by their employers, leading to insufficient 
nutrition and clothing (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 218). The failure to implement a full population 
transfer also resulted in the forced relocation of Slovak Hungarians to Czech lands which were 
once occupied by German minorities for labor (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017). These decrees were 
ultimately considered as reparations to Czechoslovakia after their war against Germany and 
Hungary.  
 For individuals who were not stripped of citizenship, Czechoslovakia attempted 
“reslovakization.” Under this policy, Hungarians deemed to be of Slovak origin could acquire 
Slovak nationality. Reslovakization was predominantly based on the perceived loyalty of 
Hungarian applicants to the state, and individuals who successfully underwent “reslovakization” 
were not subject to forced labor or loss of property. In addition to the changes made towards 
national minorities from 1945 to 1948, the Communist Party also solidified its standing and power. 
Under the communist-inspired Košice Program, there was comprehensive land nationalization, 
and governmental control was established over major industries and banks. The Stalinist take-over 
of 1948 consolidated the extensive centralization of the economy and political power that had 
already begun (Bugajski, 1995: 323).  
 
3.2.2 Czechoslovakia: 1948 – 1968  
Under communist rule the newly re-established Czechoslovak state was significantly more 
nationally homogenous, with approximately 90% of the total population being Czech or Slovak 
(Leff, 1997: 46). This was largely the result of forced population transfers of Germans, 
reslovakization of Hungarians, and the forced resettlement of national minorities. The 
establishment of a communist government disposed of its parliamentary democracy, and led to 
reduced political freedom. Despite the centralization of power, more rights were granted to 
national minorities than in the immediate post-war years. The promotion of national minority 
rights fell in line with communist thought, which sought to accommodate its minorities without 
supporting national self-determination. Hungarians regained citizenship in 1948 with the passage 
of Act No. 245/1948 Sb. on State Citizenship of Persons of Hungarian Nationality. Furthermore, 
any individual with Hungarian nationality could acquire Czechoslovak citizenship after taking an 
oath of loyalty to the state (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 235).  
The communist government also granted civil rights to Hungarians and established 
Hungarian language schools. Cultural societies, books and media, and political representation for 
Hungarian national minorities also began to emerge (Šutaj, 2011: 282). Czechoslovakia ceased 
land confiscation, permitted the return of resettled Hungarians, and the central government 
supported the development of cultural rights (Šutaj, 2011). Political representation began in 1952 
as Hungarians became included in District National Committees and Regional National 
Committees; bilingualism was further enforced in binational districts. The policies of 
“reslovakization” were further revised in 1954 (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 245). The Hungarian 
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population rose from 200,000 to 530,000 after the “reslovakization” campaign ended: Hungarians 
no longer needed to declare themselves as Slovak to avoid discrimination (Bugajski, 1995: 323). 
Hungarian national minorities were able to attain improved political representation, education and 
language policies, and cultural development under communism. However, many of these 
permissions were subject to centralized state approval and remained under the party’s supervision 
(Bugajski, 1995).  
The 1960 Czechoslovak Constitution briefly mentioned rights for national minority groups 
under Section 25, which stated “Citizens of Hungarian, Ukrainian, and Polish nationality are 
provided with all possibilities and means of education in their mother tongue and cultural 
development” (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017: 245). The period from 1948 to 1968 ultimately saw 
increased cultural autonomy, education, and language rights for national minorities; it was a drastic 
change compared to previous treatment after the Second World War.  
 
3.2.3 The Prague Spring and the Constitutional Act of 1968 
 Mild liberalization in Czechoslovakia continued with increasingly favorable policies 
towards national minorities. The Prague Spring of 1968 (from January to August) saw the 
Communist Party in Czechoslovakia attempt a series of reforms to liberalize the state and introduce 
greater political and social rights, including increased rights for national minorities. The 
government made a series of amendments to the 1960 Constitution. First, Czechoslovakia was turn 
into a federation comprised of: The Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic. 
Of the proposed changes, Amendment 144 dealt directly with national minority rights in 
Czechoslovakia. The liberalization of the state alarmed the Soviet Union, and as a result Brezhnev 
and the Warsaw Pact ordered tanks into Prague in August of 1968. The state remained under Soviet 
occupation and became one of the most repressed people’s democracies until 1989 (Harris, 2002: 
7).  
 The crushing of the Prague Spring did not fully end the movement for increased civil rights 
and cultural autonomy. The Constitutional Act 144/1968 No. Sb. on Rights of Nationalities was 
proposed in October of 1968, i.e.  after the Soviet intervention and occupation. Article 1 of the Act 
declared the equality of all citizens regardless of their language and nationality, naming “The 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as the common State of the Czech and Slovak nations and 
national groups living in its territory” (Constitutional Act No. 144, 1969). The Act further 
described considerable rights for national minorities, granting national groups representation in 
representative and elected bodies according to their population size. It also gave national minorities 
the right to develop education in their own language, cultural development, and the rights to use 
their language, create cultural organizations, and distribute press and media in their own language 
(Constitutional Act No. 144, 1969). The Act further allowed citizens to freely choose their own 
national origin, and prevented discrimination and ethnic alienation (Constitutional Act No. 144, 
1969: Art. 4). The Constitutional Act 144 was intended to be implemented in 1969, but was 
unfortunately never pushed through as a result of Soviet occupation (Kuklík, 2015).  
 With the movement for increased civil rights effectively stopped, the aftermath of the 
Prague Spring resulted in a new wave of repression that attempted to bring the state back in line 
with USSR policies. The time from 1969 to 1989 and the end of communism was coined the period 
of “normalization” as the USSR employed strict measures to ensure the full implementation of 
communist policies (Harris, 2002: 23). The newly appointed Czechoslovak leader was supported 
by the Soviet Union, and reversed liberalizing policies in line with Soviet beliefs. This period of 
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time coincided with a feeling of helplessness by the Czechoslovak populace that was further 
perpetuated with recentralization of state power and the suppression of political and social rights.  
 
3.2.4 Normalization: 1970-1989  
 National minorities under “normalization” experienced a reversal of policies following 
Soviet occupation, first with the failure to implement Constitutional Act No. 144/1968 Sb. The re-
implementation of hardline Soviet policies also correlated with a return to pre-existing minority 
treatment before the Prague Spring. These policies allowed for the continuation of cultural 
associations, Hungarian schools, and language use, but were all subject to centralized government 
approval. The discrepancy in national minority populations between the Czech and Slovak 
Republics also remained: the 1980 census determined the Czech Republic’s population as 95% 
Czech, whereas Slovakia’s population was less homogenized at 86% Slovak. Slovakia had a 
significant portion of Hungarians – 11% of the population – or just over 5.5 million individuals 
(Kalvoda, 1989: 427). Normalization also saw gradual pressure towards assimilation, which was 
mirrored in an increase in mixed marriages (by nationality). By the 1980s, roughly 20% of 
Hungarians were married to an individual who did not identify as Hungarian (Kuklík and Petrás, 
2017: 254). While power was increasingly centralized, Hungarian national minorities were able to 
attain proportional representation in many government bodies (Kalvoda, 1989). Again, inclusion 
in politics remained subject to Party approval and appointment, and as a result did not truly express 
the views of the Hungarian population.  
 Overall, the return to former policies did not stop a push for improved language and 
education for Hungarian minorities. Instead, Hungarians turned to cultural organizations as 
avenues to advocate their interests. The Cultural Union of Hungarian Working People in 
Czechoslovakia (CSEMADOK) had been established in 1949, and continued to advocate the 
promotion of Hungarian culture and language. The union had been continuously growing and by 
the 1980s, “consisted of 517 organizations with a total of 60,000 members” (Kalvoda, 1989: 429). 
In addition, numerous other organizations or cultural clubs worked on behalf of Hungarian cultural 
promotion and production: Hungarian magazines, radio, and television continued to emerge. 
Language use was regulated primarily by regional national committees. Minority 
languages were rarely used within administrative or governmental bodies, and relegated to use 
solely by national minority groups (Kuklík and Petrás, 2017). Furthermore, higher education 
revealed the discrepancy in educational opportunities between Czechs and Slovaks in comparison 
to national minorities. Among the general population in 1980, over 5% of Czechs and Slovaks 
were university graduates; in contrast, barely 2% of Hungarians had graduated university (Kuklík 
and Petrás, 2017: 254). This contrast was largely because of the lack of quality education in 
Hungarian minority schools, which did not provide adequate instruction in Slovakian. The 
unfamiliarity with the Slovak language among Hungarian pupils later hindered their ability to enter 
and successfully perform in higher education (Kalvoda, 1989).  
Growing dissatisfaction with minority language and education came to a head in 1983 with 
the Miklos Duray case. In 1983, proposals to reform schools triggered Hungarian minority 
backlash because the reforms intended to remove the teaching of minority languages in schools. 
Miklos Duray had been first arrested and imprisoned for his involvement in the Committee for the 
Protection of Rights of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia and held without trial (Kalvoda, 
1989: 430). He was arrested again in 1984 after protesting these education reforms that would 
abolish national minority teaching in their own languages. His imprisonment galvanized protests 
from the Hungarian community in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and gained international traction 
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among the Hungarian diaspora in the West (Simon & Gilberg, 1986). Duray was tried for treason 
but later released; his trial was attended by Amnesty International, the Western press, and 
Hungary’s Writers Union (The New York Times, 1983). While protests mostly stemmed from the 
Hungarian community, there was also dissent from some Czechs and Slovaks, who were beginning 
to protest the communist state (Kalvoda, 1989).  
 
3.3 Romania: World War II and Increasing Repression Under Communism 
Romania regained most of its territory from Hungary after the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, 
but ceded some of its northern territories of Besserabia – or modern day Moldova – to the Soviet 
Union. Northern Transylvania was placed back under Romanian control, and the reintegration of 
Hungarian minorities into the Hungarian state halted. During the war, Romanians and Hungarians 
living in Transylvania had occupied a gray zone, one continuously transferred between their 
respective patron-states, and fresh status reversals led to rising tensions among the Romanians and 
Hungarians during 1940-45. The Hungarian population in Transylvania accounted for 
approximately 9% of the total population, or around 1.5 million people (Kopyś, 2008: 176). 
Romania had allied itself with Germany during the war, and was eventually occupied by the Soviet 
Union as the war drew to a close. When the war was close to ending, traditional Romanian parties 
began to discuss a population transfer of the Hungarian minority population; they were suspicious 
of them as a result of Hungary’s aggressive territorial claims during the war. Hungarian minorities 
therefore aligned themselves with leftist Romanian parties in hopes of gaining better treatment 
after the war. As the war ended in 1945, Romania’s Communist Party created an alliance with the 
Hungarian People’s Union (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 49). 
The Soviet occupation was directly responsible in shaping national politics after the war. 
In contrast to Slovakia, Romania adopted a conciliatory approach its toward Hungarian minorities. 
These accommodating policies included granting national minorities increased representation in 
the government by reserving seats for national minorities (Kopyś, 2008). As Hungarian minorities 
aligned with the left, Hungarian political parties were also able to gain representation among 
leftists. For instance, the Hungarian People’s Union ran independently and won 8.3% of the votes 
in 1946 (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 59).  
As Romania became the Socialist Republic of Romania in 1947, Romania adopted Marxist-
Leninist thought in line with the Soviet model.  Under a single-party system the means of 
production were socialized, the Orthodox Church was nationalized, and power was centralized in 
an unprecedented fashion. This shift eventually marked a net loss for Hungarian minorities as they 
no longer retained their dominance in urban centers: Hungarian churches and community centers 
were closed, and their previous position as the urban middle class was weakened (Kiss, Székely, 
Toró, & al, 2018). 
 
3.3.1 The Hungarian Autonomous Region (MAT): 1952 - 1968 
 In 1950, under Soviet guidance, Romania began to consider the establishment of an 
autonomous region in Transylvania – the Magyar Autonóm Tartomány (MAT) – where the 
population was 77% Hungarian (Kopyś, 2008: 175). The MAT was located in modern-day Székely 
Land, in Eastern Transylvania (see Map 5.2.a in the Annex). The creation of an autonomous region 
sought to retain support from Hungarians who had been supportive of leftist movements (Bottoni, 
2017). The establishment of an autonomous region also followed Marxist-Leninist theory and 
practice, and mimicked the USSR’s attempt to resolve nationality issues (Connor, 1984). The 
region was demarcated near the center of Romania, avoiding both the border with Hungary and 
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areas in which Romanians were dominant. The 1952 Constitution governed this region under 
Article 18, which divided the state into 18 provinces (1952: Art. 18). The MAT was subject to all 
Romanian laws, but was able to locally elect its own representatives to the People’s Council (The 
Constitution of the Romanian People’s Republic, 1952: Art. 58). Despite the promise of 
representation, political power was still heavily centralized within the Communist Party (Bottoni, 
2017: 86). The MAT did not encapsulate all Hungarians living within Romania: only a third of all 
Hungarian minorities lived within the autonomous province (Kopyś, 2008: 178). Greater 
Transylvania had significant numbers of Hungarians who lived outside the autonomous region. 
Hungarians within the MAT were afforded better protections than those outside the region, but 
collectively, Hungarian minorities lacked political power.  
 The establishment of an autonomous region for Hungarian national minorities led to 
increased national mobilization within Romania. German national minorities petitioned for an 
autonomous region, and Romanians living within the MAT were afraid of being treated as 
minorities within the province (Kopyś, 2008: 178). Hungarian national minorities outside the 
region were also dissatisfied with their treatment. While Hungarians in the MAT enjoyed language 
use, minority education, and political representation, Hungarians outside the province were 
restricted. They were not permitted to use their language or access education in their mother-
tongue. While the region provided improved treatment for Hungarian national minorities, it was 
not necessarily satisfactory for Hungarian leaders who wanted improved conditions for the 
majority of Hungarians living outside the region.  
 The autonomous region continued to exist during the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. The 
Hungarian Revolution in Hungary was marked by anti-communist protests. Some Hungarian 
minorities in Transylvania and greater Romanian were sympathetic to the movement and led 
protests within provinces with large populations of Hungarians. The Romanian authorities viewed 
the support as betrayal to the communist state, and responded with violent crackdowns. Among 
Hungarian protesters, “several thousand were sent to labor camps, 15 were sentenced to death, of 
whom 14 were executed” (Kopyś, 2008: 180). The Hungarian Revolution marked a turning point 
in the treatment of Hungarian minorities living within Romania: Hungarian minority claims were 
now referred to as “revisionist” and “counter-revolutionary” (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 59). 
The Soviet Union withdrew from Hungary after the Hungarian Revolution occurred, and the 
tolerance for national minorities began to decline. The aftermath of the Revolution led to 
detentions of Hungarian political elites and families, with roughly 40,000 receiving prison 
sentences from 10-25 years (Kopyś, 2008: 180). The succeeding years (1957-61) saw the purging 
and repression of Hungarians, and the loss of their political influence within the Communist Party.  
In addition to violent crackdowns, Hungarian and Romanian schools began to be forcibly 
integrated in 1959. Hungarian universities, and Hungarian press outlets, were closed: the latter 
determined to be in violation of state censorship laws (Kopyś, 2008: 176). The autonomous region 
was deliberately expanded in 1960 from 759,000 square kilometers to 802,000 square kilometers 
in order to dilute its Hungarian concentration. It now included new areas with Romanian 
majorities, and was renamed the Mureș-Magyar Autonomous Region (MMAT). Two districts 
within the previous region – Kézdi and Sepsi – were removed, and placed them into another 
province with a Romanian majority (Kopyś, 2008: 181). This ethnic gerrymandering reduced the 
concentration of Hungarians within the MMAT from 77% to 62% of the population (Kopyś, 2008: 
176).  The deliberate restructuring of the region was indicative of the state’s increasing opposition 
to the autonomous zone. The MMAT was finally dissolved in 1968, and replaced with districts not 
based on national autonomy.  
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3.3.2 Ceaușescu’s Regime and Liberalization: 1965-1970  
 Nicolae Ceaușescu was appointed the general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party 
in 1965, and remained the leader of the state until his overthrow in 1989. During his regime, 
Romania became increasingly totalitarian, enacting severely repressive policies on both national 
minorities and the broader population. Ceaușescu’s initial policies hinted at the possibility of 
liberalization. He had supported the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Romania after the 
crackdown of the Hungarian Revolution, and opposed Soviet intervention in the Eastern bloc 
(Stanciu, 2013: 1064). Ceaușescu’s divergence from the Soviet model and his tolerance for 
national minorities brought him a relatively positive reception in Western media.  
 The initial stages of Ceaușescu’s regime were marked with tolerance toward national 
minorities and cultural liberalization. One of the significant events in 1968 was a meeting between 
Ceaușescu and Hungarian leaders. At the meeting, Hungarian minority leaders were concerned 
with language use, education in their mother-tongue, and increased development of cultural life. 
They requested further legal status for Hungarian national minorities, but that was denied. This 
meeting was notable as Hungarian leaders were welcomed to present their group interests to the 
central government (Šisler, 2015: 138). Following the meeting, there were advances made for 
Hungarians, including the establishment of Hungarian magazines, broadcasting, museums, and 
language programs (Šisler, 2015: 138). Ceaușescu also permitted the establishment of the Council 
of Workers of Hungarian Nationality (CWHN). This organization became the leading advocate 
for Hungarian interests after the dissolution of the Hungarian People’s Union in 1953 (Šisler, 2015: 
140). The CWHN not only promoted Hungarian national minority interests, but worked alongside 
the Romanian Communist Party to counter Soviet Union intrusion into domestic state interests.  
These developments allowed for the inclusion of Hungarian national minority voices 
within the government and granted Hungarian minority leaders a small degree of influence over 
national policy. Ceaușescu’s continued openness towards the West brought hope to both Western 
leaders and domestic Romanians who looked favorably upon liberalization. His tolerance towards 
national minorities further gained him support from Hungarian minorities who viewed him as 
sympathetic to their interests.  
 
3.3.3 The July Theses 
 Ceaușescu’s liberalization ended in July of 1971, with the promotion of his “July Theses.” 
This speech called for a “cultural revolution” in Romania and promoted a form of extreme 
nationalism that differed from the Soviet model (Culic, 2006: 179). The theses were later put forth 
as documents in a Party Plenum, but called for increased “political education and party control” 
(Stanciu, 2013, 1065). Ceaușescu cultivated a personality cult, and adopted severe restrictions on 
Western influences and liberalization. The sudden shift in policies also led to a rise in the secret 
police, repression of press, and increased propaganda in education and media (Stanciu, 2013: 
1068). 
 Under Ceaușescu, the state also eliminated avenues for minority representation and 
advocacy. In 1974 a law on the Protection of the National Cultural Heritage targeted national 
minority communities with the confiscation of historical documents, art, libraries, and cultural 
objects (Culic, 2006: 180). Hungarian party cadres were increasingly viewed as unreliable, and the 
government moved towards increased centralization and integration (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 
2018: 60). In addition to the suspicion of Hungarian minorities, Romania also employed a vast 
number of secret police and informants to maintain Party dominance. Ceaușescu’s regime had 
some of the highest numbers of informants in the Eastern bloc, and prominent Hungarian regions 
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– such as Transylvania – reported higher cases of raids (Bottoni, 2017: 114). Violent state 
repression was commonplace under Ceaușescu’s regime, both against national minorities and 
Romanians.  
The increase in Party control under Ceaușescu continued to grow into the 1980s, as 
heightened state control eroded freedoms. For Hungarians living within Romania, their situation 
worsened with the suppression of Hungarian language use in public spaces, the decline in 
Hungarian student enrollment at higher universities, and the heavy policing of their communities 
(Culic, 2006: 180). During this time, Hungary attempted to reach out to its national minorities 
outside of its state. The attempts of the Hungarian minority to connect with their kin-state 
perpetuated the suspicion that Hungarian minorities were traitors to Romania. The continued 
repression of minorities contributed to a migration of Hungarians minorities into neighboring state. 
The 1980s had an increase in migrants (or refugees) into Yugoslavia and Hungary: around  50,000 
Hungarians, or one in ten of their total number, left Romania for Hungary or Western states 
(Bottoni, 2017: 134). The alienation of Hungarians in Romania pushed Hungarian minorities 
towards their kin-state, and they increasingly felt a sense of identity with Hungary (Culic, 2006: 
181). Altogether, targeted repression, Hungarian foreign policy and outreach, and the increasing 
control of the government drove Hungarian minorities from Romania (Bottoni, 2017: 134).  
 
3.3.4 The Romanian Revolution: 1989 
Poor management under Ceaușescu had resulted in economic stagnation and growing 
discontent among the Romanian populace. Tolerance for the regime began to fade and on 
December 16th, 1989, an outbreak of Hungarian minority protests in Timișoara – Western 
Transylvania – triggered the start of the Romanian Revolution. The Hungarian minority was 
protesting against the imprisonment of a prominent Hungarian pastor, László Tőkés. He had been 
a pastor in the Hungarian Reformed Church, and had a long history of advocacy for Hungarian 
minorities. Tőkés was placed under house arrest on the church premises because the state suspected 
him of smuggling information regarding his situation to Hungary and Western Europe (Kiss, 
Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 57). The government finally attempted to evict him from the church, 
but was met with protests from his congregation (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 57). While 
Timișoara did not have a huge Hungarian minority, the protests from the Hungarian Reformed 
Church later grew into large scale protests against the communist regime. 
Ceaușescu’s government responded with violence, receiving international condemnation 
for his aggressive crackdown on protests. The ongoing poor economy, social and political 
repression, and disapproval of his government contributed to the spread of protests. Ultimately, 
what began as protests by a Hungarian minority church eventually spread and led to the subsequent 
end of communist rule in Romania (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 60). The military, which had 
once supported Ceaușescu, switched sides to support the protestors, and Ceaușescu was later 
arrested, tried, sentenced to death, and executed. The end of Ceaușescu’s regime marked the 
beginning of Romania’s democratization and its move to leave the Soviet bloc and integrate with 
Western Europe. 
 
3.4 Slovenia: WWII and National Minority Tolerance Under Communism   
Yugoslavia emerged from World War II divided among its national communities. World 
War II had contributed to a ferocious civil war, with different national minority groups aligning 
themselves with different sides of the international war. The Hungarian population size in 
Yugoslavia remained relatively the same both before and after the war, with slightly under half a 
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million dwelling in Vojvodina in Backa, and some settlements in Baranja and Prekmurje – located 
in Croatia and Slovenia, respectively (Shoup, 1963: 1). These regions were returned to Yugoslavia 
after their annexation by Hungary during the war.  
The Hungarian and German minority populations living within these regions faced 
expulsion and repression as the war began to end in 1944. They were viewed as sympathetic to 
Nazi Germany and Hungary who had jointly invaded Yugoslavia (Levene, 2013). The end of Nazi 
occupation was marked with violence, and an estimated 30,000 Hungarian national minorities 
were killed or imprisoned at the end of the war (Ludanyi, 1979: 237). An additional 40,000 
Hungarians were deported from the state (Ludanyi, 1979: 274). Despite the initial crackdown on 
national minorities, a law was soon passed in 1945 on the Prohibition of the Incitement of National, 
Racial and Religious Hatred and Discord that would apply criminal sanctions to anyone who 
denied individuals their national rights (Shoup, 1963: 72).  
 Yugoslavia re-established itself as a communist state in the 1945 elections under a single 
party: The Communist National Front. The new government removed the King and declared the 
state the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. A new constitution was issued in 1946, which 
was heavily modeled after the Soviet Union. The Constitution of 1946 followed the Marxist-
Leninist model of nationalism, and defined the new regime as a “federal people's state, republican 
in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, 
including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state” 
(Ludanyi, 1979: 274). By defining it as a federal state, the Constitution attempted to create a 
structured state that would grant regional autonomy to its republics and autonomous regions. The 
Constitution established six republics – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, 
Croatia, and Macedonia – and two Autonomous Provinces – Kosovo and Vojvodina in Serbia. The 
constitution granted republics jurisdiction over the rights of their national minorities. Republics 
created their own legislation, called constitutions, and Autonomous Provinces were governed by 
statutes.  
The 1946 Constitution claimed to grant freedoms, such as the freedom of speech and 
religion, to the Yugoslav people, but in reality secured centralized power for the Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia (Ramet, 2006: 169). Despite heavily centralized power, the Constitution still 
recognized the multinational nature of the state and attempted to maintain equality between the 
prominent national groups. National minorities were granted free use of their native language, 
bilingual administration was implemented in regions with multiple national groups, and education 
was secured for minorities (Várady, 1997). The establishment of education for national minorities 
was granted in 1945 by the Ministry of Education which provided minority language instruction 
in regions with large minority populations (Lukanovič and Limon, 2012: 96).  
 National minority education was further supplemented with a federal educational law in 
1958 that protected the instruction of minority languages in minority schools (Lukanovič and 
Limon, 2012: 97). Hungarian national minorities living in Prekmurje (Slovenia) and Vojvodina 
(Serbia) were guaranteed education in their mother-tongue, and in Prekmurje, bilingual education 
was available for all students, regardless of their nationality (Lukanovič and Limon, 2012: 32). 
Vojvodina also established bilingual Serbo-Croatian and Hungarian schools for both majority and 
minority students. The establishment of multinational schools demonstrated the state’s 
commitment to enforcing national equality. However, despite the availability of national minority 
schools and language instruction, educational inequality persisted. The differences between 
national minority schools and non-minority schools was noticeable in school resources, with 
minority books lacking in comparison to “Yugoslav” textbooks – or books written for the 
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prominent recognized nations of the state, such as Croats or Serbs, or Slovenes. Because of this, 
Hungarian students often enrolled in Slovene or non-minority schools for better future 
opportunities (Lukanovič and Limon, 2012: 32). 
 The adherence to an “equal” Yugoslavia was mirrored in subsequent versions of the 
Constitution. Under the 1963 Constitution, the government reiterated the establishment of the state 
as a federation with “equal peoples” and guaranteed citizens “the freedom to express their . . . 
nationality and culture” (Ludanyi, 1979: 245). The Statute of Vojvodina further named rights for 
Hungarians, stating that all nationalities had the right to express themselves in their own languages 
(Ludanyi, 1979: 245). Multinationalism continued to grow in Yugoslavia, with the emergence of 
newspapers, media, and television programs in different languages (Ivanova, 2012: 98).  However, 
despite the attempt to establish language equality for all national groups within Yugoslavia, Serbo-
Croatian operated as the “lingua franca,” and was most prevalent within the military and 
government (Ivanova, 2012: 100). This later contributed to arguments by national group leaders 
on what should be the “official” language of use by governmental bodies, and exacerbated 
frustrations among non-dominant national groups who felt their languages were overlooked. 
 The difference in treatment for Slavic nationalities and non-Slavic nationalities also 
became more evident with the 1963 Constitution and its discussion on autonomy. Specifically, 
Republics were granted increased autonomy from the central government, while the Autonomous 
Provinces – primarily occupied by non-Slavic minorities – remained heavily subject to the 
discretion of the Republics (Ludanyi, 1979: 245). The existence and rights of Autonomous 
Provinces derived from the Republic that was willing to grant them, and Republics were not 
obligated to establish autonomous provinces. This meant that while equality was promoted within 
the state, it still relegated political and social autonomy to Slavic nationalities and reduced rights 
to non-Slavic nationalities. Yugoslavia differentiated between nationalities who had their own 
states elsewhere – such as the Hungarians – and those who were a part of Yugoslavia (the land of 
South Slavs).  
 
3.4.1 The 1974 Constitution 
 The 1974 Constitution continued a pattern of national minority protections by guaranteeing 
non-discrimination and the right to express national culture, language use, and alphabet use. The 
Constitution followed previous constitutions by establishing the equality of all individuals, 
regardless of nationality under Article 245, which stated that “the nations and nationalities of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall have equal rights” (1974: Art. 245). In addition, the 
Constitution made specific grants to language rights under Article 269 which granted the use of 
Hungarian and Albanian in the authentication of Federal statutes (1974, Art. 269).  However, the 
1974 Constitution differentiated between “nations” and “nationalities.” Specifically, the 
Constitution stated that both nations and nationalities have the right to equality and freedom within 
the state, but only nations had the right to self-determination, while nationalities did not (1974). 
Nations were considered Slavic nationalities – such as Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs – while non-
Slavic nationalities were grouped under the term “nationalities.” This category included 
Hungarians and other smaller minority groups (Ludanyi, 1979: 243). Non-Slavic minorities were 
not considered to be “from” Yugoslavia, instead they came from other existing states outside of 
Yugoslav territory. The differentiation between the two limited which national groups were 
permitted self-determination and claims to self-autonomy. While the Constitution of 1974 made a 
clear distinction between “nations” and “nationalities,” many of the rights it granted mirrored 
existing rights under the constitutions of Republics or statutes of Autonomous Provinces. 
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 The 1974 Constitution improved the status of Autonomous Provinces, stating that the 
territorial integrity of Provinces could not be altered without the consent of the Autonomous 
Province itself. National minorities viewed this as a step towards increased self-autonomy. The 
Constitution also granted further autonomy to the Republics and Autonomous Regions of the state, 
reducing the formal power of the federal government (Ludanyi, 1979). The increased 
independence of republics resulted in additional legislation that catered to the national minorities 
living within each republic or region. Specific Republic Constitutions acknowledged the rights of 
national minorities, and granted their national minority groups further protections the central 
government did not. For instance, the Slovenian Constitution of 1974 recognized the rights of two 
national minority groups: Hungarians and Italians (Várady, 1997). In addition, the 1974 
Constitution of the Province of Vojvodina identified four national minorities, including 
Hungarians. All the republican and provincial constitutions declared the equality of nations and 
nationalities.  
 However, while the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution increased equality among all nations and 
national minorities legally, the reality was different. Hungarians and non-Slavic national minorities 
continued to have limited political representation in the central government, which was dominated 
by Slavic nationalities (Tolvaišis, 2012). The military forces and civil servants were almost entirely 
Serbian, which led to biases in their conduct and investigations (Ludanyi, 1979: 243). The 
differentiation between nations – Slavic individuals – and nationalities – non-Slavic individuals – 
created a hierarchy of citizenship with national minorities, such as Hungarians, adopting a position 
as second class citizens (Várady, 1997). Any attempts to protest inequality would be labeled as 
“nationalist” and condemned. As a result, while Yugoslavia afforded considerable rights to all 
national groups – including national minorities – their attempted policies of “equality” in reality 
meant the subtle domination of Slavic nationalities.  
 
3.4.2 Slovenia’s Secession and Independence from Yugoslavia 
 The death of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito led to the rise of Slobodan Milošević in 
Serbia and the promotion of Serbian superiority. Milošević’s rise and attempt to centralize power 
was driven by the goal of consolidating all Serbian people within the state: a Serb Yugoslavia. His 
attempts to change the Constitution of the central government were met with resistance by other 
prominent national groups – specifically the Slovenes, Croats and by Albanians in Kossova 
(Ramet, 2006: 555). Both Slovenia and Croatia resisted further integration, and wanted to establish 
a confederal relationship with the central government. In contrast, Milošević wanted a significantly 
more centralized state with increased federal power.  
The difference in Republic interests came to a head in 1990 with Milošević’s attempts to 
alter the construction of the Yugoslav Presidency Council to increase Serbian representation and 
influence. Dissent over Milošević’s actions sparked counter-nationalism within the different 
Republics. Slovenia acted upon the principle of self-determination within its Constitution and held 
a referendum to leave the state of Yugoslavia. With a majority of the population voting for 
independence, Slovenia declared independence in 1991 (Ramet, 2006: 555). Yugoslavia’s military 
– led by Milošević – engaged in a brief conflict known as the Ten Day War, but soon left the state 






4. European Union Accession 
 
 The 1990s ushered in a wave of democratization within the Eastern bloc, brought by 
revolutions within communist states in the Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia, and the later collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The pace and pattern of democratization varied, with some states experiencing 
violent transitions from communism. For the three cases analyzed, Czechoslovakia ended 
communism in 1989, and Slovakia became an independent state in 1993 after its Velvet Divorce 
from the Czech Republic. Romania’s communist regime ended in 1989 after the Romanian 
Revolution, and Slovenia gained its independence from Yugoslavia and began its transition to a 
democratic state in 1991. Hungary also transitioned from communism in 1989, with Soviet 
occupation eventually ending in 1991. The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern 
European states prompted Western Europe to call for a “return to Europe” that would eventually 
integrate Central and Eastern Europe into the West. The call for European integration 
corresponded with the establishment of the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty – or the 
Treaty of the European Union – in 1992 to promote shared security and neighborly relations among 
European states. As the Eastern bloc emerged from communism, the newly established European 
Union eventually agreed to the inclusion of post-communist states to the Union and began 
establishing criteria for accession. 
 
4.1 Slovakia: Nationalist Sentiment and Reluctant EU Compliance 
 Czechoslovakia attempted democratization as a confederal state after the Velvet 
Revolution in 1989. The fall of communism began on November 17, 1989 after the military police 
suppression of a student demonstration triggered statewide protests. Within a month, the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia resigned (Glenn, 1999: 200). The state held its first 
democratic elections in 1990, and removed parts of the constitution that protected the role of the 
Communist Party in the government (Glenn, 1999: 200). Demographically, the state maintained 
its relatively homogenous structure, with the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic each having 
concentrated populations of their respective nationalities – the Czechs and Slovaks. Most of the 
minorities were located in Slovakia, with Hungarian minorities constituting roughly 11% of the 
population in the Slovak Republic (Kusý, 2006: 49). The differences in national composition 
between the two republics and unequal power distribution between Czechs and Slovaks 
contributed to their later split in 1993.  
 
4.1.1 Czechoslovakia: National Minorities and the Velvet Divorce 
 Czechoslovakia’s political, social, and economic systems had historically been dominated 
by the Czechs (Connor, 1984: 292). The concentration of power under the Czechs in major state 
systems continuously undermined Slovaks, who had been underrepresented in the Communist 
Party (McGarry, 2018: 540). The underlying tension between the two national groups contributed 
to the state’s struggling democratization, and national minorities were eventually pulled into the 
divide between the two prominent national groups. As Czechoslovakia began its democratization, 
the state quickly accepted a Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, directly in response to 
the European Convention for Human Rights put forth by the Council of Europe. Czechoslovakia 
had ratified the ECHR as a necessary first step to gaining membership into the Council of Europe, 
which would act a part of broader Western integration. The acceptance of a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms guaranteed the rights of national minorities in the state’s constitution under 
Chapter 3, Articles 24 and 25. These two articles stated that “membership in a national or ethnic 
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minority may not be to anyone’s detriment” and further guaranteed cultural development, 
education, use of their own language, and the right to engage in affairs that concern their 
communities (Slovakia Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 1992, Art. 24 and 25). The 
provision of democratic freedoms contributed to the initial improvement of conditions for national 
minorities in the state.  
While democratization afforded national minorities increased rights, events concerning the 
Hungarian minority led to tensions with Slovaks during Czechoslovakia’s beginning 
democratization. Notably, the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dams over the Danube 
River between Hungary and Slovakia had been protested by the Hungarian minority since 
construction because it disrupted their communities. The dam contributed to disputes between 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and in 1989, Hungary decided to halt their construction of the dams. 
The suspension was interpreted by Slovaks to be an anti-Slovak move that demonstrated 
“Hungarian chauvinism,” heightening anti-Hungarian minority sentiment within the state (Kuklík 
& Petrás, 2017: 261). While the project was later resolved, the protests of the Hungarian national 
minority contributed to suspicion that the Hungarian community was not loyal to Czechoslovakia. 
Despite some issues involving national minorities, the tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks 
were at the heart of breakup of the two republics. In 1993, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist, and two 
states – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic – were established. The peaceful separation 
of the two republics became known as the Velvet Divorce. Both had developed their own 
constitutions in 1992, providing the basis for their newly acquired statehoods.    
 
4.1.2 The 1992 Constitution 
The establishment of an independent Slovakia and its 1992 Constitution granted national 
minority rights in accordance with the Council of Europe and the earlier ratification of the 
European Convention for Human Rights. The 1992 Constitution was largely based on the previous 
constitution under communism; it had simply been amended to include democratic provisions and 
necessary national minority rights in accordance with the ECHR. National minority rights were 
outlined in the Constitution under Articles 33 and 34. The rights granted were based on 
Czechoslovakia’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and stated that national minority 
identification would not be to the detriment of any individual. They further guaranteed minority 
language use, education, and cultural development (1992, Art. 34). In addition to the 1992 
Constitution, Slovakia adopted the Official Language Act, which stated that national minority 
languages could be used in regions where 20% of the population spoke the same non-Slovak 
language (Kibbee, 1996: 148). The Official Language Act was an extension of Article 34 of the 
Constitution, and was in place until it was later revoked and replaced with a new law in 1995.  
While the 1992 Constitution discussed the protection of national minorities, minority 
communities were wary of the Constitution’s preamble. The preamble began with “We, the Slovak 
Nation” (1992). The terminology implied the creation of a Slovak nation-state that would exclude 
the rights of national minorities. The Constitution was seen as the establishment of a state only for 
the Slovak people. Together, the Preamble of the Constitution and a general vagueness towards 
national minority rights were worrying to minority communities. 
 
4.1.3 Mečiar’s Leadership and Progression of Domestic Practices 
 Vladimír Mečiar was established as Prime Minister of Slovakia in 1990 and held the 
position until 1998. Many of Mečiar’s autocratic tendencies led to complications with Western 
integration, and his consistent appeal to nationalist ideology hindered Slovakia’s EU accession 
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negotiations. Mečiar’s party was the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), and relied on 
a coalition with the Slovak National Party (SNS) to construct a government (Haughton, 2002: 
1321). The SNS party was a far-right political party that continuously employed pro-Slovak 
nationalist sentiment. Together, Mečiar’s policies towards national minorities and his coalition 
with the SNS led to the implementation of anti-Hungarian minority policies that were widely 
condemned by the EU, the OSCE HCNM, and the Council of Europe. 
The policies undertaken by the Slovakian government regarding national minorities 
through the early and mid-1990s were directly shaped by opinions and recommendations from the 
European Union, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Council of 
Europe. Controversial policies would often be passed, criticized, and then roughly amended to be 
in line with recommendations from the three European bodies. The policies tended to be openly 
anti-national minority before later being curbed to abide by Western European standards. Domestic 
policies primarily concerned: language use, education, and political representation.  
 The first two laws concerning national minorities emerged in 1993 and focused on 
language use. Slovakia submitted a draft of the Surname Law in 1993 to the Council of Europe 
and the OSCE HCNM. The Surname Law increased tolerance for national minorities through name 
registration. Before the Surname Law was proposed, non-Slovaks had not been permitted to use 
their own last names. For instance, Hungarian national minorities were not able to register their 
Hungarian names because name registration was only permitted with Slovak grammar (Bakker, 
1998: 420). The previous surname policies had been condemned by the Council of Europe, and 
Slovakia proposal of the Surname Law in 1993 was widely praised by the CoE as an improvement 
in minority treatment. While the Surname Law did improve minority conditions, it was marginal 
in its improvement because it only applied to the registration of newborns (Kelley, 2004: 119). No 
further action was taken to expand the Surname Law, despite promises by the government to 
resolve any remaining issues with it. The state was also slow to implement the Surname Law, 
waiting until 1994 to put the legislation into action. Slovakia also passed a law on the use of 
bilingual signage in towns and villages, especially in areas with significant national minorities. 
The Council of Europe had criticized the lack of bilingual signage and viewed it as a source of 
conflict with minority communities. The Slovakian government initially did not pass any 
legislation to amend the issue, but eventually discussed permitting bilingual signage in towns with 
a 30% national minority population (Kelley, 2004: 120). Both of these laws received 
recommendations from the OSCE HCNM and the Council of Europe before being slowly 
implemented in 1994.  
Despite marginal improvements in national minority policies, Slovakia continued to adopt 
anti-minority legislation. The Slovakian government passed a new Law on the State Language in 
1995, which was widely criticized by the EU, the OSCE HCNM, and the CoE for its potential 
threat to national minorities. It recognized the Slovak language as “the State language on the 
territory of the Slovak Republic” and declared it to have “priority over other languages applied on 
the whole territory of the Slovak Republic” (1995, Art. 1). The Act designated that the Slovak 
language was compulsory in all schools and educational facilities, and would be the official 
language used in municipalities, official state agenda, and media (1995). The new law did not 
provide protections for national minority languages, instead stating that the use of minority 
languages would be later addressed in separate legislation (1995, Art. 1). The 1995 Language Act 
reinforced the Slovak language by marking violations of language use as punishable by fines 
(1995, Art. 10). The lack of clarity surrounding the usage and jurisdiction of national minority 
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languages and the openly the pro-Slovak rhetoric led to concerns among the Hungarian national 
minority community and Western European institutions.   
In addition to laws regulating language use, the education of national minorities was further 
subjected to controversial policies. The education ministry of the state decreed that school 
certificates would only be issued in the Slovak language. The Hungarian national minority 
community protested the decision, which further attracted condemnation by the EU, the OSCE 
HCNM and the CoE (Kelley, 2004: 128). Contention over the 1995 Act led to the firing of 
Hungarian school teachers and administrators who failed to abide by the school certificate policies. 
While the decision by the education ministry was frowned upon, the government did not change 
its decision and the policy continued to be applied.  
Tensions with the Hungarian national minorities were heightened near the end of Mečiar’s 
tenure with his proposal for a population transfer with Hungary in 1997. Mečiar was eager for 
reelection in 1998, and continued to appeal to nationalist sentiment in hopes of maintaining enough 
support from the far-right SNS party. The prime minister proposed a population exchange with 
Hungary and continual referred to the Hungarian national minority population as a “threat” to the 
state (Perlez, 1997). While the proposal was immediately rejected by Hungarian leaders, Mečiar’s 
proposal continued to incite nationalist tensions and attracted further criticism by the West. 
 Mečiar lost the 1998 elections, however, and the establishment of new government 
leadership ushered in changes to national minority treatment in accordance with pressure from the 
EU, the HCNM, and the CoE. The Hungarian minority consolidated its political parties to form a 
single coalition party: The Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK). By doing so, they were able 
to meet the increased voting threshold of 5% and gain seats in government. However, the inclusion 
of Hungarian parties into the new government’s coalition was contingent on the disavowal of any 
territorial autonomy claims (Leff and Armeanu, 2017: 234). The Hungarians, as a result, traded 
some minority interests in order to gain political representation. The inclusion of minority 
representation ushered in new laws that benefitted national minorities. The Law on the Use of 
Languages of National Minorities (Law No. 184/1999 of Coll.) declared that the Slovak 
government was committed to respecting and protecting the rights of national minorities, stating 
that minorities would be permitted to use their language officially if they constituted at least 20% 
of the population within a municipality (1999, Act. 2). The 20% threshold was adopted in line with 
previous communist-era policies. National minorities would further be permitted to submit 
requests to local governments in their chosen language, and have street signs in their minority 
language if they met the demographic threshold. The Act repealed aspects of the 1995 State 
Language Law that only permitted usage of the Slovak language in official state sanctioned 
programs or events. However, the 20% requirement for national minorities was still heavily 
criticized by Hungarian minorities, especially by those who lived in nationally diverse regions who 
may not have met the 20% threshold.  
  
4.1.4 Slovakia and International Agreements 
There are several international agreements Slovakia agreed to which subsequently 
influenced domestic policy on national minorities. Slovakia ratified the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in 1993 upon its entry to the Council of Europe. The ratification of the 
treaty led to amendments in the 1992 Constitution that, as earlier discussed, afforded democratic 
rights and protections for national minorities and human rights. Agreement to the ECHR brought 
Slovakia in line with democratic ideals.  
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 Further influencing domestic policy was the implementation of the Treaty on Good 
Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation Between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak 
Republic in 1995, also known as the Basic Treaty. The bilateral agreement was favorably viewed 
by the West, which had promoted bilateral treaties as an effective way of ensuring national 
minority protections. The Treaty worked to promote good relations, shared security, and to 
preserve the cultural, national, and linguistic integrity of national minorities within their respective 
states (1995). The vast majority of national minority protections stemmed from Article 15, which 
acknowledged membership of a national minority as a personal choice of the individual; required 
all minorities to be protected from discrimination; and secured the right to express, maintain, and 
develop their respective cultures (1995, Art. 15). While the de facto protections for national 
minorities in Slovakia may have differed, the Basic Treaty attempted to create de jure protections 
for national minorities in both states.    
Lastly, Slovakia agreed to the Framework Convention on National Minorities (FCNM) in 
1995. The adoption of the FCNM was in line with negotiations from the Basic Treaty, where both 
states agreed to protect minority rights in accordance with the FCNM (1995, Article 15). 
Slovakia’s ratification of the FCNM was seen as a step forward in the treatment of national 
minorities by the West. Together, international treaties and agreements aided Slovakia in its 
accession and integration into the EU. The adoption of these policies continued to indicate 
Slovakia’s commitment to joining Western Europe, but their impact on domestic policy, 
specifically with regards to national minorities, was questionable. Comparatively, Slovakia’s 
domestic policies had a much greater influence than international agreements on Hungarian 
national minorities, and the domestic practices were profoundly shaped by the state leadership and 
willingness to cooperate with Western Europe.  
 
4.1.5 European Union Accession 
Following the fall of communism, Western Europe viewed the national minority situation 
in Slovakia as a potential trigger for instability in the region. As a result, Western Europe invested 
a great deal of funding in the state under the European Union’s PHARE program, which worked 
to develop economic, industrial, social, and political systems as part of the pre-accession process. 
The threat of conflict and the anticipated costs of peacekeeping operations within the region led to 
the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars into PHARE programming; this was the better 
alternative to the much higher projected costs of war (Brown & Rosecrance, 1999: 169). Slovakia 
had also indicated its intention to merge with the European Union since its independence, and as 
a result had quickly forwarded its membership with the Council of Europe. The state was seen as 
a part of a broader enlargement of the European Union into Central and Eastern Europe (European 
Commission, S. 9/97: 9). However, while the state claimed to be eager to join the West, Mečiar’s 
lack of cooperation with the EU before and during accession complicated the state’s progress.  
Slovakia formally applied for EU membership on June 27, 1995, and was repeatedly 
evaluated to see if it met the Copenhagen criteria to begin accession. In the European 
Commission’s initial opinion on Slovakia’s application in 1997, the Commission determined that 
the state had not yet met the Copenhagen criteria to start accession talks (European Commission, 
S.9.97: 77). The evaluation outlined various aspects of Slovakia’s minority group treatment that 
were in violation of the Copenhagen criteria on minority rights. The European Commission was 
particularly concerned that the state had not adhered to Recommendation 1201 of the FCNM 
(European Commission, S.9/97: 19). While non-binding, Recommendation 1201 of the FCNM 
provided for collective rights of national minorities. These included the right of minorities to 
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establish their own organizations and political parties, official usage of their names in their mother 
tongue, and the ability to establish schools and education systems in their language 
(Recommendation 1201, 1993). The Recommendation additionally granted national minorities the 
right to foster relations with their kin-states, and generally worked to promote the collective rights 
of national minorities as individuals (1993: Art. 12). Slovakia had passed legislation in 1996 that 
denied the recognition of collective rights for minorities, directly in violation of Recommendation 
1201. Despite receiving Western criticism, the Recommendation was not legally binding and 
Slovakia was not legally obligated to amend their policies (European Commission, S. 9/97: 19).  
In addition to initial concerns on Slovakia’s application, the European Commission noticed 
the lack of provision for national minority representation in the central government. The 
Commission saw this as the deliberate exclusion of minorities from state decision-making. While 
there were no reserved minority seats, Hungarian minority parties were still able to attain seats in 
parliament due to their large population size – roughly 10% of the state – and Slovakia’s use of a 
proportional voting system (European Commission, S. 9/97: 19). The European Commission 
viewed the development of Hungarian political parties positively, and saw it as a small 
improvement amid many concerning national minority issues. 
One of the most prominent issues the European Commission addressed with the state was 
the passage of the 1995 Language Law, which had made extensive provisions for the usage of the 
Slovak language with little clarity surrounding the rights of national minority languages. In 
response to Western condemnation, Slovakia had promised to amend the law, but did not do so 
until 1999 with the Law on Minority Languages. The European Commission viewed the 1995 Law 
as a contrast with Article 34 of the Slovak Constitution, which guaranteed the protection and usage 
of national minority rights (European Commission, S. 9/97: 19). The situation surrounding 
language usage was further aggravated with the lack of funding to Hungarian cultural associations 
and the termination of bilingual school certificates. As a result of Slovakia’s inadequate 
performance and ability to address outstanding issues, including national minority rights, Slovakia 
was not considered ready for accession negotiations in 1997. 
The following year the European Commission published another report on the status of 
Slovakia’s application to begin the accession process. The 1998 Report noted there had been no 
significant change in the protection of minorities or in legislation for minority languages (European 
Commission, S. 8/98: 11). The lack of protections for the rights of national minorities was 
becoming evident, with the dismissal of teachers and school administrators who refused to give 
out school certificates in Slovak in Hungarian schools. The European Commission raised 
additional concerns regarding the Basic Treaty between Slovakia and Hungary, since practices 
prescribed within the treaty had not been implemented. Amid numerous disappointments, the 
European Commission praised the Parliament’s rejection of an Educational Act Amendment in 
1998, which would have prohibited the teaching of most subjects in national minority languages. 
The proposed act would have stood in violation of the Constitution and contributed to aggravation 
of national minority relations. At the end of the 1998 Report, the European Commission concluded 
that Slovakia needed further progress on national minority rights in order to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria (European Commission, S. 8/98). 
The change in Slovakia’s government in 1998 resulted in increased cooperation with the 
EU. Slovakia finally began accession talks with the European Union in 1999. In the 1999 Report, 
the European Commission deemed Slovakia had satisfied all the Copenhagen criteria necessary to 
begin accession; the declaration was done in spite of ongoing concerns regarding the national 
minority population (European Commission, 1999). The European Commission considered the 
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passage of the 1999 Law on the Use of Minority Languages in Official Communications as 
sufficient in protecting minority languages. Previous concern regarding the lack of national 
minority representation within the government was satisfied with the appointment of a Deputy 
Prime Minister for Human Rights, National Minorities and Regional Development (European 
Commission, 1999: 16). The Commission believed Slovakia had fulfilled the Copenhagen political 
criteria, but declared that there needed to be additional work done to protect minority rights.  
Interestingly, following reports on Slovakia’s accession after 1999 no longer discussed 
Hungarian national minorities, and instead focused on the treatment and policies impacting the 
Roma community. While significant, the absence of commentary on the prominent Hungarian 
national minority marked a sudden shift in the attitudes of the European Commission. The lack of 
recommendations regarding Hungarian minorities was especially notable considering the 
European Commission had stated that further work still needed to be done regarding minority 
protection in the state (European Commission, 1999: 18).   
Slovakia continued to progress through accession, with greater focus on the political and 
economic institutions of the state. The state was finally deemed ready for EU membership in 2002 
and slated for entry into the European Union in 2004; membership occurred on the same timeline 
as Slovenia (European Commission, Gen. Rep. EU 2002). In 2003, Slovakia held a referendum to 
join the European Union and roughly 93% of the population voted to join the EU (NSD Slovakia, 
2003). Slovakia was later welcomed into the European Union on May 1, 2004.  
 
4.1.6 The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
Slovakia was admitted as a member of the OSCE in 1993. The OSCE’s HCNM was deeply 
interested in conflict prevention within the state and the HCNM began visitations in 1993, viewing 
the treatment of the Hungarian minority as ripe for destabilization. In his initial report, the HCNM 
expressed concern for Hungarian language instruction in minority schools (OSCE, 1993). During 
this time, Slovakia was passing new laws providing for the use of non-Slovak surnames and 
bilingual signs; these were praised by the HCNM. However, the HCNM was repeatedly concerned 
that Slovakia was pushing through laws on national minorities without first consulting the OSCE; 
because of this, the laws could not be first reviewed for improvement before being implemented 
(OSCE, 1993).  
The following year in 1994, the OSCE advocated increased inclusion of national minorities 
in government, and proposed establishing an organ that would focus on the treatment of national 
minorities. The Slovak government stated that they had already established a body called the 
Governmental Council of the Slovak Republic for National Minorities, which three Hungarians 
sat on. While the Slovak government insisted that there was political representation for Hungarian 
minorities, the OSCE remained concerned about the lack of involvement of national minorities in 
general elections (OSCE, 1994). There was further contention over the teaching of Hungarian 
children, with the HCNM receiving reports that there were not enough experienced teachers to 
teach the Hungarian language. In response, Slovakia restated the significance of the Slovak state 
language, and deemed the number of Hungarian language teachers to be appropriate. 
Furthermore, the HCNM’s 1995 report also focused on the financing of cultural 
development for national minorities. It noticed state funding for the Ministry of Culture had 
increased in comparison to previous years, but remained concerned that the funding was for the 
promotion of Slovakian culture at the expense of national minorities (OSCE, 1995). The 1995 
Report continuously referred the Slovak government to its international obligations under the 
Framework Convention on National Minorities and the state’s constitution. Many of the policies 
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Slovakia passed during this time were questionable in their adherence to international agreements 
or constitutional provisions.  
The 1996 Report by the HCNM focused on the Slovak Penal Code adopted in 1996. The 
Penal Code amendment specified that anyone with the intention of harming or undermining the 
constitutional order of Slovakia would be punished with imprisonment or a fine (OSCE, 1996). 
During this time, the Hungarian minority had been making claims for increased autonomy that 
could be interpreted as anti-Slovakian by the government. Enforcement of the Penal Code would 
threaten the assembly of Hungarian national minorities, and further challenge democratic ideals. 
The HCNM also noted there was a discrepancy in the treatment of Hungarian minorities compared 
to other minorities with an ongoing trend of discriminatory policies targeting the Hungarian 
population. In a response to the Penal Code concern, the Slovak government notified the OSCE 
that it was unable to pass the Penal Code in Parliament despite repeated attempts to do so (Kelley, 
2004: 124).  
While much of the concern of the HCNM centered on language rights, two further issues 
were raised in 1998 on draft laws proposed by the Slovak government. First was a Law on Local 
Elections that attempted to fix electoral representation along national lines. The fixation of voting 
rights on national identity violated democratic principles that allowed individuals to vote for 
whoever they wanted, regardless of national affiliation. The draft law was also considered to 
negatively impact national minorities as it ascribed a national identity to individuals – this would 
remove the freedom to associate with a minority culture, or the ability to identify with a national 
group privately (OSCE, 1998). The HCNM emphasized the right of the individual to choose to 
identify with their nationality. In addition to this, the Slovak government proposed a draft law on 
Education, which attempted to impose a concept called the “alternative school” (OSCE, 1998). 
The draft law proposed restrictions on national minority schools through the creation of schools 
designated for national minorities that provided bilingual teaching, language choice, etc. The 
establishment of alternative schools was in opposition to the wishes of Hungarian national 
minorities, who wanted the freedom to choose where to send their students to school – whether 
they were Hungarian, Slovak, or bilingual schools. Neither of these draft laws were later passed 
through government, but did represent the continued contention over national minority rights that 
persisted during Slovakia’s transition to Western integration.  
The shift to a new government in 1998 and the removal of Mečiar from office led to some 
improvements in national minority rights and treatment. The accommodations made to national 
minorities – specifically the 1999 Law on National Minority Languages provoked the EU to 
determine Slovakia had met the Copenhagen criteria regarding democracy and human rights and 
was ready to begin accession. The HCNM continued to work closely with the EU through its 
accession process, and later made additional comments on Slovakian elections and policies 
impacting national minorities following Slovakia’s admittance to the EU. 
 
4.1.7 The Council of Europe 
Slovakia’s relationship with the Council of Europe also changed over time, increasingly 
becoming more cooperative with the organization as it progressed through EU accession. While 
the Council of Europe has offered numerous opinions on Slovakian national minority policies, it 
has published detailed reports addressing the progress of domestic policy. These reports consider 
how domestic policy needs to be improved in accordance with provisions laid out in the 
Framework Convention for National Minorities (FCNM) and the European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages (ECRML).  
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Slovakia signed the FCNM in 1995 as a part of the Basic Treaty with Hungary, and the 
CoE provided a report on the implementation of the FCNM in Slovakia in 2000. In this report, the 
CoE recognized the improvements the Slovakian government had made in respect to national 
minority protections since its adoption of the FCNM. Concerns for improvements were largely 
focused on language policy, notably the 1995 Language Law which increased the dominance of 
the Slovak language. However, some of the CoE’s worries on the 1995 Language Law were 
assuaged with the passage of the 1999 Law on National Minority Languages. The implementation 
of the 1999 law was seen as a significant step forward in the treatment of national minorities within 
the state (Council of Europe, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)001). The CoE noted the trend in 
improvement that had occurred in the state over time; this corresponded with the removal of 
Mečiar from government and increased willingness of the state to comply with EU 
recommendations. In addition to concerns focusing on national minority language, the 2000 Report 
stressed the need for increased communication between national minority leaders and the 
government. The inclusion of minority leaders would increase avenues for cooperation between 
the central government and minority groups on minority protections.   
The CoE provided further commentary on the state’s implementation of the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified and entered into force in 2001. The report 
raised concern regarding the 20% threshold for the use of minority languages, which was set out 
in the 1999 Law on National Minority Languages. The CoE noted that this threshold may not 
provide adequate protection for national minorities who do not meet the 20% benchmark to use 
their national language. While the threshold was met by Hungarian national minorities in 
concentrated regions, it was difficult for other national minority groups to achieve (Council of 
Europe, ECRML (2007)1). The CoE further recommended that the Slovak government provide 
increased training for teachers in Hungarian to diversify the curriculum available in minority 
languages. The difference in adequate training for teachers in Slovak and Hungarian contributed 
to educational inequality. Concerns for the Hungarian language were further expressed about the 
administrative and court systems, where the usage of Hungarian was low. Both reports from the 
CoE on the implementation of the FCNM and the ECRML focused on national minority language 
rights. Since the ECRML report was provided several years later than the FCNM report, the CoE 
was concerned about the slow progress made by the state on minority policies. Since these initial 
reviews, the CoE has continued to review the implementation of the FCNM and the ECRML in 
the years following EU accession.  
 
4.1.8 Policies in Practice  
 The numerous changes in domestic policy that occurred throughout the 1990s and the mid-
2000s continued to shape the experiences of Hungarians within Slovakia. Many of the reports of 
the HCNM and the CoE relied upon input from leaders of the Hungarian community in Slovakia. 
The controversial policies of the Slovak government continuously heightened Hungarian minority 
fears during accession.   
 The lack of reserved seats for minorities within the Slovakian parliament was alarming to 
Hungarian minorities and eventually led to the establishment of political parties along national 
lines. The Hungarians were able to find representation within government by establishing their 
own political parties, notably the Magyar Coalition Party (MKP) which formed in 1998 when three 
parties merged to increase their chances of election to parliament (Friedman, 2005: 383). While 
the Hungarians were consistently able to gain positions within government as a result of the 
proportional representation system, there were attempts to remove Hungarian representation under 
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Mečiar’s government. In the 1998 elections, Mečiar proposed changing the proportional 
representation system to a majoritarian one that would have ensured the domination of Slovak 
parties. In addition, Mečiar’s government increased the state-wide threshold for parties to win 
representation in parliament from 3% to 5% of the vote (Friedman, 2005: 383). While the 
majoritarian voting system was not implemented, the 5% threshold persisted, making it more 
difficult for national minorities to gain representation in the Slovak Parliament.  
 In education, Hungarian national minority schools were established in line with Slovakia’s 
constitution and later recommendations made by the EU, the HCNM, and the CoE. In the 2000 
Report by the Slovakian government to the Council of Europe, there were 277 public nursery 
schools that used Hungarian as the main language of instruction; additionally, there were 101 
schools with bilingual education (Council of Europe, ACFC/SR (2000)4: 38). The education 
model was based on the 1992 Constitution, which mandated primary and secondary education. 
There were Hungarian, Slovakian, and bilingual schools available, and families could choose 
which schools to send their children to. Slovak schools located in regions with Hungarian 
minorities also offered some classes in the Hungarian language (Council of Europe, ACFC/SR 
(2000)4: 38). Education was incredibly important to the Hungarian national community, which 
saw it as fundamental to the continuation of its cultural survival and development.  
During the evaluations by the EU, the HCNM, and the CoE, there were concerns regarding 
inequality between Slovak and Hungarian schools –specifically focused on the training of 
Hungarian teachers and differences in available resources. Schools were a source of national 
tension, with the continued passage of laws that limited the use of Hungarian in school certificates, 
and the firing of teachers who did not abide by education policies. Hungarian national minorities 
navigated a difficult position in democratizing Slovakia because of Mečiar’s ultra-nationalist 
stance. The removal of Mečiar from the premiership in the 1998 elections immediately led to 
improved national minority protections, but the position of Hungarian minorities remained a point 
of contention throughout Slovakia’s accession to the EU. 
 
4.2. Romania: Democratization and EU Accession 
 
4.2.1 The Aftermath of Communism 
 Romania’s emergence from communism was marked by violent protests after the removal 
of communist leader Nicolae Ceaușescu. The Hungarian national minority population was then 
roughly 1.6 million people, or 5-7% of the total population of Romania (Kocsis, 2007: 184). The 
relative size of the population remained roughly the same before and during EU accession, with 
the population concentrated predominantly in Transylvania and the border with Hungary. Tensions 
between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority had been worsening under 
Ceaușescu’s regime, and continued as the state emerged from communism. Hungarian minorities 
advocated increased cultural and linguistic autonomy after facing repression under Ceaușescu’s 
regime. The destabilization of the regime and ongoing demands for increased autonomy by the 
Hungarians led to an outbreak of violence in Târgu Mureș, a town in north central Transylvania. 
The clash was the bloodiest outbreak of national violence during Romania’s transition from 
communism, killing several people and leaving several hundred injured (Battiata, 1990).  
Hungarians formed the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ), which 
successfully spread throughout cities with Hungarian populations in the immediate aftermath of 
the 1989 revolution. The party organized itself around advocacy for self-determination and 
collective rights for Hungarians in Romania (Toró, 2016: 85). The RMDSZ’s goals of resolving 
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national minority conflict were also supported by Romanian elites, specifically the National 
Salvation Front that won the 1990 political election and became the dominant political party after 
1989 (Toró, 2016: 85). The shared goals among the Hungarian minority elites and Romanian elites 
contributed to a gradual shift towards pluralist policies that permitted increased autonomy for 
national minorities and led to improved national relations (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 79). 
The slow trend towards pluralism and the resolution of national minority issues were steps towards 
democratization further advanced in the new 1991 Constitution. 
 
 4.2.2 The 1991 Romanian Constitution 
 Romania’s 1991 Constitution marked the beginning of the state’s democratization and 
declared the state as a “democratic and social state” that guaranteed the rights and freedoms of its 
citizens (1991, Art. 1). The Constitution addressed national minority rights under Articles 4 and 6, 
which prohibited discrimination on the basis of nationality, recognized the rights of national 
minorities to preserve, develop, and express their culture, and further ensured the Romanian 
government would protect minorities in their cultural development and preservation (1991, Art. 4 
and 6). National minorities were further granted rights to education, as the Constitution made 
primary and secondary school compulsory for all citizens; public education was to be free. 
National minorities were guaranteed the right to learn their mother tongue, and to receive education 
in it (1991, Art. 32). In addition to the rights of self-identification and mother-tongue education, 
the Romanian government incorporated the right to representation for national minorities within 
its bicameral parliament. Under Article 59, the Constitution recognized that national minorities 
who do not obtain the number of votes needed for parliamentary representation would have one 
seat each in the lower house of Parliament – the Chamber of Deputies (1991). In addition to 
linguistic, educational, and political rights, the Constitution also gave members of national 
minorities the right to have an interpreter in court trials (1991, Art. 127).  
 While the Constitution afforded more rights to national minorities, it remained unclear on 
its acceptance of national minorities in the state. The Preamble declared Romania to be a “national 
state” (1991, Preamble). This left minorities unsure if the government was declaring Romania a 
nation-state that would be unaccepting of minority communities. In addition to this, there was a 
general lack of clarity on the position of national minority languages vis-à-vis the Romanian 
language. Despite these concerns, the formal granting of education, language, and political rights 
to national minorities was a stark contrast from practices under the Ceaușescu regime. The 
Constitution marked a pluralist trend in the Romanian government, and was successful in 
establishing a democratic base for future policy improvements during accession. 
 
4.2.3 Foreign Relations with the West and Hungary 
 Romania began establishing relations with the West shortly after its transition from 
communism. Western Europe had begun investing in hopes of conflict prevention and to bolster 
the state’s resources as it democratized. This came largely from the European Union’s PHARE 
program, which invested several hundred million dollars yearly in the state in preparation for later 
EU accession (European Commission, S. 8/97: 12). Romania also quickly joined the Council of 
Europe in 1993, viewing membership as a way to demonstrate its commitment to democratization 
and integration with the West. The Romanian government adopted the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in 1993, and further committed itself to the nonbinding Recommendation 
1201 on the collective rights of national minorities. Together, these actions demonstrated the 
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commitment of Romania to submit itself to recommendations by the Council of Europe with 
respect to improving human and minority rights.  
 In addition to signing the ECHR, Romania signed and ratified the Framework Convention 
on National Minorities (FCNM) in 1995. This action, together with the later adoption and 
ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 2006, cemented 
Romania’s commitment to improving national minority rights to the West. Together, ratification 
of the ECHR, the FCNM, and the ECRML provided the basis for the Council of Europe to review 
national minority policies, and their consideration further influenced European Union 
recommendations on national minority policies in Romania. 
 Romania’s national minority policies were also drastically shaped by the state’s 
relationship with Hungary. The two states have had an intermittently adversarial history, but signed 
the Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation, and Good Neighborliness in 1996. The treaty 
recognized the significant role of their respective national minorities, and agreed that the protection 
of human and national rights was dependent on their cooperation. The Treaty promised increased 
trade, sharing of scientific research, but focused most on issues of national minorities. Under 
Article 12, the Treaty supported cooperation in the development and exchange of culture, 
specifically in education (1996, Art. 12). Article 15 addressed the significance of the Framework 
Convention on National Minorities and ensured the rights of their minorities to express their 
cultures freely, to promote cultural and language development, and to access education in their 
mother tongues (1996, Art. 15). It further guaranteed the right of cultural expression in media, and 
agreed to work towards securing these rights together. Most significantly, however, the two states 
renounced territorial autonomy claims in exchange for the security of national minority rights (Leff 
and Armeanu, 2017: 238). The revocation of territorial autonomy possibilities was a turn from 
communist era legacies which had established the Magyar Autonomous Region (MAT) and given 
the Hungarian minority in Romania considerable national minority protections.  
 Romania’s general adherence to its international agreements resulted in improved rights 
for national minorities throughout its transition to an integrated European state. The international 
and bilateral treaties shaped domestic policy on national minorities, especially because Romania’s 
1991 Constitution recognized the priority of international treaties on human rights over domestic 
regulations (1991, Art. 20). The ratification of these agreements benefitted Romania in its 
accession process, since the EU viewed the implementation of these treaties as a significant step 
towards ensuring national minority protections that were in line with the Copenhagen criteria.   
 
4.2.4 Notable Domestic Policies on National Minorities  
Following the creation of the 1991 Constitution, Romania continued to pass legislation on 
national minorities that gradually improved minority treatment. Romania’s initial policies 
following its emergence from communism were unfavorable for national minorities, and a 
significant change in minority sentiment did not occur until the mid-1990s. In 1991 Romania 
passed the Local Administration Act, which met strong criticism from the Council of Europe and 
the OSCE HCNM because of its discrimination of national minorities. The Local Administration 
Act established the Romanian language as the official language in all local government and public 
administration meetings, regardless of the languages spoken by council members (Kettley, 2003: 
254). In addition, national minorities could only use their language if they constituted a “significant 
numerical concentration” and the use of mother-tongue languages remained subject to approval of 
formal requests (Kettley, 2003: 254).  
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In 1993, the Romanian government established the Council of National Minorities to 
address national minority issues. This creation was praised by the European Union, but in reality 
did not effectively improve the protections for national minorities or increase the political voice of 
minorities in government (Kettley, 2003: 253). Additional anti-national minority legislation was 
passed in 1995 with the Act on Education that restricted educational access to national minorities 
in their mother tongue. While the state provided access to education in minority languages for 
primary and secondary levels, there were significant barriers to higher education for Hungarian 
minorities (Kettley, 2003: 254). Entrance exams in important subject areas for higher education 
were only given in Romanian, which meant Hungarian students would need to transfer to 
Romanian-language schools as children to improve their future prospects. The education law also 
received international condemnation, and was later amended in 1997.  
  Despite the ratification of national minority treaties such as the ECHR and the FCNM, 
significant progress was not made domestically until 1996. Instead, the government focused 
predominantly on democratization policies and ignored outstanding national minority concerns 
(Kettley, 2003: 247). Government attitudes began to shift in 1996 when the Hungarian political 
party RMDSZ gained representation in parliament and began to influence the state’s decision 
making process (Toró, 2016: 85). The RMDSZ worked alongside a majority coalition government 
that prioritized the protection of national minorities (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018). This marked 
a departure from the previous administration. Changes in national minority polices began to 
emerge and correlated with Romania’s application to the European Union. 
 In 1997, the government enacted the Government Emergency Ordinance No. 36 of 1997 
which amended the 1995 Education Act. The amendment was later updated in the new 1999 
Education Act, but in the meantime acknowledged the significance of education in minority 
languages. The Emergency Ordinance was accepted and approved by the Hungarian national 
minority and demonstrated an attempt to balance the linguistic education between Romanian and 
Hungarian students (Kettley, 2003: 256). National minority instruction remained very important 
to the Hungarian community, who continued to work towards the establishment of a private 
Hungarian university in the state.  
 The 1999 Law of National Education resolved matters. It replaced the 1995 Education Act, 
and specified specific protections for national minority students in Romania’s education system. 
Notably, the act granted minorities the right to learn their mother tongue and to have curricula 
taught in minority languages. Under Article 10, the government confirmed that public education 
would be carried out in both Romanian and national minority languages. The Romanian language 
was still acknowledged as the official language of the state and would be taught to students in all 
schools, regardless of their nationality (1999, Art. 10). National minority students were granted 
specific rights under Article 45 of the Education Law, which allowed them to request resources, 
classes, or materials to learn in their mother-tongue (1999). The law also ensured that students who 
did not have the possibility to study their language in their district would receive free transportation 
or housing to attend the nearest school that offered their language instruction (1999, Art. 45). The 
1999 Education Law attempted to promote equal opportunity to higher education by permitting 
university entrance exams to “be taken in the language in which the subjects in question have been 
studied” (Art. 46). Doing so greatly benefitted national minority communities who attended 
minority schools and studied curriculum in their mother-tongue. A private Hungarian school was 
later established in 2001, which directly catered to the future interests of Hungarian national 
minorities (European Commission, SEC (2001) 1753: 19).  
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 Another act that shaped national minority treatment during the course of accession was the 
2001 Law on Local Public Administration. This law permitted the use of a national minority 
language in towns where a national minority constituted over 20% of the population residing there 
(2001, Art. 40). Furthermore, in towns with a national minority population over 20%, any decisions 
that would be made public were to be broadcasted in both Romanian and the national language 
(2001, Art. 51). The implementation of this act was a considerable improvement from the 1991 
Law on Local Administration.  
 Lastly in 2003, the 1991 Constitution was amended to clarify the position of national 
minority languages. The amendments to the constitution granted the use of minority languages in 
public administration, constitutionalizing the earlier Law on Local Administration in 2001 that 
permitted national minority language use in towns meeting the 20% population threshold (2003: 
Act. 120). Additionally, the 2003 amendments further guaranteed the right of national minorities 
to use their mother tongue in court (Art. 128). Under the 1991 Constitution, national minorities 
were entitled to speak with the use of an interpreter, which – with the exception of criminal trials 
– would incur a cost to the individual. The 2003 Amendment improved this by ensuring the use of 
translations or interpreters without additional fees (Act. 128). Romania’s democratization and 
accession continually made strides towards national minority protections which were praised by 
the European Union, the OSCE HCNM and the Council of Europe. 
 
4.2.5 European Union Accession 
 Romania first applied for European Union membership in 1995, and – like Slovakia and 
Slovenia – was seen as a part of a broader enlargement of the European Union into Central and 
Eastern Europe. Romania’s application was considered in 1997, at which time the European 
Commission deemed the state unfit to begin accession negotiations as it had not met the 
Copenhagen criteria. However, in its initial appraisal, the European Commission looked favorably 
upon Romania’s national minority polices – particularly those related to the Hungarian minority. 
The European Commission noted how the political system enshrined representation for Hungarian 
minorities by reserving 15 seats for minorities in the Chamber of Deputies in the bicameral 
parliament (European Commission, S. 8/97: 13). At the time of consideration, Romania had further 
ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities under the Council of Europe. Additionally, 
the bilateral treaty between Hungary and Romania in 1996 had greatly improved the treatment of 
Hungarian minorities within the state.  
 However, despite the positive view on Hungarian treatment in Romania, the European 
Commission raised concerns over the state’s refusal to recognize collective rights despite signing 
the non-binding Recommendation 1201 on collective group rights. They also expressed concern 
over an article of the Criminal Code that forbade individuals from singing a foreign national 
anthem or carrying a foreign flag (European Commission, S. 8/97: 17). These were the only issues 
raised regarding Hungarian minorities, and the Commission focused more predominantly on issues 
impacting the Roma community. As of 1997, the European Commission believed the state to be 
undertaking the correct steps to improving national minority treatment, especially for Hungarian 
minorities. 
 In the following 1998 evaluation, the Commission determined that Romania had fulfilled 
the Copenhagen political criteria, and – after consideration of the state’s economic and political 
progress – the state was slated to begin negotiations in 1999 (European Commission, S. 7/98). 
Upon beginning its accession talks, the Commission approved of continued improvements for non-
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Roma minorities, including the Hungarian community. Romania had amended its education law 
in 1999 to provide the legal basis for minority languages, allowing national minorities to establish 
their own universities. Furthermore, national minorities were able to receive instruction in their 
mother tongue at all education levels; the state incorporated minority culture into the educational 
curriculum, textbooks, and materials (European Commission, COM (2000) 710: 24). The 
treatment of national minorities was considered satisfactory to the EU and continually improving.  
 As Romania progressed towards membership, more changes developed that impacted 
national minorities. As discussed, the 2001 Law on Local Administration allowed for the usage of 
a minority language in official regional affairs, including decisions and services from the local 
government. Improvement continued with the establishment of a private Hungarian university, 
funded with aid from Hungary (European Commission, SEC (2001) 1753: 19). The collaboration 
was further indication of improved relations between the Hungarian and Romanian states. 
Romania continued to establish institutions for reporting discrimination against national minorities 
in 2002 and 2003, increasing transparency in the legal framework and investigation process 
(European Commission, SEC (2001) 753; European Commission, SEC (2002) 1409). The 
implementation of national minority policies continued to improve throughout accession, and the 
Commission’s reports became increasingly more positive. The Commission eventually determined 
the state was ready for EU membership in 2005. In contrast to Slovakia and Slovenia, Romania 
took considerably more time in progressing through accession negotiations, but its policies on 
national minorities remained consistently positive throughout accession. Romania was officially 
admitted as a new member state in 2007.  
 
4.2.6 The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities  
 The OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities has published numerous reports 
on the treatment of national minorities in Romania. These reports and recommendations have 
directly shaped domestic policies. In the 1993 correspondence between the Romanian government 
and the OSCE HCNM, the HCNM praised the establishment of the Council for National Minorities 
which was seen as a pathway to open communication between national minorities and the 
government (OSCE 1028/93/L, 1993). The OSCE offered advice on the role of the Council, 
pushing Romania to adopt laws on education that would strengthen the position of national 
minority languages. While this was proposed, it was evident that the Council for National 
Minorities did not contribute to positive developments in national minority policies until after 
1996.   
 In addition to the 1993 correspondence, the OSCE made statements in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s on the cultural programming at Babes-Bolyai University, the largest public university 
in Romania. The OSCE recognized the significance of higher education to the Hungarian minority, 
and wanted to ensure the university was effectively accommodating all national groups. The OSCE 
first evaluated the university’s development of a multicultural curriculum that developed programs 
in Romanian, Hungarian, and German (OSCE, Ref. 730/98, 1998). In later recommendations made 
regarding the university, the HCNM proposed improvements to instruction in national minority 
languages (OSCE, 2000). The recommendation came with further encouragement to increase 
funding to the Hungarian curriculum, in order to bring it in line with Romanian educational 
development. As the university continued to accept recommendations, the OSCE deemed the 
development of the university’s multicultural program to be a model for other states in Eastern 
Europe (OSCE, 2000).  
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4.2.7 The Council of Europe 
 In addition to EU and OSCE recommendations made on national minority policies, the 
Council of Europe played a formative role in establishing national minority rights. Similar to 
Slovakia, Romania first joined the Council of Europe as a beginning step to European integration. 
Romania became a member of the Council of Europe in 1993 after ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Council of Europe first conducted a report in 1999 on 
Romania’s adoption and implementation of the Framework Convention on National Minorities, 
which Romania ratified in 1995. 
 The 1999 Report noted that Romania had taken many steps to prevent discrimination for 
Hungarian minorities, but saw that the improved treatment for Hungarians did not result in 
improved protections for other minority groups – most notably the Roma. In its evaluation of state 
media, the Council of Europe noticed that portrayals of national minorities tended to stereotype 
minority communities (Council of Europe ACFC/SR (99) 11., 1999). The upcoming 2000 
elections had also resulted in the rise of anti-minority sentiment and xenophobic language. The 
rise in far right-wing politics correlated with increased support for the nationalist Social Democrat 
Party (PDSR) which had split from the National Salvation Front in the early 1990s (Kettley, 2003: 
257). The rise of anti-minority sentiment at the time prompted the Council of Europe to call for 
increased dialogue among national minorities leaders and the central government.  
 The Council of Europe later released a report on the state’s implementation of the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. While the report was published in 2012, it reviewed 
Romanian policies that were established under European integration. The Council of Europe’s 
main concern surrounded the 20% threshold needed to use a minority language in local 
administrations and public signage. The 20% population threshold was considered to be 
particularly difficult for smaller national minority groups – who may not constitute 20% of the 
population in any region – to access publications and enjoy signage in their national language. The 
2012 report encouraged the state to provide greater funding and support for Hungarian media; it 
specifically discussed the creation of a Hungarian language channel, instead of broadcasting 
programs in Hungarian (Council of Europe ECRML (2012)3: 85).  
 Altogether, while the Council of Europe provided recommendations Romania could 
undertake to improve the treatment of its Hungarian minorities, the CoE believed that the state had 
fulfilled many of the undertakings of the FCNM and ECRML. The Council of Europe had more 
significant reservations regarding the state’s progress in establishing Roma minority protections, 
but Hungarian national minorities were largely considered protected under existing policies.  
 
4.2.8 Policies in Practice  
 Romania’s improvements on national minorities led to tangible changes for Hungarian 
communities. Politically, the Hungarian national minorities established prominent political parties 
– notably the RMDSZ – that worked together with majority coalitions in government on behalf of 
Hungarian minorities. The Constitution also reserved positions for national minorities in 
parliament to ensure representation, regardless of the seats attained through general elections. The 
Council of National Minorities, established in 1993, continued to receive praise from the European 
Union in the early 2000s for its increased transparency in investigations of discrimination against 
minority individuals. As a result, Hungarian national minorities were not excluded politically 
during the period of EU accession, but enjoyed an influential position in the central government’s 
decision making process. 
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 In language polices, bilingual education and use of bilingual signage were also successfully 
established. A study conducted in 2004 discovered that “nearly two-thirds of Transylvania’s 
Hungarians were highly or very highly proficient in Romanian” (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 
176). The high percentage of Hungarian minorities comfortable speaking Romanian was a direct 
result of the education system established by the state that had established bilingual educational 
programs. However, Hungarian minorities noted there was still room for improvement regarding 
the training of Romanian teachers in Hungarian schools. An additional national level survey 
conducted in 2008 found more than 90% of Hungarian inhabited administrative units had bilingual 
signage; the survey also revealed more than 80% of local administrations with Hungarian 
communities were publishing information in Hungarian (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 203). 
The high percentages of Hungarian language use and education demonstrated Romania’s continual 
improvement in Hungarian minority protections.  
 Lastly, in media and cultural development, Hungarian radio and television programs were 
regularly broadcasted throughout Hungarian populated regions. Radio broadcasting hours per 
week varied based on the region, but there were several radio stations and television channels that 
would regularly provide Hungarian language programming. The demand for increased 
programming was also met by some Hungarian non-governmental organizations. These NGOs 
were prominent avenues for Hungarian advocacy, and roughly 300 NGOs were established that 
dedicated their work to improve education, cultural preservation, and community development 
(Magyari, Mark, Harbula, & Magyari-Vincze, 2008: 26). Altogether, the treatment of Hungarian 
national minorities was vastly improved in comparison to pre-accession policies under 
communism. While the state still had areas for improvement, the Hungarian national minority 
developed forms of political and social advocacy that came from direct political representation or 
private organizations.  
 
4.3 Slovenia: The National Minority Model in Central and Eastern Europe   
 Slovenia’s independence from Yugoslavia focuses our attention on the Hungarian 
population within the Prekmurje region, near the northeastern border of Slovenia next to Hungary. 
Yugoslavia’s remaining Hungarian population was concentrated in Vojvodina, Serbia. Slovenia’s 
Hungarian population had been in gradual decline since the 1950s, with the Hungarian minority 
population making up approximately 0.8% of Slovenia’s population in 1953 (Lipott, 2013: 66). 
The population size continued to fall, and the 1991 census placed the Hungarian population at 
0.4% of the population, or approximately 8,000 individuals (Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Slovenia, 2002). The decline was attributed to low birth rates, higher seniority levels, and the 
regional location of the minority group, which originally lagged in economic development and 
prompted migration away from the state (Lipott, 2013: 66). Slovenia’s population after 
independence was fairly homogeneous, with nearly 88% declaring themselves as Slovenes 
(Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2001).  
 
4.3.1 The 1991 Constitution  
Slovenia’s declaration of independence in 1991 from Yugoslavia led to the implementation 
of a new constitution as the basis for the state’s democratization and European integration. This 
Constitution had been drafted as early as 1987, when Slovenia had already begun advocating for 
increased autonomy from the Yugoslavian state. The attempted consolidation of the state provoked 
Slovenia to push for independence (Hayden, 1992: 7). The 1991 Constitution was indicative of 
Slovenia’s longstanding desire to gain independence and demonstrated the history of national 
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minority protections in the state under communism. As a result, the 1991 Constitution can be 
viewed as an extension of long-standing policies from Yugoslav communism that increased rights 
to its national minorities.  
 The 1991 Constitution is the current constitution of the state and recognizes two national 
minorities, called autochthonous minorities: the Italians and the Hungarians. Hungarians are first 
recognized under Article 5 of the Constitution, which guarantees their rights and ensures their 
cultural development in Slovenia (1991, Art. 4). Article 11 grants language rights to national 
minorities. It recognizes Slovene as the national language, but in regions with Hungarian or Italian 
communities, both Slovene and the minority language are official languages (1991, Art. 11). The 
majority of rights for national minorities are found under Articles 61 to 64. These articles address 
the rights to express cultural affiliation, to use minority languages when exercising rights in public, 
and further designate specific rights for the Italian and Hungarian national communities. Article 
64 explicitly grants the rights for national minorities to: “use their national symbols freely;” 
“preserve their national identity” and “establish organizations and develop economic, cultural, 
scientific and research activities, as well as activities in the field of public media and publishing” 
(1991, Art. 64). Both the Hungarian and Italian communities are also given the right to foster 
relations with their kin-states. Most importantly, Article 64 guarantees that Hungarians will be 
able to establish self-governing communities, and provides them direct representation both in local 
government and in the National Assembly, or the central government. These rights are not 
contingent on the sizes of their communities.  
 The Slovenian government ensured that Hungarian national minorities would have access 
to cultural development, state funded and mandated bilingual education in their mother tongue and 
Slovene, and further included them in the central government. Hungarian representatives in the 
central government had a say over national minority policies, and the passage of new legislation 
needed the consent of minority representatives. By doing so, minority representatives had a veto 
over policies that would impact minority communities (Lipott, 2013: 68). Slovenia’s proactive 
stance on national minorities was favorably viewed by the Council of Europe, the European Union, 
and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.  
 
4.3.2 Foreign Relations with Hungary and the West 
Slovenia’s rapid transition further led to the establishment of relations with the newly 
democratizing Hungary. The two states signed two treaties on national minorities in their 
respective states, primarily addressing the treatment of Hungarian national minorities in Slovenia 
and the Slovene minority population in Hungary. The two states established the Convention 
Providing Special Rights for the Slovenian Minority Living in the Republic of Hungary and the 
Hungarian Minority Living in the Republic of Slovenia (November 1992) and the later Hungarian-
Slovenian Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation (December 1992). These bilateral treaties 
provided the basis for national minorities protections, and were viewed favorably by Western 
Europe. The West often perceived bilateral treaties as an effective solution to stabilizing national 
minority relations.  
The Convention Providing Special Rights for the Slovenian Minority Living in the 
Republic of Hungary provided for: the “preservation, development, and free expression of their 
cultural, linguistic, religious, full Slovenian and Hungarian identities” (1992, Art. 1). The 
Convention also outlined cooperation between the two states that would facilitate education 
through the exchange of teachers, materials, and scholarship; it further promoted the use of mother-
tongue languages and the rights of their minorities to develop their own media. In addition to this, 
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the Convention ensured economic development within the regions of the state with minorities and 
granted them the right to form their own local organizations and self-governments. Most 
significantly, the Convention acknowledged the ability of national minorities to form relations 
with their kin-states. The two states continued to establish an inter-governmental commission that 
would meet twice yearly to discuss the issues and interests of their national minorities (1992, Art. 
15). The rights afforded under the bilateral treaties with Hungary mirrored the existing rights that 
were granted to Hungarian minorities under Slovenia’s 1991 Constitution, with a particular focus 
on language, education, and political rights.  
In addition to establishing friendly relations with post-communist Hungary, Slovenia 
began its integration into Western Europe through membership to two European bodies: the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
Slovenia joined the Council of Europe in 1993 and became a signatory to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). In addition to the Council of Europe, Slovenia joined the OSCE in 
1992. Together, Slovenia’s membership to the CoE and the OSCE demonstrated its commitment 
to democratic governance, respect for human rights, and cooperation with Europe to maintain 
peace and stability. Accession to these organizations was significant in moving forward with later 
EU accession, as all members of the EU are also members of the CoE and the OSCE. Both of these 
organizations cooperated closely with the EU in Slovenia’s accession negotiations.  
 
4.3.3 European Union Accession 
 Slovenia formed an early relationship with the European Union, discussing the possibility 
of integration in 1993 before later formally submitting its application. The state formally applied 
for candidacy on June 10, 1996 and was accepted as an EU candidate in 1997 by the European 
Commission (European Commission, Gen. Rep. EU 1996). Slovenia received praise from the 
Commission in its initial application because of its generous protections of human and minority 
rights. The European Commission, upon its assessment of the 1992 and 1996 state elections and 
the 1991 Constitution, deemed Slovenia “a democracy with stable institutions which guarantee the 
rule of law, human rights, and respect for, and the protection of, minorities” (European 
Commission, S. 15/97, 2000: 20). Slovenia was further commended for its positive protection of 
human rights and minorities with its adoption of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities in 1998 and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages under 
the Council of Europe in 1997 (European Commission, S. 14/98, 2000: 11).  
The European Union ultimately did not express any concerns regarding the status of 
Hungarian minorities, and concluded that Slovenia’s constitution and existing policies regarding 
Hungarian minorities met the standards set forth in the Copenhagen criteria. As a result, Slovenia’s 
accession focused more heavily on economic development than on the establishment of human 
rights and minority protections. The state was approved for EU membership by the European 
Commission in 2002, and was deemed to be on track to completing and closing all 35 chapters of 
accession by 2004. After gaining European Commission approval, Slovenia conducted a 
referendum on accession to the EU in 2003, and 89% of the population voted to join the EU (NSD 
Slovenia, 2003). As a result, Slovenia formally joined the European Union on May 1, 2004.    
 
4.3.4 The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities  
 In addition to the EU’s evaluation of Slovenia’s national minorities, Slovenia’s policies 
were also evaluated and commended by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM) and the Council of Europe (CoE). The OSCE conducted an analysis into the linguistic 
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rights of national minorities in the state in 1999 and published a report on its findings. In the report, 
the OSCE considered the linguistic policies of national minorities in its 51 member states, 
including Slovenia, through a questionnaire survey. The OSCE stated that Slovenia, among other 
states, had met the standards of the Copenhagen Document –a number of provisions regarding 
national minorities put forth by the OSCE in 1990 (OSCE Report on the Linguistic Rights, 1999). 
In addition, the report concluded that the provisions in the evaluated states met the expectations of 
international treaties, including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 The OSCE looked also favorably upon the state’s language policies. The provision of 
bilingual education and the establishment of national minority languages as additional official 
languages were viewed as positive protections for national minorities (OSCE Report on the 
Linguistic Rights, 1999). Both of these policies were first established in the 1991 Constitution. 
Slovenia’s development of education and media for national minorities continued to improve, and 
their commitment to protecting national minority rights was further solidified through their 
repeated evaluations by the OSCE.  
 
4.3.5 The Council of Europe 
 In addition to praise from the European Commission and the HCNM, the Council of 
Europe’s Rapporteur of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights lauded Slovenia’s 
attention to national minority and human rights in 1993 stating, ‘“Slovenia, in our opinion, fully 
respects the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms. The way it protects the rights of 
minorities is a model and an example for many other European states both east and west”’ (Council 
of Europe, ACFC/SR (2000) 4: 12). Slovenia’s policies for national minorities were considered 
above the standard expectation for Central and Eastern states seeking integration to Western 
Europe, and afforded more rights to national minorities even in comparison with Western 
European states. 
Slovenia, despite receiving approval from the European Commission at the beginning of 
its accession process regarding its national minority protections, continued to demonstrate its 
commitment to improving national minority rights. The state signed the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) and implemented it in 1999. A report conducted 
by Slovenia and submitted to the CoE upon implementation of the FCNM in 2000 provided data 
regarding the state’s treatment of its national minorities. Slovenia’s constitution recognized the 
supremacy of international law, and ensured that its domestic policies complied with numerous 
international agreements on human and minority rights (Council of Europe, ACFC/SR (2000) 4: 
8). The report discussed all of its domestic laws as they related to the FCNM, with a particular 
focus on education programs, language use, and cultural development and media.  
Slovenia signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in 
1997 and ratified it in 2000. Adoption of the ECRML led to further evaluation and reports by the 
Council of Europe on Slovenia’s performance. In a 2004 report by the CoE, the Council offered 
few recommendations to improve the treatment of minorities. The report concluded in its overall 
statements that the state’s “legal framework offers a high standard of protection for the Hungarian 
and Italian languages. In several respects this standard was already in place when Slovenia was 
still part of Yugoslavia, but after it gained independence in 1991 Slovenia maintained it, 
developing it further” (Council of Europe, ECRML (2004)3: 8). The report recognized Slovenia’s 
history of national minority protections, and saw how the state’s actions continued to follow a 
longstanding trend of proactive minority rights. However, Slovenia’s positive minority treatment 
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was not the same for all minorities, and it continued to receive criticism for its poor treatment of 
the Roma.  
When the ECRML report looked specifically at the use of the Hungarian minority language 
in nationally mixed areas, the Committee of Experts noted it had not received any complaints from 
Hungarian communities (Council of Europe, ECRML (2004)3: 9). Furthermore, the report 
concluded that the provision of education in the Hungarian language was sufficient in protecting 
the interests of the Hungarian minority. This was due in part to its Constitution, which made 
bilingual education mandatory in nationally mixed areas for all students living within the region. 
This meant that both Hungarian and Slovene students learned both languages in their schools. The 
Committee of Experts considered this an effective measure to protect the Hungarian language, and 
agreed with the Slovenian government that this best expressed the wishes of Hungarian speakers 
(Council of Europe, ECRML (2004)3: 21). While Slovenia met the CoE’s standards for both 
language and education in accordance with the ECRML, the CoE’s Committee of Experts 
encouraged the Slovenian authorities to improve the usage of the Hungarian language in the court 
and administrative system (Council of Europe, ECRML (2004)3: 26). Though this 
recommendation was made, the CoE also acknowledged that a “rich legal framework exists in 
regard and measures seem to have been taken in the past” to improve the use of the Hungarian 
language in courts (Council of Europe, ECRML (2004)3: 51). The CoE finally concluded that 
Slovenia had enacted many of the necessary protections for national minorities and expected it to 
continue to improve its domestic policies for national minorities.  
 
4.3.6 Policies in Practice 
 Slovenia’s policies for national minorities were largely an extension of pre-existing 
communist-era practices. Independence and accession further improved national minority 
conditions, and Slovenia’s deliberate intention to integrate into the West was mirrored in its 
adherence to numerous international and bilateral treaties governing minority treatment. With 
respect to language use, the Slovenian government incorporated Hungarian language into public 
signs in bilingual regions, included the use of the Hungarian language in courts, and further 
ensured that bilingual education was mandatory for all students living in nationally mixed regions, 
regardless of nationality. All notices and publications by the state or government in the 
autochthonous regions were required to be bilingual, and all legal or official affairs were to be 
conducted in the language chosen by the individual (Report Submitted by the Republic of Slovenia 
ACFC/SR (2000) 4: 101). The importance placed on language rights was mirrored in the education 
system and media.  
 In national minority education, Hungarian kindergartens and secondary schools in the 
Prekmurje region were funded by the state. In 2000, there were six bilingual kindergartens, 
attended by roughly 1000 students (Report Submitted by the Republic of Slovenia ACFC/SR 
(2000) 4: 49). In addition, there was one bilingual secondary school that was attended by almost 
400 students (Report Submitted by the Republic of Slovenia ACFC/SR (2000) 4: 50). The schools 
received Hungarian textbooks, and the Slovenian Ministry of Education, Sport, and Science 
subsidized travel to and from the schools. Teachers in the bilingual schools also received a 20% 
wage increase to foster good training and instruction (Council of Europe, ECRML (2004)3: 22). 
This was an improvement from an earlier report in 1999 to the Council of Europe by Slovenia 
which discussed how the teachers lacked sufficient training in bilingual instruction and needed to 
improve education within multinational regions.  
		 62 
 In addition to language and education, Hungarian media and press were widely available 
within the Prekmurje region. There was a weekly newspaper published in Hungarian, in addition 
to state funding that mandated the inclusion of Hungarian speakers in public programming for 
nationally mixed regions (Application of the Charter in Slovenia ECRML (2004)3: 30). The state 
also made foreign press importation free, and consumption of Hungarian media increased ties with 
the kin-state. In addition to state established media and publications, the Hungarian national 
minority community also developed roughly 30 organizations which have been committed to 
Hungarian cultural development (Lipott, 2013: 66). As a result, much of the cultural and media 
development were financed by the state and organized by institutes designated for Hungarian 
national minority interests.  
 Hungarian national minorities were lastly granted political representation through 
appointment in local elections and in the larger central government. As previously mentioned 
under the 1991 Constitution, no matters concerning national minorities could be undertaken 
without the consent of national minority representatives (Lipott, 2013). Minority representation 
also extended to local government, where national minorities have had the right to at least one 
representative and additional rights to organizing local self-government (Lipott, 2013: 69). By 
doing so, national minority communities increased agency over their own affairs, and enjoyed 
cultural autonomy. The inclusion and representation of national minorities both in local and central 
governments ensured that the interests of minority groups would be promoted. The culmination of 
evaluations conducted by the European Union, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe demonstrated 
that Slovenia not only maintained, but improved its commitment to national minority rights 
throughout accession. Slovenia’s policies were a continuation of communist-era practices, and 
their improvements exceeded standards for national minority protections within Europe.  
	
5. The Aftermath of European Union Membership 
  
5.1 Slovakia: Shaky Compliance and Declining Minority Rights   
 Slovakia’s EU accession was largely defined by contested national minority policies that 
slightly improved over time. While Slovakia was deemed fit to enter the European Union as a 
member in 2004, the European Commission noted that further work still needed to be done 
regarding its national minorities. Since its membership, Slovakia’s policies on national minorities 
appear to have regressed, especially in their protections of Hungarian minorities. Slovakia’s 
Hungarian population has remained much the same after accession, hovering around half a million 
people (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2011). They remain the largest national minority, 
accounting for nearly 10% of the population (see Map 5.1.a in the Annex). The Slovak state is 
fairly diverse, with national minorities comprising over 20% of the total population; the state is 
roughly 80% nationally Slovak (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2011). As such, issues 
surrounding national minorities continue to be of great significance and the HCNM and the 
Council of Europe have continued to critically evaluate domestic policies impacting national 
communities. 
 
5.1.1 Political Representation  
 The Hungarian national community in Slovakia does not have allocated seats for national 
minority representation in parliament. Slovakia adopted a party-list proportional representation 
system with a 5% threshold for representation in the Slovak National Council – the national 
parliament (Friedman, 2005: 382). Three prominent political parties have represented the 
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Hungarian national minority – the Magyar Coalition Party (MKP), Coexistence, and the Magyar 
Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH). These three parties differ in stances not related to 
national minority rights, but share similar concerns regarding Hungarian minority treatment. In 
elections, the MKDH and the MKP have repeatedly cleared the 5% threshold for representation, 
and have been able to represent the Hungarian national minority population in the Slovak 
parliament. However, the percentage of votes Hungarian parties have received has declined in the 
years following 2002 (Leff and Armeanu, 2015: 232).  
 The Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) was formed in 1998 and enjoyed political 
inclusion until it began to split after EU membership. The diversification of Hungarian parties 
resulted in different party stances, some of which were more “nationally accommodating” and 
wanted to establish bridges with other minority groups in the state (Leff and Armeanu, 2015: 232). 
The Hungarian minority vote has been fragmented among the political parties, with ongoing 
worries about the ability to meet the 5% voting threshold. In the elections before 2020, Hungarians 
were still able to garner representation in government, albeit at smaller numbers due to split voting. 
The latest elections in 2020 resulted in no Hungarian parties in the Slovak parliament 
(Vaski, 2020). The inability to elect a Hungarian party to government was partly a result of the 
contrasting political leanings of the minority parties; several of the political parties which typically 
formed a coalition were unable to compromise and work together. As a result, the Hungarian vote 
was divided among several Hungarian political parties and unable to gain enough votes in total to 
meet the threshold for representation. The inability to elect a Hungarian political party has also 
been attributed to 30% of Hungarian minorities voting for Slovakian political parties, and low 
voter turnout rates among the Hungarian community (Vaski, 2020). The lack of Hungarian 
representation in the central government and its consequences are yet to be seen.  
 
5.1.2 Language Use 
 Slovakia’s decline in national minority policies continued in its changes to minority 
language protections. In 2009, the Slovakian government passed an amended law on language, the 
State Language Law No. 418/2009. It adapted the earlier 1995 Language Law and increased 
compulsory usage of the Slovak language. The Act notably stated that the Slovak language would 
be used in all public documents with the exception of school certificates and would be the default 
language in all information systems, textbooks, instruction, and official inscriptions unless 
otherwise regulated (Council of Europe, CDL (2010)080). The right to use national minority 
languages remained contingent on the 1999 Law on the Use of Minority Languages, which set the 
ability to use a minority language at a 20% threshold of the population within each region 
(Mikalayeva, Schwellnus, & Balázs, 2012: 391). While the 1999 Law on Minority Languages still 
afforded protections to national minorities, the lack of updated policies governing minority 
language use in the wake of the 2009 Language Law was disconcerting to Hungarian communities. 
The neglect to update policies on national minority language use, in combination with the extended 
use of the Slovak language, was seen as widely discriminatory towards national minorities. 
The 2009 Language Law further received condemnation from the HCNM and the Council 
of Europe. The HCNM published a statement in 2009 that expressed dismay that the law was 
adopted before receiving the HCNM’s opinion. It stated that the law could lead to issues with 
international standards governing national minority rights – especially as Slovakia has signed 
numerous treaties and conventions protecting national minorities (OSCE, 2009). In addition, the 
HCNM was concerned with the lack of clarity surrounding the usage of national minority 
languages. The HCNM asked for a new law on national minority languages that would help bridge 
		 64 
the gap between the 2009 Language Law and the 1999 Act on National Minorities, but no 
immediate action was taken by the state (OSCE, 2009). The passage of legislation before 
consulting the OSCE or the Council of Europe followed a trend that had occurred under EU 
accession; both organizations had repeatedly frowned upon Slovakia’s implementation of national 
minority policies without waiting for recommendations first.  
The Council of Europe published its opinion on the 2009 Language Law, echoing the 
concerns raised by the OSCE. Like the OSCE, the Council of Europe found that the Language 
Law was problematic in its lack of clarification on the rights of national minorities to use their own 
language, especially in regions where minority populations did not meet the 20% threshold. The 
obligation to use the Slovak language in regions not meeting the threshold would be in violation 
of international agreements (Council of Europe, CDL (2010)080). While both the HCNM and the 
CoE made recommendations to Slovakia, there were no sanctions to ensure cooperation with the 
proposals (Mikalayeva, Schwellnus, & Balázs, 2012: 391). The state later amended its Language 
Law to be in line with international recommendations, but the amended version still fell short of 
the hopes of the Council of Europe.  
 
5.1.3 Education  
 Discrepancies in educational opportunities for national minorities continued to persist, 
specifically in higher education. In a study conducted in 2006 on Hungarian national minorities 
entering higher education, Hungarians were found to be lagging behind the majority of the state. 
Just 7% of Hungarian minorities entered higher education in comparison with the 12% average of 
the population (Pásztor, 2017: 118). The achievement gap has been attributed to the importance 
national minorities place on education in their mother-tongue as a means of preserving their 
national identity and culture. The decision between attending a Slovak school with a higher quality 
of education or a Hungarian minority school with poorer instruction is viewed as a choice between 
increased future opportunities and cultural preservation.  
The choice over which school to attend for Hungarians is also partly a matter of social class 
– wealthier individuals tend to send their children to Hungarian schools, while lower-income 
families send their children to Slovakian schools (Pásztor, 2017: 121). Wealthier Hungarians can 
compensate for the lower quality of education among Hungarian minority schools, and view 
cultural development as more important than the increased future opportunities that comes from 
Slovak schools. For lower income families, the possibility of increased career opportunities takes 
precedence over the preservation of national culture. The low percentage of Hungarians attending 
university has been further connected to broader questions on national identity. Many universities 
are located further away from Hungarian communities; the decision to attend higher education in 
Slovak “carried the risk of leaving the ethnic [national] community for good” (Pásztor, 2017: 121). 
As a result, education for national minorities in Slovakia remains highly contested for the 
Hungarian community, which views it as part of a larger question on how to best preserve national 
identity while attempting to open future opportunities for their children.  
 
5.1.4 Foreign Relations with Hungary  
 Slovakia’s relations with Hungary have remained contentious after EU accession, and 
peaked with the passage of a dual citizenship law by Hungary in 2010. That legislation welcomed 
dual citizenship, especially for its Hungarian national minorities abroad. Slovakia reacted strongly, 
and immediately passed a law that banned dual citizenship for its citizens who voluntarily chose 
to adopt a second citizenship (Kusá, 2013: 15). Slovak citizenship could be lost if the individual 
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requested to be removed from the state, or if they chose to adopt citizenship in another state. The 
law did not apply retroactively, but after May 2010, individuals were no longer permitted to 
acquire dual citizenship (Kusá, 2013: 15). This legislation was seen as a target on national 
minorities – particularly Hungarian minorities – who may have desired to cultivate closer 
relationships with their kin-states. The law however, impacted more than Slovakia’s national 
minorities, as some Slovaks in the diaspora lost their citizenship as a result of the policy.  
 Overall, Slovakia’s polices on national minorities have noticeably declined after attaining 
EU membership. The lack of minority inclusion in government, decline in educational and 
language protections, and reactionary legislation to Hungary’s policies indicate the state does not 
view the maintenance of national minority protections as a priority.  
 
5.2 Romania: Sustained National Minority Protections 
 The population of Romania’s Hungarian population remained relatively the same after EU 
accession. In the 2011 census, the Hungarian minority population accounted for roughly 6-7% of 
the state (Romania Central Population and Housing Census Commission, 2012). This population 
was concentrated in regions in Transylvania, specifically in the northwestern region of 
Transylvania along the border of Hungary, and in central-eastern Transylvania in Székeley Land 
(Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 435) – (see Map 5.2.a in the Annex). Romania’s national minority 
policies have largely remained consistent with the protections established before and during EU 
accession. The state was admitted into the European Union in 2007, which was slightly delayed in 
comparison with Slovakia and Slovenia. The delay was primarily a reserved judgment on 
Romania’s economic and administrative capacities, its corruption, and its democratic caliber, but 
not its management of national minorities. While the accession process took longer for Romania 
than Slovakia and Slovenia, its national minority polices met the standards obliged by the EU. 
Romania’s more recent protections for national minorities and their treatment can be evaluated 
through minority political engagement, language and education, and cultural development. 
 
5.2.1 Political Engagement 
 Politically, Hungarian minorities have continued to have a diverse spectrum of political 
parties to represent their views in government. The electoral system in Romania is a closed list 
proportional representation system, with a 5% electoral threshold. The RMDSZ, or the Democratic 
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, has often cleared the threshold successfully in the elections 
after accession. They consistently received 6-7% of the votes throughout the 2004 to 2008 
elections (Protsyk, 2010: 8). Hungarian political parties have been able to obtain seats in both 
houses of parliament; in the Chamber of Deputies, the proportion of representatives to the 
Hungarian population size has been fairly stable, with a 1:1 ratio (Protsyk, 2010: 6). In the upper 
house – the Senate – smaller minority groups are underrepresented, but Hungarians were able to 
obtain around 8% of the seats in the 2004-8 term (Protsyk, 2010: 7).  
 The development of political parties has allowed Hungarian minorities to have a central 
role in state legislation. Their inclusion in government is reinforced in reserved seats for national 
minorities in the Chamber of Deputies, first laid out in the 1991 Constitution, and maintained 
through subsequent elections. The OSCE and the Council of Europe have continued to monitor 
elections in the state after EU accession, and have continued to progress smoothly.  
 Despite the robust political representation of Hungarian national minorities, Hungarian 
political parties have been split over how to best represent group interests. Territorial autonomy 
claims have been longstanding interests for the Hungarian community, especially those residing 
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on Székely Land. The Székely Land was notably granted autonomy under communism as part of 
the MAT, and claims for territorial autonomy have continued despite agreements to disavow 
advocacy for regional autonomy. The push for autonomy has increased tensions between the 
Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority, since the Romanian majority views territorial 
autonomy claim as a violation of the 1996 Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation, and Good 
Neighborliness with Hungary (Leff and Armeanu, 2017: 239). The tension over territorial 
autonomy claims has led to some splits among Hungarian political parties, but they largely remain 
united in their advocacy for the Hungarian minority and have been able to consistently hold 
representation in government.   
 
5.2.2 Language and Education 
 The promotion of higher education for national minorities in the aftermath of the 1999 
Education Act have correlated with increased attainment of higher education degrees by 
Hungarians. In the 2011 census, about 10% of Hungarian minorities had received a higher 
education degree, in comparison with 16% of Romanians; the national average was 15% (Kiss, 
Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 435). For individuals born in 1985, i.e. who attended university during 
or after accession, the rate of participation in higher education for Hungarians was roughly 27%; 
Romanians born in 1985 had an average of 34% with a degree in higher education. (Kiss, Székely, 
Toró, & al, 2018: 434). Educational inequality still persists, but Hungarians are attending higher 
educational institutions at increasing rates. The rise in attendance can be attributed to the increase 
of national minority curriculum and programming in public universities, as well as the 
establishment of Hungarian higher educational institutions.  
 
5.2.3 Cultural Development 
 Hungarian national minorities have continued to rely upon Hungarian newspapers, 
television, and radio as sources of cultural development. In a 2015 survey by the Romanian 
Institute for Research on National Minorities, there were 117 Hungarian language media sources 
in Romania. Of these, 58 were print media and the remaining 54 were radio or television (Kiss, 
Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 327). The distribution of locally generated Hungarian minority 
newspapers has declined over time, largely because of the increased consumption of print media 
from Hungary itself. While print consumption from Hungarian minority sources has decreased, 
Hungarian minority radio has dominated the radio system in Romania:  48% of the general 
population, and 64% of the Hungarian minority population, listen to Hungarian language 
programming (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018: 331). The ability to broadcast exclusively in 
national minority languages was made possible with 2004 legislation, and since then Hungarian 
minority radio has continued to grow. In contrast, television programming is still predominantly 
Romanian, but with regular programming available in Hungarian.  
 
5.2.4 Foreign Relations with Hungary 
 The Hungarian national minority maintained ties with the Hungarian state throughout 
accession and after EU membership. Hungary passed legislation in 2010 on dual citizenship, which 
largely welcomed its national minorities abroad to claim citizenship. Hungarian minorities who 
had long been making claims for increased autonomy viewed this law positively. In 2016, less than 
3% of Transylvanian Hungarians opposed the citizenship law, and the overwhelming majority of 
them saw it as an opportunity to cultivate closer ties with their kin state (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & 
al, 2018: 137). As part of Hungary’s attempt to bolster relations with its national minorities abroad, 
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its government has increased funding of Transylvanian Hungarian communities. In 2017, Hungary 
granted more than $(US) 118 million to Hungarian minority organizations and institutions; this 
has strengthened the relationship between the community and its kin state (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & 
al, 2018: 138). 
 The ongoing support from Hungary to the Hungarian national community in Romania has 
been favorably viewed by Hungarian political parties, who have continuously attempted to foster 
close relations with their kin-state. In 2018, three Hungarian political parties – the Democratic 
Union of Hungarians in Romania, the Popular Hungary Party, and the Hungarian Civic Party – put 
forward a joint demand for “territorial, local, and cultural autonomy” (Luca, 2018). The Romanian 
government, however, has often opposed demands for collective rights, and has deemed territorial 
autonomy as unacceptable. The increase in foreign investment from Hungary and the repeated 
attempts to cultivate close relations between Hungarian minorities and their kin state has strained 
political relations within Romania, and between the two neighboring states. Despite this, there has 
not been a significant decline in national minority policies, and Romanians have maintained their 
protections for Hungarian minorities.  
 
5.3 Slovenia: A Legacy of National Minority Protections   
 Out of the three states considered in this research, Slovenia’s policies on national minorities 
have remained consistent before, during, and after accession. Slovenia’s successful Western 
integration and democratization has been continuously recognized by the European Union, the 
United Nations, and the World Bank (Lambroni, 2009: 130). It emerged from communism and 
accession as one of the most prosperous states that joined the European Union in 2004. Following 
its accession to the EU in 2004, Slovenia held the Chairmanship for the OSCE in 2005 (OSCE 
News Room, 2005). The appointment of Slovenia’s former prime minister was indicative of the 
OSCE’s desire to continue outreach into Central and Eastern Europe, and demonstrated confidence 
in the ability of the former prime minister’s capacity to “strengthen [...] dialogue” within the region 
(OSCE News Room, 2005). Slovenia also held the Presidency of the EU Council in 2008, the first 
of the new member states to do so (Lambroni, 2009: 129). These European nominations were 
marks of Slovenia’s status as a role model in Central and Eastern Europe. Slovenia’s protections 
for national minorities continued after being admitted into the EU, and demonstrated its 
commitment to maintaining positive national minority policies that were in line with international 
agreements and recommendations.  
 
5.3.1 Political Participation  
 Hungarian political participation remains governed under the 1991 Constitution and the 
Law on Self-Governance which ensure the involvement of national minorities in Slovenia’s 
parliament. National minority representatives have continued to have a veto on issues that would 
directly impact their minority communities, and minorities employ a dual voting right by voting 
once for their representatives, and again at general elections (OSCE News Room, 2012). While 
this right has been contested in court, Slovenia has maintained that these rights granted to national 
minorities are not in violation of its constitution and the principle of equality before the law (Roter, 
2017: 77). Slovenia’s legal framework has received additional praise from the OSCE in 2012, 
which viewed it as a “framework [that] provides for the rapid and effective consideration of 
complaints and appeals” (OSCE News Release, 2012). The OSCE has continued to evaluate the 
state’s elections, and has repeatedly praised the state for its inclusion of Hungarian and Italian 
communities (OSCE News Release, 2012). 
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5.3.2 Education and Language  
 In addition to consistent protections for political representation, education and language 
rights have remained in place in Slovenia following accession. The Hungarian community places 
a high priority on national minority education and language usage, and policies on both have been 
continuously improved in the aftermath of EU membership. Slovenia’s bilingual education model 
continued after accession, with the goal of achieving equality between the Slovene and Hungarian 
languages in nationally mixed regions. As previously discussed, all students – regardless of 
nationality – within the region of Prekmurje are required to take classes in both Hungarian and 
Slovenian. In 2011 and 2012, the kindergarten school program had an attendance of 293 children 
(Lukanovič & Limon, 2014: 431). There is an additional free bilingual pre-school program offered, 
and students self-declare their first language. This means that nationally Slovenian students could 
declare Hungarian as their first language, simply as a matter of which they learn first in school. 
The enforced bilingual education ensures that Hungarian culture and language is preserved by both 
Slovenes and Hungarians.  
 In addition to kindergarten, primary schools are instructed in both Slovene and Hungarian. 
This policy is in accordance with Slovenia’s National Education Institution, which regulates the 
curriculum and the training of teachers, and provides the resources for mandatory bilingual 
education (Lukanovič & Limon, 2014: 431). Classrooms have two teachers, one with training in 
Slovenian, and one in Hungarian. In secondary education, there remains one fully bilingual 
secondary school in Prekmurje in the town of Lendava. This school was the single secondary 
school established before and remained during the process of accession. The secondary school 
enforces a system where both Slovene and Hungarian have equality in class subjects and in 
teaching instruction (Lukanovič & Limon, 2014: 432). In 2011 and 2012, this school was attended 
by 308 students (Lukanovič & Limon, 2014: 432). The use of Hungarian schools has continued, 
despite the declining population Hungarians that has continued since the late 1960s. Since 
bilingual education is not contingent on the numbers of national minorities, Hungarian minorities 
are guaranteed their language instruction regardless of their shrinking population size. 
 
5.3.3 Cultural Development 
 While Slovenia has largely been praised in its treatment of national minorities, some 
concern has arisen over their funding for cultural development. Under the Law on Mass Media in 
2001, funding for national minorities comes directly from the state government (Lipott, 2013: 76). 
However, promised funding has not been consistent, and Hungarian minority media has received 
comparatively less resources than Slovenian media. In 2005, it was reported by the advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities that there was 
a discrepancy between the broadcasting time and resources dedicated to Hungarian programming 
in comparison with Slovenian and Italian resources (Lipott, 2013: 76). In addition to this, funding 
from RTV, the national television programming of Slovenia, decreased in 2012 by around 10% 
(Lipott, 2013: 76).    
 
5.3.4 Foreign Relations with Hungary  
Slovenia’s overall relations with its domestic Hungarian communities have been largely 
positive, and the state has maintained mutually beneficial relationships with Hungary as well. The 
rise of populist sentiment in Eastern Europe, specifically in Hungary, has been mirrored in 
Slovenia. Hungary’s Viktor Orban supported the right-wing movement in Slovenia and 
campaigned alongside the current Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa in 2018 (Kingsley, 2018). 
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The two states have maintained close relations, and their current governments share similar 
sentiments regarding immigration, foreign policy, and domestic affairs. The relationship between 
Hungary and Slovenia has been relatively peaceful since their Treaty on Good Neighborliness in 
1992.  
 Overall, Slovenia’s policies on national minorities have been stable, with no significant 
change or decline in the treatment of its Hungarian national minorities. While concern has arisen 
for the Roma minority, the state has been appraised positively by outside observers because of its 
treatment of its Hungarian national minority. Slovenia’s protections of its national minorities have 
stemmed from a longer history of positive treatment under communism, where Yugoslavia 
afforded considerable rights to its national minority groups. The protections for national minorities 
are continuation of this legacy that has persisted into current day policies. 
 
6. Key Findings and Analysis 
 
6.1. Case Analysis and Results 
 Let us now cross-analyze the cases of Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia to consider the 
impact European Union accession has had on the treatment of their Hungarian national minorities. 
Each state may be considered according to their communist legacies, pre-accession national 
minority policies, the changes in their policies during accession, and the continuation or otherwise 
of these policies after EU membership. The periods will be categorized as “anti-minority” or “pro-
minority” in accordance with their benefit or harm to national minority communities. “Anti-
minority” refers to legislation that received condemnation by the EU, the Council of Europe, or 
the HCNM. “Pro-minority” policies are actions that have been praised by any of the three 
institutions for increasing protections or maintaining the rights of national minorities in their states. 
Evaluating the current state of policies after membership will determine whether EU accession has 
had a lasting impact on national minority treatment.  
 
6.1.1 Slovakia 
 The first case to be discussed is Slovakia. Slovakia’s national minority policies became 
especially severe in the aftermath of the Prague Spring in 1968. After 1968, the government 
centralized its power, and the possibility of liberalizing policies towards national minorities came 
to an end. The repression of the general populace and national minority rights continued until the 
regime’s collapse in 1989. Despite democratization, Slovakia’s transition from communism 
remained unfriendly towards its national minorities. A strongly nationalist government took power 
that passed several anti-minority policies in its pre-accession time period. Slovakia was criticized 
for its lack of clarity on the standing of national minorities in its 1992 Constitution, which heavily 
relied on its previous constitution under communist rule. Despite passing some pro-minority 
legislation – specifically the Law on Surnames and the Bilingual Signage Law in 1993 – they were 
not implemented until later in 1994 after prodding from the Council of Europe and the OSCE 
HCNM. The state also passed openly anti-minority legislation with the 1995 Language Law, which 
excluded protections of minority language use and reinforced the dominance of the Slovak 
language. Many of the policies on national minorities in the pre-accession period were repeatedly 
criticized by Western Europe. Additionally, even upon approval to begin accession talks in 1999, 
the EU maintained reservations regarding Slovakia’s progress in its national minority protections. 
As a result, the communist and pre-accession periods for Slovakia can be categorized as anti-
minority.  
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 Slovakia’s accession continued with anti-minority sentiment, with the state repeatedly 
passing legislation that raised concerns for the EU, the CoE, and the OSCE HCNM. The Slovakian 
government was criticized for its anti-minority rhetoric, specifically Mečiar’s proposal for a 
population exchange with Hungary in 1997. During Mečiar’s leadership, the Council of Europe 
and the HCNM were alarmed as the government continued to pass legislation affecting national 
minorities without first consulting any of their organizations. Slovakia’s shaky compliance with 
the EU, the CoE, and the OSCE was mirrored in the delays between receiving recommendations 
from each organization and amending anti-minority policies. Slovakia’s stance on anti-minority 
policies during EU accession did not begin to change until after Mečiar was removed from office 
in 1998. The change in government ushered in new protection laws for national minorities in 1999. 
Despite this, Slovakia’s accession period is still largely defined by anti-minority sentiment, and a 
general reluctance towards establishing pro-minority policies.  
 After attaining EU membership, Slovakia’s policies for national minorities have regressed. 
This fact became noticeable with the lack of political representation for national minorities in 
government, and heightened in 2009 and 2010 with the passage of legislation that directly targeted 
the language use and citizenship of national minorities. Slovakia’s policies after accession 
demonstrated that anti-minority sentiment has persisted; there have been few amendments made 
to improve the conditions of national minorities after EU membership. While the state’s policies 
on national minorities slightly improved during accession negotiations, the regression in minority 
treatment demonstrates that EU membership has not had a significant impact on current state 
protections. Instead, there is a historical component – perhaps legacies from communism – that 
have continued to shape the treatment of national groups in the state. The decline in polices and 
the general reluctance of the state to adhere to protections in the wake of accession shows that 




 In comparison to Slovakia, Romania and Slovenia’s national minority treatment after EU 
membership have been drastically different. Similar to Slovakia, Romania’s last communist 
regime under Ceaușescu was defined by extreme centralization of state power, and repression of 
the general populace and national minorities. Hungarian minorities had originally been granted 
relatively tolerant rights under communism, including regional autonomy, but the rise of 
Ceaușescu in 1965 led to the termination of Hungarian minority autonomy and increased 
intolerance for minorities. Near the end of communism, the fall of Ceaușescu’s regime was 
triggered by Hungarian protests that spread state-wide. The immediate aftermath of communism 
also resulted in anti-minority sentiment. However, Romania’s Hungarian minorities found 
effective representation in their elites, who advocated in government on their behalf. Romania’s 
anti-minority stance in its pre-accession time was evident in its restrictions on national minority 
language use and education, which limited higher education accessibility for Hungarian students. 
Upon consideration, the majority of the period under communism and the beginning stages of its 
democratization were strongly anti-Hungarian. 
The state’s anti-minority policies began to evolve after the inclusion of Hungarian political 
parties in the central government and the election of a pro-minority Romanian party to government 
in 1996. The shift in Romania’s perception of national minorities also corresponded with 
beginning accession to the EU. Upon starting accession talks in 1999, the state was deemed to 
have fulfilled the necessary requirements for national minority protections. The state adopted a 
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proactive stance towards the adoption of pro-minority policies, and continued to amend domestic 
policies in line with recommendations from the EU, the OSCE’s HCNM, and the Council of 
Europe. Accession notably improved education for national minorities and increased protections 
for minority language usage in local government.   
 Following EU membership, Romania has maintained its protections for its national 
minorities; there has not been a decline in minority group treatment. Hungarian national minorities 
have maintained representation in government, which has been a primary source of advocacy for 
the group’s rights. The Hungarian community has further improved its cultural development, and 
maintained deep ties with its kin-state; this has continued through the consumption of Hungarian 
state media and the rise of foreign investment from Hungary in minority regions. While Hungary’s 
stance towards its diaspora has contributed to tensions between the Hungary and Romania, there 
has not been increased repression of Hungarian national minorities.  Romania has been successful 
in maintaining policies that are beneficial to their Hungarian minorities, and this positive sentiment 
has carried throughout and after EU accession. 
 
6.1.3 Slovenia 
 The last state to consider is Slovenia, which has been considered one of the most protective 
states for minorities by the EU. As a part of Yugoslavia, Slovenia had policies that granted 
education and language rights for its national minorities. The state was relatively de-centralized, 
and as such each Yugoslav Republic had a considerably degree of control over the rights they 
could grant to minority groups. As Slovenia began to consider independence, they began to 
construct their subsequent 1991 Constitution as early as 1987 (Hayden, 1992: 7). The draft 
constitution proposed increased decentralization from Yugoslavia, and likewise implemented 
further national minority rights. The proposed draft also reinforced the state’s trend of positive 
policies towards national minorities. The protections in the 1991 Constitution after Slovenian 
independence allowed the state to increase its policies on national minorities. The Constitution 
guaranteed language, education, and political rights and representation to its Hungarian minorities. 
Slovenia’s policies repeatedly received praise from the EU, the CoE, and the OSCE’s HCNM 
which viewed the state’s national minority protections to be among the best in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Upon consideration for accession, the EU had little to no concerns regarding the state’s 
policies for national minorities. As a result, Slovenia’s communist and pre-accession national 
minority policies can be deemed positive; there were continued improvements in minority 
treatment. 
During accession negotiations, Slovenia did not receive additional recommendations to 
improve its Hungarian minority policies. Instead, the state received praise for its inclusion of the 
Hungarian minority population in education and government institutions. Slovenia was also 
favorably viewed for its adoption of international treaties that continued to guarantee national 
minority rights; the state’s commitment to ensuring minority protections was further secured in its 
constitution which confirmed the supremacy of international law over domestic law. Accession 
only saw an increase in pro-minority policies, and no decline was evident.  
 Slovenia’s positive stance toward its national minorities has continued even after attaining 
EU membership. Hungarian national minorities have representation in media, veto rights in 
government on legislation that impacts their community, and have found success in bilingual 
schooling. The state has also maintained good relations with Hungary, establishing ties that 
facilitate cultural exchange between the two states. The culmination of these policies allows us to 
conclude that Slovenia has had no regression in national minority policies. It has, since 
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communism, maintained a proactive stance on national minority treatment and has continued to 
meet the expectations set forth by the EU, the CoE, and the OSCE’s HCNM. 
 
6.2. Reconsideration of the Research Question  
In summary, all three states and their policies towards national minorities have been 
impacted by their communist regimes, democratization, and EU integration. Of the three, Romania 
and Slovenia have maintained favorable sentiment towards their national minorities throughout 
and after EU accession. Their membership to the EU has not resulted in a reversal of policies that 
are detrimental to their Hungarian national minority communities. In contrast, Slovakia’s national 
minority policies slightly improved under EU accession, but their protections were later reversed 
after its EU membership. Among the three states, Slovakia stands out for its declining protections 
for Hungarian minorities after gaining EU membership.  
The findings of my research allow me to answer the original research question: What has 
been the impact of European Union accession on national minority treatment in post-communist 
Central and Eastern European states? With consideration of the three proposed hypotheses, I 
conclude that national minority treatment – specifically Hungarian minority treatment – has been 
impacted by both European Union accession and legacies from communist-era policies. It is 
impossible to isolate one from the other; instead, both communist policies and EU accession have 
informed how states treat their national minorities and should be viewed as a progression of one 
another. National minority policies continued to evolve in each of these three states under different 
communist leaders, and continued to do so throughout democratization and EU accession. The 
evolution of policies demonstrates how national minority group treatment is shaped over time by 
numerous events, such as – the Treaty of Trianon, World War II, communism, democratization, 
and EU membership.  
The culmination of these events and policies on national minority polices affirms the 
hypothesis that both EU accession and communist era policies have shaped national minority 
group treatment. While this hypothesis can be affirmed, it alone does not explain the different 
outcomes of minority treatment in the three cases considered. All three states have been shaped by 
communist experiences and EU accession – this is evident through the changes each state made to 
national minority policies before and during their accession negotiations. However, two of the 
three cases maintained pro-national minority policies while one regressed in its national minority 
protections. Slovakia’s change in national minority policies stands out as an outlier among the 
three cases, and will be further evaluated to consider what alternative factors have contributed to 
its decline.  
 
6.3 Additional Contributing Variables  
  Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia have all been shaped by their communist regimes and 
their accession to the European Union. However, Slovakia’s drastically different outcome from 
Romania and Slovenia in its national minority treatment after EU membership must be further 
explained. There are several proposed variables that may have impacted the outcome of Slovakia’s 
national minority policies.  
 
6.3.1 Keenness to EU Integration 
 First, membership and accession to the European Union are shaped not only by the EU’s 
agreement to integrate the region, but by the individual state’s willingness to comply with EU 
recommendations. In the case of Slovenia and Romania, both states emerged from communism 
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with the intention to merge with the West. Slovenia had begun outreach to the West upon its 
independence from Yugoslavia, and quickly joined the Council of Europe as a stepping stone to 
Western integration. It had also previously established ties with Western Europe under 
communism through trade relations (European Commission, Gen. Rep. EU 1996). In addition to 
this, Romania’s government wanted to join Western Europe. The state received a considerable 
amount of PHARE funding from the EU after it began democratization, which was used to develop 
the state to meet pre-accession criteria (European Commission, S. 8/97: 12). When Romania was 
considered for accession in 1999, the EU had no reservations regarding its national minority 
policies. In contrast to both, Slovakia did not adopt a proactive stance towards EU accession until 
after the removal of Mečiar from government in 1998 (Nič, Slobodník, and Šimečka, 2014: 4). 
This was noticeable through Slovakia’s continued reluctance to cooperate with the EU, the CoE, 
and the OSCE under Mečiar’s government. Despite Slovakian government reluctance, the people 
of Slovakia wanted to integrate with the EU. Slovakia’s endorsement of the EU through 
referendum was the highest, with over 90% of the population voting to join the EU in 2003 (NSD 
Slovakia, 2003). Romania did not hold a referendum to join, instead its parliament voted on 
accession to the EU. 
 However, the comparative keenness of the government to join the EU may have resulted 
in the different outcomes among the three states. Both Romania and Slovenia wanted to join the 
EU and Western Europe, and as a result began adopting pro-minority stances as preparation for 
integration in the early stages of their democratization. In contrast, Slovakia’s policies on national 
minorities remained comparatively slow and reactive – changes were only made to policies after 
they were condemned. The difference in the desire to join the EU and to be approved by Western 
European institutions may have resulted in varied willingness to comply with recommendations 
made by the three organizations. Slovakia’s shaky compliance with the EU may have only 
occurred in order to gain membership. After gaining membership, Slovakia may no longer have 
had the incentive to comply with recommendations made towards its national minority policies. 
The overall reluctance to join the EU could lead to decreased seriousness in policy implementation, 
and the later decline in adherence to policy changes.  
 
6.3.2 Position of the State After Communism  
 A second variable that may have influenced Slovakia’s outcome may have been the 
position of the state as it emerged from communism. In the case of Slovenia, the state emerged 
from Yugoslavia relatively unscathed. Among the Yugoslav states, it was better off economically, 
politically, and did not experience a violent transition to democracy; it wanted further autonomy 
from Yugoslavia (Ramet, 2006: 555). In the case of Romania, the state was not a part of a former 
larger state and, with the obvious exception of Soviet occupation until 1958, it retained its 
independence throughout communism. The state did not experience a breakup from a broader 
federation or confederation as it transitioned to democracy. In comparison, Slovakia was a part of 
a confederation with the Czech Republic. Czechoslovakia attempted democratization in 1990, but 
relations between the two states fell apart and both decided to create independent sovereign states 
in 1992. However, of the two republics under Czechoslovakia, Slovakia was considerably 
underrepresented in the Czechoslovak government, military, and the country’s main industries 
(Connor, 1984: 292). Slovakia, of the two, emerged “weaker” than the Czech Republic.  
 The difference in its position as it emerged from communism may have contributed to 
Slovakia’s poor treatment of its national minorities. The state and its dominant Slovak population 
were already vulnerable when they broke with the Czech Republic. The concentration of minorities 
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in Slovakia may have stirred up additional anxiety regarding the stability of the state; the 
government securitized its national minority groups out of fear. For Romania and Slovenia, their 
emergence from communism may have been more comfortable since they were already established 
states with control over their government and prominent state industries. Perhaps Slovakia’s 
reluctance to grant national minority rights may have stemmed from its uncertainty in its own 
government and desire for Slovak hegemony after independence.  
 
6.3.3 Duration of EU Accession 
A third variable that may have shaped Slovakia’s treatment towards its national minorities 
is the duration of EU accession. Slovenia began accession in 1997, after it was deemed to have 
fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria. Both Slovakia and Romania were slated to begin accession talks 
at the same time as Slovenia, but neither state had met the Copenhagen criteria by 1997. Both 
countries began accession talks in 1999. Despite delayed accession for Slovakia and Romania, 
Slovakia had a considerably shorter accession timeline. The state was approved for membership 
in 2002, and officially admitted into the EU in 2004. In contrast, Romania began accession talks 
in 1999 but was not officially admitted until 2007. Of the three states, Slovakia spent the shortest 
time in accession negotiations, while Slovenia and Romania both took longer to become member 
states. Slovakia was also the only state which began the accession process despite the EU having 
reservations about its national minority policies (European Commission, 1999: 18).  
The short duration of accession negotiations may have resulted in Slovakia’s declining 
minority policies because there was not enough time for the government or its citizens to fully 
implement and adjust to changes in national minority protections. Both Slovenia’s and Romania’s 
more gradual and measured accessions, in combination with their proactive stances on minority 
policies, may have contributed to better adoption and implementation of EU recommendations. 
Slovakia’s timeline was very quick, with many changes being made politically, economically, and 
monetarily. As a result, it may have been more difficult for Slovakia to fully implement all aspects 
of EU recommendations during its short accession timeline. If Slovakia did not fully implement 
all national minority recommendations, or the citizens of Slovakia did not fully accept the new 
minority policies, it may have been easier for a regression in national minority treatment over time. 
The protections and policies were not fully implemented in the first place. This may explain why 
Slovakia’s national minority policies have declined, while Romania’s and Slovenia’s have not.  
 
6.3.4 Size of Hungarian National Group 
 Another factor that may have contributed to the varied outcomes of Hungarian minority 
treatment is the size of the Hungarian population in each state. Proportionally, Slovakia has the 
largest Hungarian minority population. It has consistently hovered around 10% of the population 
(Kusý, 2006: 49). In contrast, Slovenia’s Hungarian population is several thousand, or under 0.5% 
of its population (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2001). Romania’s Hungarian 
population remains around 1.5 million, or 5-7% of its population (Kocsis, 2007: 184). The 
difference in the population size in each of the states can contribute to the willingness of 
governments to grant protective minority rights. National minority rights typically afford a degree 
of autonomy and cultural agency to their groups. This may be threatening to states with a large 
minority population as they believe granting minority group autonomy may promote secessionist 
movements.  
 In the case of Slovakia, the large population of Hungarians concentrated along the southern 
border with Hungary may be viewed as a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
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state. Since the Hungarian minority population is close to its kin-state, the Slovakian government 
may view the minority group as possible secessionists. Slovenia and Romania, in contrast, may be 
more willing to grant and maintain protections for national minority rights since their Hungarian 
populations are comparatively small and unlikely secessionists. They are able to grant more 
generous national minority autonomy and protections because their Hungarian minority population 
is not large enough or concentrated enough to warrant worries about secession. In this case, 
Slovakia’s regression in its national minority policies could be explained as a way of mitigating 
the risk of their Hungarian national minority group seceding. Changes in national minority policies 
during accession would have been necessary to gain membership, but after admission to the EU, 
would no longer need to be respected. Instead, Slovakia’s decline in minority policies may be 
driven by worries about the integrity of its state.  
 
6.3.5. Pre-Communist Causes 
 There are several facets to the last variable of pre-communist causes. They include: 
Hungarian policies under Austria-Hungary before World War I, the Treaty of Trianon, and the 
changeover of territory within the region during and after World War II. First, before the Treaty 
of Trianon, the Austro-Hungarian state encompassed part of the territories of Slovakia, Romania, 
and Slovenia. These are regions along the border of Hungary that each currently have Hungarian 
minority populations. Under Hungary’s regime within the empire, the Hungarian kingdom enacted 
“Magyarization” policies that forced integration of the state’s national minorities – who at the time 
were Slovaks, Romanians, and Slovenians (Kiss, Székely, Toró, & al, 2018). Slovakian, 
Romanian, and Slovenian minorities were repressed while Hungarians maintained hegemony as 
the dominant group. National minorities under Hungary were marginalized under the state, and 
continually wanted independence from Austria-Hungary.  
The Treaty of Trianon after WWI broke up Austria-Hungary, and ceded territory to 
Slovenia (Yugoslavia), Romania, and Slovakia (Czechoslovakia). The distribution of territory 
created many Hungarian national minorities in territories no longer under Hungarian rule. The 
memories of Magyarization lingered, and Hungarian minorities lost their positions of dominance. 
The Treaty of Trianon remained a significant national loss to Hungary, which attempted to reclaim 
its ceded territories during WWII. Hungarian aggression further damaged relations between the 
states, as Hungary coerced the three states into returning parts of the territories ceded from the 
Treaty of Trianon. During WWII, Hungary then engaged in re-integration methods after 
reclaiming its lost territory. This maneuver again repressed Slovakians, Slovenians, and 
Romanians who found themselves once more under Hungarian domination. The end of WWII and 
the loss of the Axis Powers resulted in the return of these territories to their respective states. 
While all three states regained their territories after WWII, their reactions to Hungary’s 
actions during World War II vastly differed. Romania and Slovenia adopted more conciliatory 
policies towards their Hungarian minorities; Romania granted the minority group regional 
autonomy in 1952, and Tito’s reconstruction of Yugoslavia afforded greater national minority 
protections that would later continue into Slovenian independence. In contrast, Slovakia engaged 
in extremely repressive measures against the Hungarian and German minorities after WWII ended. 
Slovakia forcibly deported the German population, and attempted to do the same with its 
Hungarian population. When it was unable to remove its Hungarian population, it transferred many 
of them to different regions within the state, and sent uncooperative Hungarian minorities to labor 
camps.  
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The intense measures adopted by the Slovakian government after WWII and the trauma of 
the continuous territorial changeovers between Hungary and Slovakia may have resulted in long 
term consequences for interstate and minority group relations. Even after gaining EU membership, 
Slovakia’s relationship with Hungary remains tense. In response to Hungary’s dual citizenship 
law, Slovakia deliberately passed legislation that would make it impossible for its Hungarian 
minorities to attain Hungarian citizenship without giving up their Slovakian citizenship. Hungary 
also continues to view the Treaty of Trianon as a loss of its people and its territory; it has made 
repeated attempts to cultivate relationships with its national minorities abroad even in its current 
foreign policy.  
 As a result, Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia have all been impacted and shaped by the 
Treaty of Trianon and the subsequent transfers of territory between Hungary and their states before 
and after WWII. However, Slovakia’s particular history of violence may have been an outstanding 
legacy that still shapes their treatment of Hungarian minorities today. The legacy of brutal 
repression and retaliation towards Hungarians after WWII may continue to define Hungarian 
minority and Slovak relations today. The history of the Treaty of Trianon in Slovakia may be a 
part of ongoing tensions that have caused the decline in national minority policies after gaining 
EU membership. Slovakia may have viewed changes to national minority policies as a temporary 
necessity to gaining EU membership, but upon membership, would no longer need to be enforced. 
Consideration of Hungarian and Slovakian policies demonstrate that both states still view the 
legacies of the Treaty of Trianon as significant.  
The previously discussed five variables may all partly explain the different outcome for 
Hungarian minority protections in Slovakia. The keenness of the state to join the European Union, 
the position of the state as it emerged from communism, the duration of accession, the size of the 
Hungarian minority group, and pre-communist events may have contributed to the impact EU 
accession and communism have had on Hungarian national minorities. While some of these 
variables may have had a greater impact than others, there is a possibility that the combination of 
these factors shape current Slovakian policies for its Hungarian national minority. As a result, the 
decline of Hungarian national minority group policies in Slovakia are influenced by both 
communist legacies and EU accession, but may further be the result of a combination of any of 
these additional variables.  
 
6.4 Limitations of Research 
 The outcomes of the research presented in this thesis leave much to be further explored. 
The possibility of many contributing factors that may have influenced Hungarian minority 
treatment in Slovakia proves that there is no blanket improvement in minority treatment that occurs 
with EU accession. Rather, EU accession can shape national minority policies, but it is ultimately 
up to the individual state to enforce protections for their national minority groups. At the very 
least, EU accession can lead to nominal compliance that varies greatly by each state; de jure 
policies protecting national minorities may not lead to de facto improvements in minority 
treatment.  
 Furthermore, the research conducted has only evaluated the situation of Hungarian national 
minorities in three post-communist states. For every policy that was praised regarding Hungarian 
group treatment, there were criticisms made by the EU, the CoE, and the OSCE’s HCNM on the 
treatment of other national minorities within the three states. Notably, the EU, the CoE, and the 
OSCE each concluded that the treatment of Roma minorities was incredibly poor in each of the 
three states. This has unfortunately still persisted. Condemnation of Roma policies did not lead to 
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much change in protections granted to the Roma community. The lack of compliance for Roma 
policies stands in contrast to the changes made towards Hungarian national minorities. As a result, 
EU accession is one aspect that can improve the treatment of some national minorities, but it is not 
the central factor in shaping national minority policies.  
 
6.5 Areas for Further Research 
 There are several variables that can be considered for further research to evaluate the 
difference in outcomes among Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania. First, further consideration 
regarding the speed of accession is necessary. Additional research could consider how EU 
accession recommendations become internalized by states, and consider how public sentiment 
towards the EU and national minorities evolve over the course of accession. Consideration of 
accession length would provide greater understanding for how states may implement their policies 
and have them be accepted by their citizens. In the case of Slovakia, it would be interesting to see 
whether public sentiment towards national minorities and Hungarian minorities changed before, 
during, and after accession. If there was no change, it may bolster the idea that EU accession was 
rushed and policies were not fully accepted by the state and its people. The acceptance of policies 
in Slovakia could be compared with data on public sentiment in Slovenia and Romania that looks 
at public opinion on national and Hungarian minorities. If both of these states have increasingly 
positive public perceptions of Hungarian minorities throughout accession, it could be attributed to 
increased acceptance of EU policy recommendations.  
 A second variable that can be explored for future research is the size of the national 
minority group and its impact on the maintenance of national minority protections. If the size of a 
minority group has an impact on the willingness of a state to comply with EU accession 
recommendations, we would expect states with smaller national minority populations to have 
better compliance with national minority policies after EU membership. In contrast, states with 
larger populations of national minorities may experience a regression in national minority group 
treatment after membership. Research could be conducted with a variety of cases in Central and 
Eastern Europe which have joined the European Union. Cases with both large and small national 
minority groups could be evaluated to find a trend between national minority group size and 
compliance with EU accession recommendations after attaining EU membership. If states with 
larger national minority groups tend to have a decline in their protections of national minorities, it 
may be indicative of underlying worries states have regarding the possibility of secessionist 
movements by their national minority groups. 
 The consideration of areas for further research falls within a broader discussion of EU 
conditionality. Briefly touched upon in the literature review, scholars Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 
and Kelley have provided research on how EU conditionality impacts the compliance of EU 
candidate states. For Kelley, EU accession is influenced by three factors: the normative pressures 
of the European institutions, the conditionality of the institutions – or the incentives to join and 
obey recommendations – and domestic political factors (Kelley, 2004: 3). While normative 
pressure and domestic policies can influence how compliant a state is with accession 
recommendations, Kelley argues that EU conditionality remains the most powerful influence on 
state conformity to recommendations. Kelley claims that the prospect of EU membership can 
influence policy in states with “sizable ethnic minority groups” (Kelley, 2004: 174). Despite 
ongoing pessimism about the influence of conditionality, the perceived benefits from EU 
membership remain impactful on a broader scale for all candidate states. 
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 In contrast to Kelley, Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon view EU conditionality as a highly 
subjective and individualized influencer on state compliance. EU conditionality does not have a 
broad “blanket” impact in all states – rather, it is highly dependent on the individual state and the 
combination of domestic political and social forces that impacts the willingness of a state to abide 
by EU recommendations (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2004: 174). The prospect of joining the EU 
might not be powerful enough to force changes in domestic policy. Instead of viewing compliance 
as a result of EU membership conditionality, compliance with EU recommendations is a result of 
domestic factors.  
 The scholarship surrounding EU conditionality is highly contested, with scholars debating 
the actual effectiveness of prospective EU membership as a way to establish lasting domestic 
political change. Arguably, as in the cases evaluated in this thesis, EU conditionality may not be 
the greatest factor in shaping domestic policies on national minorities. EU conditionality has 
resulted in changes in state policies in all three cases – notably in Slovakia who saw a brief 
improvement in minority protections during accession. However, it is difficult to claim that EU 
conditionality was the main driving factor behind changes to national minority policies. Instead, 
the differing results among the three cases after EU membership may bolster the argument made 
by Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon: EU conditionality is highly subjective in its effectiveness to 
guarantee state compliance and there are numerous additional factors that influence the outcomes 
of state policies during and after accession. In light of the numerous contributing variables to this 
research and the discussion of EU conditionality prompted by Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, and 
Kelley, further research on national minority compliance within Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia 
is needed.  
 
6.6. Concluding Remarks  
This thesis has evaluated the impact of European Union accession on national minorities 
in post-communist Central and Eastern European states. Through a qualitative case analysis of 
Hungarian national minorities in Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia, this research has considered 
how national minority group treatment and polices have changed under predominantly Marxist-
Leninist communism, democratization and EU accession, and under current policies after EU 
membership.  
 Analysis of Hungarian minority treatment during and after EU accession has demonstrated 
that both communist legacies and EU accession recommendations have contributed to current 
national group treatment. However, the decline in minority protections in Slovakia and the 
different results of compliance among the three states may be the result of additional variables, 
most notably the duration of accession negotiations and the size of the minority group in the state. 
While this research has focused solely on Hungarian minorities in three states, it holds broader 
implications for national minorities in the European Union. National minority status remains 
salient in Central and Eastern Europe with continuous changes among national groups relations 
and minority group policies. The expansion of the European Union into the region demonstrates 
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Map 2.1.a: The 1910 Census of Austria-Hungary 
 
Graph of the population demographics from the 1910 Census of Austria-Hungary, categorized 




Winkler, W. (1921). The Population of the Austrian Republic. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 98, pg. 1-6.  
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Map 2.2.a: The “Carte Rouge”  
 
The “Carte Rouge” from the Paris Peace Conference in 1919-1920 depicting the territory of 
Austria-Hungary. Red shading indicates the distribution of the Hungarian population according 
to the 1910 census of Austria-Hungary. Light green indicates Slovaks, and purple shading 



























Paris Peace Conference. (1918). Hungary 1918. Hungary 1918. Paris: American Geographical  
Society Library Digital Map Collection. 
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Map 2.2.b: The Proposed Borders of Hungary in 1920 
 
American map depicting the roughly proposed borders of Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference 
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Map 2.2.c: Newly Constructed Borders of Europe after 1920 
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Society Library Digital Map Collection. 
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Map 5.1.a: 2011 Census Demographics of the Slovak Republic 
 
Demographics of the Slovak Republic and its Hungarian minority according to the 2011 Census. 
The shading represents the concentration of the minority population within the region; most 
Hungarians are found in the Southern regions of Slovakia.  
 
Map from: The 2011 Population and Housing Census Selected Results (2012). The Statistical 
Office of the Slovak Republic.  
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Map 5.2.a: 2011 Romanian Census and Demographics 
 
Demographics of Romania and its Hungarian minority according to the 2011 Census. The 
eastern Székely Land indicates the region where the historical MAT (Magyar Autonóm 
Tartomány) was located. Hungarian minorities are highly concentrated in Partium (along the 




Map from: Kiss, T., Székely, I., Toró, T., & al, e. (2018). Unequal Accommodation of Minority 
Rights: Hungarians in Transylvania. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. pg. 25.  
 
 
